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USSR-U.S. Consultative Group Meets in Geneva

PM0504090990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Session Opened"]

[Text] Geneva, 4 Apr—A routine session of the Soviet-U.S. Permanent Consultative Commission opened here today.

It was established in accordance with the memorandum of understanding between the governments of the USSR and the United States of 21 December 1972 to promote the realization of the aims and provisions of the Soviet-U.S. agreements on strategic arms limitation and on measures to reduce the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war.

U.S. Defers Decision on Further Limiting N-Tests

PM1104100190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "No Plans for Restrictions"]

[Text] Washington, 9 Apr—The U.S. Department of Energy is proposing that the resolution of the question of whether the United States can introduce additional restrictions on nuclear tests "without damaging its national security interests" be postponed for another 10 years. That was the basic conclusion of the department's report prepared at the request of Congress.

The U.S. Department of Energy is responsible for the development [razrabotka] of U.S. nuclear weapons and for testing them at an underground nuclear site in Nevada. A Soviet-U.S. treaty signed in 1974 but still not ratified limits the yield of underground nuclear explosions to 150 kilotonnes. It is expected that after agreement is reached this year on ways of monitoring observance of the treaty it will finally be ratified and the USSR and the United States will start talks on further limits on nuclear tests.

In this connection Congress asked the Department of Energy to draw up proposals on possible new proposals in the sphere of underground nuclear tests. In a written reply to Senator S. Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Energy Secretary J. Watkins stated, however, that after studying this matter his department has not "discovered any additional restrictions on nuclear tests which would be in line with U.S. interests" outside the terms of the 1974 treaty.

Security Worries on E. Europe Pullout Aired

PM0904104190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Apr 90 Second Edition p 7

[Yevgeniy Shashkov "View From Moscow" article: "Guarantee of Threat or Security? East Europe During the Transitional Period"]

[Text] The reformist "seventh wave" which has engulfed the countries of East Europe has not only changed the political look of the whole continent. It has smashed the military-strategic setup in Europe. At Chop on the border it is difficult today to find "slots" for the troop trains heading home. By summer it seems that the flood of trains will increase still further. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from a number of Warsaw Pact countries has caused many people real mental confusion and given rise to a sense of disquiet, particularly among those who experienced World War II.

In purely human terms one can understand these people. I do not think that this departure will convinced them that the renunciation of forcible tutelage over East Europe is a victory for common sense, a victory for democracy, and will in the long term benefit our state interests. It is still a fact that a considerable proportion of the population regarded—and still does regard—the presence of Soviet troops in this region as a guarantee of the country's security. Many people see the measures being taken to dismantle this system as detrimental to defense.

So did the Soviet Union benefit from the system of "cordons sanitaires" and "buffer zones" and could it have been retained in its original form? In my view, no. Economists still have to calculate what the burden of military-political control over vast territories in Eastern and Central Europe cost our people. And what the end result of the absurd attempt to secure absolute parity with all opposing forces around the Warsaw Pact was, especially when you consider that the Soviet share of Warsaw Pact expenditure has always topped 90 percent. (The U.S. contribution to NATO is approximately 50 percent.)

The thesis that Soviet troops in Warsaw Pact countries guaranteed the USSR's security was also mooted. The way in which the Western press skillfully intimidated its readers with the myth about "Soviet tanks which can reach the English Channel in 48 hours" is probably still fresh in many people's minds. I would not have resurrected this banal tale from the "enemy image" series were it not for one thing. Soviet publications have exposed the "tanks" affair so often that one of my work colleagues, a former frontline soldier, even joked: "After all, they probably really will reach the Atlantic if the order is given to destroy the enemy." The veteran was mistaken, and people in the West were confident that the tanks could not reach that far.

In 1988 the U.S. WALL STREET JOURNAL reported that top Pentagon military officials had once conducted a complex computerized "war game." Combat operations in Europe were programmed. The computer's conclusion was surprising: Soviet troops were neutralized just 30 km into West Germany.... The Pentagon preferred to keep the details of its "victory" secret.

Of course, battles on computer screens and real combat operations are, as they say, two very different things. But

misgivings were voiced on several occasions regarding Soviet troops' vulnerability in East Europe in view of their stationing in far-flung positions and their considerable isolation from reserves. But we did not pay very much heed to them. Today, when we have given up trying to find bland formulas and are switching to realistic assessments, some Soviet experts say outright: Groupings within the Warsaw Pact represent a cumbersome, vulnerable, and extremely costly military machine which is best suited—with the amendments to date—to repeating World War II battles.

Without doubt, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Warsaw Pact states must be backed up by guarantees of the USSR's security. In particular, by the retention of a broad belt designed for "separation of forces" along the Soviet western borders. The Soviet Armed Forces must be transformed on a qualitatively new military-technical basis as our military system within the Warsaw Pact is dismantled. This entire complex of measures will fully accord with the choice our country has made—to switch to more economical, more reasonable, strictly defensive sufficiency guaranteeing the defense of the homeland.

I foresee the question: Where is the guarantee that the USSR's security will not suffer during the transitional period? Of course, there are definite grounds for concern. After all a serious military danger may arise not only owing to deliberate aggressive actions on someone's part. The countries of East Europe have entered a period of inevitable and necessary change—change that brings with it elements of instability. Conflicts may flare up on religious grounds in some countries, on ethnic grounds in others, and other sorts of upheaval cannot be ruled out in other countries. I would like to believe that nothing of the kind will occur there. But I would not venture to claim that there is no possibility of a military clash if a particular conflict is internationalized.

Nonetheless, even during the transitional period our country has guarantees of security. I see them in the potential of trust between East and West that has been established of late. In the fact that common sense, the renunciation of confrontational sentiments, and common interest in a gradual, democratic, and peaceful transition to a new quality of international relations in Europe have prevailed on both sides.

Whether we like it or not, the nuclear factor will be a part of mankind's life until military-strongarm instruments for keeping the peace are completely replaced by reliable guarantees of security in the political, economic, humanitarian, and environmental spheres. What about the Soviet Union's avowed task of ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons on earth? There are no doubts about this ideal, this goal.

The coming agreement on a 50-percent cut in strategic offensive arms may be a step toward it. In principle these arsenals could have been cut, in my opinion, even more drastically. Our "nuclear interdependence" with the United States would in no way be changed by this. In my view, the problem lies elsewhere. There is still no integral, scientifically based work on priorities in the reduction of arms and armed forces on the basis of economic and military-political expediency. If we proceed on the basis of the aims of perestroyka—and we will not be able to continue perestroyka without cuts in military spending and the conversion of military production—the task of cutting conventional arms must be a top priority. It is conventional arms that swallow the lion's share of military resources.

I think that what we need now is the speediest elaboration of optimum solutions on questions of strategic stability for the long term. Not only their elaboration but also implementation. Only then can we ensure a breakthrough to a qualitatively new world where states' security will be based not on the guaranteed threat of the use of military force but on the guaranteed absence of such a threat.

11th Conference of World Media Association Held

Perestroyka, Glasnost High on Agenda

LD1004194190 Moscow TASS in English 1839 GMT 10 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 10 TASS—The development of cooperation in the information field and disarmament were high on the agenda of the 11th conference of the world mass media association, which opened here today.

Discussion will also focus on questions relating to the influence of perestroyka and glasnost on the developments in the Soviet Union and the rest of the world.

Glasnost plays a great role in the implementation of reform in the Soviet Union and is at the same a visible expression of and condition for the further development of perestroyka, deputy head of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee's International Department Andrey Grachev told the forum.

He stressed that perestroyka is a logical step in the development of Soviet society.

Comparing the notions of glasnost and freedom of speech, Grachev noted that they were closely related in many ways. He admitted that Soviet society needed "to catch up with many Western countries and incorporate true freedom of speech in legislation, liberating it from state and psychological censorship and using it in the interests of democracy."

At the same time Grachev said that for Soviet people glasnost implies more than just freedom of speech. It is also a democratic forum for discussing urgent and contradictory social issues and one of the vital political guarantees of the irreversibility of perestroyka.

Former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Arthur Hartman spoke at length about the Soviet Union's integration into the world economy and problems of disarmament. He expressed confidence in the successful conclusion of Soviet-American talks on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons and the talks between 23 NATO and WTO [Warsaw Treaty Organization] member-countries on the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe. He stressed however that the forthcoming reductions were not sufficient to achieve durable stability. The stocks must be reduced to a minimum, so that none of the sides feels endangered.

Japanese NHK Television Company director Hisanori Isomura focused on the development of economic interaction between European and Asian countries. He supported the idea of building a common European home and noted that this home should remain open for cooperation with countries in other regions, including Asia.

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky addressed the plenary meeting of the conference in the evening. He spoke about the development of global cooperation in the modern world.

Gorbachev Receives Participants

LD1104183590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 11 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev received a group of participants in the world media conference in the Kremlin today. [Participants included] members of the World Peace Council, the Latin America Unity Association, and representatives of the executive committee of the world federation of newspapers and publishers, who have been meeting in Moscow. Among those present were former presidents of several Latin America states, Asia and Africa, political scientists, journalists and publishers from various foreign countries. A frank conversation on perestroyka and glasnost in the Soviet Union was held. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said, among other things:

[Begin Gorbachev recording] It was said here that perestroyka no longer belongs to us alone. I agree with that, and more than that, I actually see in this a weighty argument in favor of the view that the whole world, and not we alone, needs perestroyka. Precisely for this reason, this idea has received such a response, this idea of renewal, of comprehending where we all find ourselves, and what kind of breakthrough we need to make in moving towards a better world.

We now find ourselves at the most difficult, and critical stage of implementing the policy of perestroyka, the concept of perestroyka. We have begun resolutely to change economic relations, including property relations, the forms of economic life. We are carrying out a radical political reform affecting all levels of power and administration, the whole political process. We have entered into profound revolutionary reforms of the federation, affecting the life of all peoples, all republics, autonomous formations. We have entered into a process of profound re- interpretation of our history.

I could continue further—the party is being reformed, the Army is being reformed, new political movements are emerging, new public institutions are emerging. The whole of society has started moving. And we have, as it were, left the administrative-command system, the old system in which society had lived, but we have not yet entered the new system. The process of its formation, creation, is under way.

And so our ship, having left one system without having entered the other, is now in the most complex state. We have to get through this transitional period as quickly as possible and enter, and master, switch on the new mechanism, master the new forms of life. This is the most crucial stage.

None of this is simple for those who are leading this process, but it is still more complex for those 300 million who live in this country. For this reason all of these revolutionary reforms are being accompanied by great confusion in people's minds, by discussions, a clash of

positions. This is what is characteristic of our society today, today this is probably the most politicized society in the world.

I am confident that there is no way back, all problems can be resolved only by moving forward. Of course, we are only at the beginning of the process of forming a new world order, the beginning of a new, perhaps also prolonged, peaceful period in the development of civilization. All of this is still...all these systems and structures are still very frail, fragile, vulnerable, and as a result of this a very enormous mutual responsibility lies on all of us, in all ways, to foster this healthy process which has unfurled in international relations, world relations [applause]. [end recording]

Conference Seen as 'Important'

LD1104184290 Moscow TASS in English 1816 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 11 TASS - By TASS correspondent Vladimir Shishlin:

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev received participants in the 11th conference of the World Media Association in the Kremlin today.

Prominent political, public and religious figures and journalists from more than 40 countries are attending the conference which is being held in the Soviet capital for the first time.

Touching upon problems during the present stage in the renewal of Soviet society, Gorbachev emphasised that the country is now living through a critical and difficult period. "I feel that society is leaving the 'rallying' state and is becoming involved in real deeds," he said. "Availing ourselves of these sentiments, we want to radicalise the process of reforms."

The president thanked participants in the forum for their words of solidarity with perestroyka-oriented work and for their high assessment of the Soviet people's actions.

"I am confident that there is no way back and that all problems will be resolved only as we move forward and through the mastering of new forms."

"We are only at the beginning of the process of shaping a new world order," Gorbachev said. "The structural elements of this new world are very fragile and vulnerable, putting immense mutual responsibility upon all of us. It is essential to promote this robust process, which has developed in international relations."

"I am personally convinced that everything will ultimately work out because new thinking has stimulated tremendous energies in the world, the molding of a new epoch is the job not only of politicians but also of broad social forces and peoples."

Having pointed out that it was precisely within this context that he viewed the conference of the World Media Association, Gorbachev called it "a very important element of cooperation" and welcomed the mission of the forum's participants.

Ecology Discussed

LD1104211990 Moscow TASS in English 1955 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 11 TASS—The morning session of the 11th congress of the world media association on Wednesday examined causes that aggravated the ecological situation in the world and discussed prospects for international cooperation in environmental protection.

The Moscow conference is in its second day.

Current ecological problems are connected with the long-held anthropological view of nature, according to which man is the crown and centre of the universe. Nikolay Vorontsov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Conservation of Nature, said in his speech.

The living biosphere is shrinking at a disastrous pace, he said. "This means that we need to replace anthropocentric mentality with a biospheric one, according to which mankind is only part of the biosphere."

Vorontsov believes the conservation of nature is impossible without international cooperation. All countries should help conserve natural resources that are of worldwide importance—tropical forests.

Prominent Soviet ecologist, Aleksey Yablokov, deputy chairman of the Soviet Parliament's Committee for Ecology and Rational Utilisation of Natural Resources, cited a large number of specific examples of man's thoughtless attitude towards nature.

He suggested a programme for urgent ecological measures to coordinate ecological protection legislation of various countries, to ensure the international application of ecologically clean technologies and to require each country to preserve unique biological life forms.

Professor Kenneth Mellenby from Britain pointed out that, despite the overall deterioration of the ecological situation, the term "ecological crisis" is now inappropriate.

He believes one should not "panic." It is important to work out unified ecological standards, to map out two or three priority ecological problems and to focus on resolving them.

The British scientist is also critical of nostalgia for times when man was left to his own devices in communion with nature and his life was "short and primitive."

Mellenby said no one can maintain that modern civilisation has only harmed man. For example, life expectancy has increased in many developed countries.

It is also wrong to speak of the need to curb the industrial growth of the developing countries, since the level of

their well-being depends on industrial development. Rather than limit this growth, they must be assisted in mastering ecologically clean industrial technologies, Mellenby said.

Economic Reforms Considered

LD1104212190 Moscow TASS in English 2013 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 12 TASS—Not a single state can build its domestic policy in isolation from world trends and objective laws governing development, said Vadim Zagladin, a prominent Soviet politial scientist.

Addressing the 11th conference of the World Media Association here on Wednesday, he said that an arbitrary exclusion of any country from the world-wide process is ultimately detrimental to everyone in the present-day world.

Mankind should learn jointly to plan out its future, to govern the most essential processes that affect every state, Zagladin emphaised.

His speech concluded Wednesday's plenary session at the forum. Then participants began to discuss factors that influence the development of the world's foreign economic contacts in the light of perestroyka in the Soviet Union.

East-West relations depend primarily on how the economic system will develop inside the country, said Pavel Bunich, deputy chairman of the Soviet Parliament's Committee on Economic Reform.

He emphasised that a real economic reform in the Soviet Union is yet to be effected.

He believes that one thing can be said now: The government has firmly made up its mind to take radical steps. "Previously we saw a great restraint with regard to market, whereas now the government favours it," he said.

An item about foreign investments in the Soviet Union is being prepared for discussion in the USSR Supreme Soviet, Bunich said.

Having pointed out the importance of a law to this effect, he emphasised that the law would envisage economic and political guarantees for Western investors in the Soviet economy.

Forum on Media, International Perestroyka Opens

PM1004131190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

["Own Information" report: "Mass Information and International Relations"]

[Text] An international conference on "the role of the mass media in perestroyka in international relations" opened in Moscow's international trade center on Monday. When the newspaper was being signed to press the forum's guests and participants were still continuing to arrive in Moscow. We were told at the conference press center that a number of former heads of state and prime ministers are expected to attend, as are over 300 eminent public figures and journalists from 40 countries.

The conference is devoted to the mass media's growing role in deepening cooperation between East and West, the prospects of world economic integration, and international cooperation in the field of environmental conservation. In addition those taking part in the conference will comprehensively examine the positive aspects of perestroyka and the influence exerted on world development by the profound changes in the Soviet Union and East Europe. During the conference there will be three plenary sessions on the subjects "for the development of relations and cooperation between East and West," "international cooperation in the field of environmental protection," and "toward world economic integration."

International Newspaper Publishers Hold Conference

Frolov Addresses Chiefs

PM1104111990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Apr 90 Second Edition p 4

[P. Bogomolov and A. Stepanov report: "Captains of the Press at 'Roundtable'; Moscow Conference of International Federation of Newspaper Publishers Has Begun Its Work"]

[Excerpts] The lofty mission of the mass media in the modern world, freedom of the press, and its humanist potential, the rapidly growing role of the press in improving the global political climate are, perhaps, the most important topics at the conference of the International Federation of Newspaper Publishers [IFNP] which opened 8 April in Moscow. This is the world's biggest organization concerned with publishing, uniting more than 14,000 newspapers which are published in five continents.

For the first time in the 50-year history of this prestigious international association, the federation's executive committee is holding its representative forum in a country which is not a member of the IFNP. And this, by the way, is not only a result of successful contacts between Soviet and foreign organizers of the conference which include, besides the leaders of the IFNP, the All-Union Copyright Agency and the editorial staff of PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA. It seems that the most important prerequisite for holding the conference in Moscow was ultimately something greater—the influence of the policy of glasnost on the spiritual atmosphere in the country and outside it, the growing trust of the foreign public and the press in the objective and responsible coverage in our publications of the complex renewal processes taking place in the USSR.

I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of PRAVDA, when opening the conference, gave a high assessment of the tasks of the publishers' meeting in Moscow. The foreign guests received with sincere appreciation the cordial greetings and best wishes for successful work and fruitful cooperation with Soviet publications conveyed to them on the instructions of Soviet President M.S. Gorbachev. The mutual desire for this cooperation even predetermined the progress of the meeting, and the tone of the lively, unconstrained, and frank dialogue struck up at it. It began—and this is quite natural—with the sides' introduction to each other's work and plans.

Giovanni Giovannini, president of the IFNP, took the floor on behalf of the guests: [passage omitted]

The sources and prospects of glasnost in the USSR, and the changes in the newspaper and journal market which are inevitable in the conditions of the switch to a multiparty system, the degree of economic independence of publications as one of the most important conditions of the real guaranteeing of freedom of the press—I.T. Frolov had occasion to answer these and many other questions. The novelty of the tasks facing the party press at the present critical stage, he said, does not at all mean, as people in the West sometimes think, rejecting the ideological legacy of those who were at PRAVDA's inception. It would be easiest to "change the nameplates," but quite a different question is at issue: Turning PRAVDA into a truly authoritative platform combining healthy CPSU forces and all society—the publication of a renewed newspaper of a renewed party.

"As for the need to strengthen the material-technical base and our newspaper's greater economic independence about which the IFNP leaders are—not fortuitously—asking, then it [not specified] really must be heightened," PRAVDA's chief editor continued. "And the guarantee for this is broader rights given to the editorial office in accordance with the CPSU Central Committee resolution adopted just the other day."

Taking advantage of the short break between sessions, we asked G. Giovannini to share his first impressions of the conference's work.

"I have the most favorable impressions," he said. "The conversation began freely, in an unconstrained fashion and moreover was extremely meaningful. And it is logical that it centers on a wide-ranging exchange of opinions. Today one can only talk tentatively and moreover hypothetically about any results or prospects, for instance, of your country's joining the IFNP. After all, there is no national association of newspaper publishers in the USSR which could become a member of ours. For the same reason not a single East European state is a member of the IFNP. But if you want to be the first—why not?"

In the afternoon the guests visited the PRAVDA editorial office. The dialogue with members of its editorial board was thorough and keen. The captains of the foreign press talked about themselves, about the publications and organizations represented by them. Just as at the first meeting, the guests asked many pointed questions. Answering them, the PRAVDA staff did not conceal the difficulties of one of the oldest newspapers in our country—the shortage of paper and the antiquated printing facilities.... They also talked about how PRAVDA will work after the adoption of the law on the press. By all accounts, the guests appreciated the frankness of the conversation.

The conference participants will be visiting other Soviet publications and the USSR Union of Journalists. Obviously they will also have to take on the role of interviewees—not the most usual role for representatives of the mass media who tend to ask the questions themselves. We shall talk about this further.

Executive Committee Meets

PM1204084590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Apr 90 First Edition p 6

[Report by P. Bogomolov and Al. Stepanov: "Out of Argument is Born the Truth. The International Federation of Newspaper Publishers Conference Continues in Moscow"]

[Text] The second day of the meeting began with a closed session of the federation executive committee. The USSR is not a member—for the moment, anyway—of the International Federation of Newspaper Publishers, and the conference participants really do need to discuss their internal affairs and elaborate a strategy for future collaboration among the captains of the newspaper and magazine industry in 35 countries.

But eventually the conference hall doors were flung open. And we could tell from the comments made by the guests as they filed out that the debate had again focused on the foreign publishers' impressions of Moscow. There was also a discussion of the results of yesterday's debate on the old, but evergreen question of freedom of the press in East and West and of the press' widening influence on people's minds and hearts.

"In identifying points of contact, we argue a great deal, of course, and polemicize," Dr. Pedro Crespo de Lara , authoritative representative of the Spanish newspaper and magazine world, said. "But in the end we always come down to universal values, one of which was reflected at yesterday's meeting at PRAVDA, where freedom was talked of not as an absolute state, but as a process, a desire for self-improvement. I fully agree with this interpretation. But the question is, however: Shouldn't the independence and objectivity of the press be reinforced by guarantees of its greater financial and economic independence, including here, in East Europe? At the same time, one could quite easily embark on the initial stage of practical IFNP cooperation, for example, with Soviet partners, right now, without waiting for the final outcome of the wide-ranging changes currently taking place in your media."

In the afternoon the meetings' foreign participants paid a visit to the IZVESTIYA staff, calling at the editorial office and at the plant.

Hungary Admitted as Member

PM1104140790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[Report by P. Bogomolov and Al. Stepanov: "First Steps Taken"]

[Text] The International Federation of Newspaper Publishers conference has ended in Moscow.

To the newspapermen's delight, the last of the three days of the conference produced a sensation, albeit a small one. The IFNP Executive Committee decided to admit its first East European state—Hungary—as a member. Federation President Giovanni Giovannini, who had visited the country, was behind this. Now the annual general assembly—it is to be held in Copenhagen in May—has to approve the executive committee's decision.

We asked Mr. Giovannini to say a few words about the conference results.

"Our aim was simple—to begin a discussion, to strike up an acquaintance with Soviet colleagues. The first personal contacts have been established, and that is gratifying. The task facing our press—transferring publications and publishing houses to market conditions—is truly enormous. The first steps are being taken. We have taken satisfaction in listening to all that our Soviet colleagues have said about the press law currently being drafted and the establishment of the principles of glasnost."

IFNP secretary general Yan Nouen agreed with Mr. Giovannini's opinion.

"One of our federation's aims is to help newspapermen achieve economic independence. Of course, we did not come to teach our Soviet colleagues what to do. But perhaps some of our ideas will be acceptable in your conditions, too. I must say that I will be leaving Moscow in an optimistic frame of mind."

Bonn CSCE Conference Concludes 11 April

LD1204030490 Moscow TASS in English 2118 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] Bonn April 12 TASS—A 35-nation conference on economic cooperation in Europe, attended by representatives of governments and business circles, ended here on Wednesday.

The conference, which lasted more than three weeks, discussed ways to put the Helsinki process onto a firm economic foundation and to turn international economic relations into a factor of unity and cooperation, rather than the apple of discord.

Speakers pointed to the importance of the conference for overcoming the economic split in Europe, for building the foundation for a common European home and working out guidelines for the establishment of mutualy beneficial and equitable economic cooperation on the continent.

The participating nations approved the Final Document, in which they proclaimed their intention to create a new order of peace, stability and prosperity in Europe, based on the principles of the Helsinki Final Act.

The 35 nations expressed their determination to extend interaction in the spheres of economy, science, technology and the environment. Taking into account the far-reaching and rapid changes in Europe, they proposed studying the possibility of deepening their cooperation in these spheres.

These efforts can involve the already existing international economic institutions, such as the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

The latter was proposed to consider the holding of a conference of experts from countries participating in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe and in the OECD under its aegis in order to stimulate economic reforms and the integration of countries carrying out reforms into the international economic system.

The Final Document emphasies the interrelationship between political pluralism and the market economy, the role of a rule-of-law state and the full recognition and protection of all forms of property, including private property, and the need for conducting a policy that would help establish social justice and improve living and working conditions.

Agreement on Bank for Aid to E. Europe Reached

PM1204082590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Kovalenko dispatch: "Bank for East Europe Being Created"]

[Text] Paris—Delegations from 42 states—including the Soviet Union—have reached an agreement in Paris to create the EBRD [European Bank of Reconstruction and Development] for East Europe and have initialed its charter, which comprises 58 articles.

The bank's creation, the meeting's chairman—Jacques Attali, special adviser to the French president—declared at the end of the meeting, is "a very important political decision," for the new financial institution will for the first time unite the countries of East and West Europe, Asia, and North and South America. Its chief task, J. Attali pointed out, is to help East European states in the development of democracy and to assist their switch to a market economy.

The new bank's capital has been fixed at 10 billion ECU's ($12 billion). The EC will provide 51 percent of the capital, the United States 10 percent, Japan, France, the FRG, Britain, and Italy 7.5-8.5 percent each, the Soviet Union six percent, and all the East European states approximately 13.5 percent [figures as published]. Investments may be made in ECU's, dollars, and yen, but the ECU will be the accounting unit.

Credits for the private sector will make up 60 percent of the loans being granted, and those for the state sector 40 percent. It is a question of allocating funds for the creation and development of very important infrastructures—roads, transport, telecommunications (for a long time Washington and London insisted on financing exclusively the private sector through the EBRD but then made concessions).

The Soviet Union's involvement in the new bank's activity was the most acute question during the three rounds of the talks held in the French capital this year. The United States advocated that only states which have already embarked on the path of a market economy be members of the EBRD. In addition, Washington maintained that the Soviet Union will swallow up the greater part of its resources.

As a result of the compromise that was reached, the newspaper LES ECHOS, the organ of French business circles, points out that during a three-year transitional period the Soviet Union will be able to use credits in accordance with its contribution and will have access only to a limited number of bank services. At the end of this period our country will participate fully in the EBRD's activity. Observers emphasize that, on the whole, this step attests that Western capitals are gambling on the success of perestroyka and the economic reforms being implemented in the USSR.

J. Attali emphasized that the criteria for granting credits will be "exclusively economic," with due regard for the fact that the EBRD's member countries must observe Article 1 of its charter, which speaks of their adherence to multiparty democracy, pluralism, and the market economy.

All decisions on granting credits will be adopted by a simple majority, but a majority of fourth-fifths of all the new bank's members is required to alter its status.

The EBRD's location still has to be decided. According to the Paris press, London and Amsterdam are the main contenders. Two candidates aspire to the post of president of the bank—J. Attali, who was the initiator of its creation, and former Netherlands Finance Minister H.O. Ruding. All these questions will be decided before 30 May—the date on which it is planned to hold the official opening ceremony of the EBRD in Paris.

Heightened NATO Activity in Nordic Area Scored

PM1104143190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[Colonel A. Filippov commentary under the rubric "International Notes": "'Hard Frost' and Others..."]

[Text] "Cold Winter" and "Hard Frost" are certainly not weather forecasts warning of an approaching cold spell but the names of NATO exercises regularly held in northern Europe. One gets the impression that, despite the warming of the political climate on the European continent, some people in the West would like to at least "freeze" NATO military activity in the northern regions at its former level. This conclusion is borne out to some extent, for example, by the following statement by Norwegian General G.O. Beitland at a seminar on military doctrines in Vienna: "Norway does not intend to make any serious changes to its long-term plans for the operational and combat training of the national and joint armed forces in Norwegian territory."

Attention is drawn by the fact that NATO's so-called northern flank is beginning to shift toward the focus of the NATO bloc's military activity. For example, according to the official notification made by the NATO countries in line with the Stockholm document, they plan to conduct 50 percent of all notifiable measures organized in Europe in the north of the European continent in 1990. This is several times higher than the number of notifiable measures conducted on the bloc's northern flank in 1989. All in all, it is planned to conduct more than 70 different exercises involving allied or national armed forces in the North European Theater of Military Operations in the course of this year.

So what is the explanation for this high level of NATO military activity in Europe's northern regions? Despite the positive changes taking place in Europe, NATO circles claim that the Soviet Union, its Northern Fleet, and the group of Soviet forces stationed on the Kola peninsula pose a threat of attack. Realizing that the "enemy image" has become rather tarnished of late, NATO's brain centers have come up with a highly dubious idea, to put it mildly, in order to justify its militarist preparations. According to them, NATO must not sit idly by while instability is growing in the East European countries and the center of military confrontation between the two blocs is moving out of central Europe toward the outer flanks as a result of the forthcoming conclusion of the treaty on conventional armed forces.

These conjectures on the shifting "center of military confrontation" are being put abroad at a time when the Soviet Union is unilaterally reducing the numerical strength and effective combat strength of its forces in the northwest part of the country in line with its defensive doctrine, for a long time has not conducted any major operational and tactical exercises in these regions, and has reduced by approximately one-third the number of other exercises conducted in the north. It is simply

impossible not to have noticed this, but NATO prefers to turn a blind eye to the facts. It is also ignoring Soviet proposals to begin consultations on reducing military activity and limiting the scale of air force and naval activity in the waters of the Baltic, North, Norwegian, and Greenland Seas, extend confidence-building measures to them, and begin talks on reducing naval armaments.

At the same time, the NATO leadership is increasing its efforts to broaden the potential of its forces in Norway. Reserves have been established there for the United States' 4th Marine Infantry Brigade and for the Anglo-Dutch Marine Infantry Brigade. Both brigades are intended for redeployment in Norway in "a period of threat." Fuels and lubricants depots are being built in southern Norway to back up FRG naval activity in war time. Norwegian-U.S. talks on concluding a bilateral agreement on establishing U.S. naval supply points in Norwegian territory are nearing completion. The country's territory is essentially being turned into a gigantic depot for U.S. and NATO arms.

NATO's demonstrations of strength are not leading to stronger stability and security in northern Europe. They do not accord with the spirit of the time or the mood of the European public. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, its military activity is implemented in strict accordance with its defensive doctrine and on the basis of the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense.

Opening of Bratislava Mini-Summit Reported

PM1104143190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Apr 90 Second Edition p 6

[PRAVDA-TASS report under general headline: "News in Brief"]

[Text] Czechoslovakia, 9 Apr—A one-day meeting between the Hungarian, Polish, and Czechoslovak presidents, heads of state, and foreign ministers, as well as representatives of the public, opened today in Bratislava. The Austrian, Italian, and Yugoslav foreign ministers were invited to the meeting as observers. Although the agenda of the meeting has not been officially announced, in the opinion of political observers, the talks and discussions will concentrate on problems of European security in the context of the integration processes on the continent, as well as regional cooperation and interethnic relations.

United States & Canada

Bush Says U.S. Not To Recognize Lithuania

LD1204070790 Moscow TASS in English 0657 GMT 12 Apr 90

[Text] Washington April 12 TASS—U.S. President George Bush has reaffirmed that his administration will not grant diplomatic recognition to Lithuania.

He considers his restrained attitude towards the complicated and delicate problems involved the only correct approach and will stick to it.

Bush met leaders of Baltic-American groups on Wednesday at the White House. In contrast to other presidential meetings, reporters were not allowed to attend. The meeting lasted for more than an hour in the presence of Secretary of State James Baker.

According to Presidential Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater, Bush reaffirmed his support for Baltic self-determination and said that the United States has never recognised the incorporation of the Baltic States, as they call them, into the Soviet Union.

Bush explained the administration's stand on Lithuania and stressed that the matter must be settled through a peaceful dialogue between the Soviet leadership and freely-elected representatives of the Lithuanian people.

He said once again that this problem may put a strain on U.S.- Soviet relations.

The president told the Baltic-American leaders that the U.S. should refrain from actions that could worsen the situation. He stressed that "quiet diplomacy is most likely to lead to a peaceful solution."

Urged by the groups to grant de facto recognition to Lithuania, he told them he would not do so. Bush did not give the impression that the administration is ready to change its approach, Fitzwater pointed out.

The president stressed that the U.S. has to take into account many aspects when considering this problem. He also expressed his support for glasnost and perestroyka and said that they enable Lithuania to see its future in a new light.

Lebedev Comments on U.S. Information Talks

PM0604151090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 13, 27 Mar-2 Apr 90 pp 23-24

[Interview with CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department Deputy Head Aleksandr Lebedev by Dmitriy Pogorzhelskiy: "A Dialogue on a Delicate Subject"—date, place not given; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] Until a few years ago it was hard to imagine that Moscow and Washington would ever discuss cooperation in the sphere of information.

Today such a dialogue is under way, and making good progress. Another Soviet-American discussion on the subject was held in the U.S. capital recently. Our observer Dmitriy Pogorzhelskiy interviewed Aleksandr Lebedev, Deputy Chief of the Information Department of the CPSU Central Committee, head of the International Information Subdivision, who had taken part in the discussion as deputy head of the Soviet delegation.

[Pogorzhelskiy] That was a third discussion of this kind. USIA Director Bruce Gelb remarked that those were the friendliest and the most constructive negotiations ever conducted by our two countries. Do you share this view?

[Lebedev] I agree with Mr Gelb in principle, although I think it is an overstatement to describe the talk in superlatives. I think our dialogue is progressing in other directions, as well, such as disarmament. Nevertheless, I can understand Mr Gelb's optimism, and I share it. First of all, our contacts and cooperation in the sphere of information have started quite recently, and therefore what we have to show for our efforts is most impressive. Second, and this is most important, the delicacy of the very subject of discussions should be taken into account. You will probably agree with me that the information sphere is the most ideologized one of all. It is invariably regarded as a "natural" foothold for psychological warfare. Nevertheless, it is precisely in this sphere that a breakthrough has been accomplished over the past two or three years.

[Pogorzhelskiy] As a participant of the first meeting, could you kindly compare the atmosphere there with that at the third one?

[Lebedev] Frankly, the contrast is striking indeed. Two years ago, the government's spokesmen behaved in the "best traditions" of the confrontation epoch, endlessly remonstrating and reproaching each other...The Americans accused us of distorting facts and deliberately spreading misinformation through the Soviet press and through international public organizations. We behaved in the same way.

It is an open secret that the USIA draws up for the U.S. Congress annual reports on "Soviet active measures" in the field of misinformation. Honestly, these reports are not of much interest, although they claim to be scientific. The "scientific" classification of propaganda into types is most amusing, in particular. For instance, "black" type of propaganda is ascribed to the KGB, "grey" to the International Department of the Central Committee, and "white" - to the former Propaganda Department. In a word, the Soviet Union is accused, from year to year, of the deliberate dissemination of propaganda aimed against the United States. And mind you, this is done by a government agency, under the auspices of Congress, and at the American taxpayers' expense.

May I repeat that the first meeting was centred on this range of questions. Now at the third meeting these subjects were relegated to the background; in any case we didn't spend as much time and effort on them, their

discussion did not lead to the aggravation of the situation, to confrontation, but passed calmly and in a businesslike way.

True, it had been preceded by efforts made by both sides with a view to reducing to a minimum any causes for mutual complaints. That was by no means an easy matter because we discussed information appearing not at the level of official government publications, but in individual newspapers, issued by publishing companies, as well as radio and television programmes. Previously, the Americans kept stressing that their press was free and independent. Now they no longer resort to this argument as readily as they used to, as it becomes ever more obvious that our own mass media make their own decisions on what to publish, and are free from the Central Committee's censorship. Besides, it is sometimes hard to distinguish misinformation from a piece of information which is not to someone's liking...

[Pogorzhelskiy] And still, I find it hard to imagine that the talks went without mutual pinpricks...

[Lebedev] It would be premature, of course, to say that we have no bones left to pick with one another, considering that we concentrated primarily on information disseminated by government or semi-official sources.

Here is a specific example. In Washington, and later at a New York press conference, I said frankly that although Radio Liberty's programmes, on the whole, had become more informative and less biased than earlier, their tone had changed sharply following the aggravation of the situation in Transcaucasia last January. On certain days (especially on January 19, 20 and some others) they were marked by manifest one-sidedness, prejudice and even open incitement, especially if one compared programmes in different languages. Armenians were set against Azerbaijanians, and both nations—against Russians and the army. Unverified facts and figures were broadcast. However, that was exactly what we had agreed to oppose—the kindling of hostility, the creation of the "enemy image." I should like to underline the fact that our remonstrations were met with understanding and calmness, as were our remarks concerning the Voice of America government radio station. In particular, we mentioned certain manifestly anti-Soviet VOA programmes beamed to East European countries. Incidentally, as far as I know, ethical and legal norms accepted in the U.S. demand that mass media should set forth the positions of sides in a balanced and detached manner.

[Pogorzhelskiy] Have you agreed on any concrete ways to improve the overall situation in the sphere of information contacts and cooperation?

[Lebedev] Yes, precisely. Appreciable progress has been made in this direction. I am certain, for instance, that the position of Soviet and American correspondents in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., respectively, will be improved considerably because many restrictions previously imposed on their movements and on access to information sources have been lifted.

We said in Washington that we were prepared to revise, on the basis of reciprocity, the "off-limits zones" regime which, incidentally, we had been the first to introduce, with the Americans following this bad example. Curiously, the Americans set up—again, on our model—something like the notorious Diplomatic Corps Service Administration, although in the United States there is no need for mediatory institutions of the Intourist type. The organization proved to the liking of certain quarters in the U.S., to such an extent that the Americans now seem to be much less willing than we are to decline the obtrusive "services" the agencies of this kind offer.

Freedom of broadcast exchanges between the Soviet Union and the United States was high on the agenda. The odds are clearly not in our favour in this respect. The U.S. radio "voices" can be heard all over the territory of the Soviet Union, and more radio stations are being built. Our answer to that is only the Radio Moscow short-wave transmitter. The programmes it beams to the States have only a limited audience because few Americans use short-wave radios. A few years ago an attempt was made to rectify the situation by starting medium-wave (1,040-MHz) transmissions from Cuba with Havana's consent. The idea proved to be worthless. The station's audibility zone was minimal and, in addition, it interfered with the operation of American commercial transmitters. In other words, there appeared another irritant in our relations which, though not deliberate, was quite vexing.

In the end, we came to the conclusion that the transmissions from Cuba had to be stopped. At the same time, we decided to try and secure the Americans' cooperation in helping us reach millions of American listeners. Although the USIA does not operate on American territory, it helped us contact representaties of private radio stations. Negotiations have already been held, and this September our delegation will go to the United States for a national conference of the U.S. radio networks with a view to negotiating further practical steps. The PBS, one of the well-known and more popular companies, has already agreed to transmit regular programmes on life in the Soviet Union. In addition, the Americans have voiced their readiness to help us train personnel in preparing news and other programmes for U.S. radio audiences. We have agreed to discuss the possibility of placing more representatives of the Soviet Overseas Radio Service in the U.S.A., at the same time, the Voice of America is asking us to accredit one more correspondent in Moscow.

The talks on increasing the editions of the Soviet Life magazine and the Amerika magazine in the U.S.S.R. to 250,000 copies—and on removing the "ceilings" altogether in the long run—have been a success. Here, too, the observance of full reciprocity also involves a number of problems. The USIA representatives have promised to offer us advice concerning the improvement of the distribution of our magazine in the U.S.A.

An agreement has been reached on increasing the number of exchange students to a thousand, and a project for setting up a Soviet-American university has been discussed. We have discussed the possibility of starting a joint newspaper in time for the Summit—IZVESTIYA is looking for partners. Negotiations on the opening of information and cultural centres in Moscow and Washington were continued.

[Pogorzhelskiy] While listening to you, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, I recalled Bruce Gelb's words and imagined the reaction to all this by certain guardians of our ideological dogmas. Won't they protest against "concessions" and "one-sided" measures in the holy of holies—ideology?

[Lebedev] Yes, I know that a proportion of our public often misinterprets our position as invariably one-sided compliance, as all but an "ideological striptease." This is nonsense. The rivalry of ideas and political concepts will always go on in the information sphere. The important thing is that this rivalry should be honest, that no psychological warfare tricks should be used, that both sides should give priority to universal values in actual fact, not merely in words. It is not so difficult, after all, while remaining true to one's principles, to refrain from taking advantage of the other side's problems in pursuance of self-interested objectives.

Of course, there exists objective inequality related to material-technical potentialities and geographical peculiarities. This is a fact. This inequality is hard to remove overnight. Nevertheless, we are trying to rectify the situation—not by reducing the flow of information from "the other side" but by increasing and improving that from ours. It is important to equalize these flows, to make information truly objective and authentic. The current dynamics of Soviet-American relations makes this a realistic proposition. The number of those who wish us well in the U.S. has increased sharply over the past few years thanks to changes in our domestic and foreign policy—specifically, in the sphere of information. This is beginning to yield results.

Here are two concrete and rather indicative examples. Our Novosti Press Agency has asked for permission to open its office in New York. Some two or three years ago, this idea would have seemed utopian: the Voice of America didn't have an office in Moscow at that time, and the Radio Liberty and Free Europe broadcasts were jammed. Today the Americans have agreed to look into this request and provide an answer at an early date.

Here is another example. The State Department has been steadily refusing visas to Soviet trade union delegations—allegedly on behalf of the AFL-CIO. Recently, a delegation of Soviet miners—strike committee representatives—visited the U.S. as guests of the AFL-CIO and of the USIA. Naturally, we raised the question of normalizing this sphere of contact which promotes the process of our two nations becoming more familiar with one another and cultivates extensive exchange of views. As a result, we have succeeded, in principle, in realizing a formula for lifting restrictions on the issue of visas to Soviet trade union delegations, including those of the AUCCTU (although the American side still does not recognize this organization as a negotiating partner). Presumably, the Soviet side will not prevent members of trade union organizations not affiliated with, or not representing the AUCCTU officially, from visiting the United States. In any case, the trade unions have the last say in the matter, but there is no denying that the situation has changed for the better.

[Pogorzhelskiy] So the results are encouraging. It seems, though, that we still have much to accomplish, to make the agreements a reality, is that right?

[Lebedev] That's very true. Much of what I have mentioned is already embodied in agreements, but quite a few problems still remain to be solved. We shall need day-to-day contacts on some problems, including that of the so-called misinformation. We have agreed to examine every item which the other side finds objectionable and which is not confirmed by facts, and to supply appropriate denials, letters to the editor, and so on. This is already common practice and does not encroach on the freedom of the press in any way.

On the whole, I repeat, we have attained a new level—that of partnership with the United States—in the field of information. Vladimir Petrovskiy, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., the head of the Soviet delegation, stressed this in Washington. Bruce Gelb suggested that the next meeting be held in Moscow this November, and we accepted his proposal. This is very reasonable, and will serve as the forerunner to the Soviet-American Summit which is certain to give new impetus to the entire complex of Soviet-American relations.

China

Bovin Previews Li Peng's Upcoming Moscow Visit

PM1104170890 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 14, 8 Apr 90 p 3

[Aleksandr Bovin article: "China, the USSR, and Europe"]

[Text] The forthcoming visit to Moscow of Chinese Premier Li Peng, member of the Standing Cmmittee of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), is expected to be one of the major political events of the year. It will continue the difficult process of balancing and improving relations between the USSR and the PRC, the two greatest socialist powers, on whose positions, policies and degree of cooperation the character of the 21st century will considerably depend.

There are more than enough topics for discussion. From Moscow and Beijing, events are seen from different angles. To understand your partner (even if you disagree

with him) means to make your vision of the world more vivid and more stereoscopic.

Of primary importance will be the whole complex of Soviet-Chinese relations, with an emphasis on the expansion of mutually-advantageous economic cooperation. Until now, unfortunately, it seemed that the substance and intensiveness of the daily working dialogue between the PRC and the USSR was lagging behind the requirements of the time and the dynamism of political life. Everything seems to indicate that the inertia of the past is still a factor, as is the immersion of each country in its own affairs, in its own difficulties and problems.

The Chinese adopted their course aimed at radical transformations in 1978 roughly a decade before we did. They started with the economy and in a relatively short period of time succeeded, especially in the countryside, in achieving appreciable successes. The changes in political life were effected much more slowly. Finally, the difference between China's economic and political potentials crossed the danger line. An explosion followed. The authorities used tanks as irrefutable "arguments."

Since then the classical slogans like "To learn from Lei Feng", fight against "bourgeois liberalization", "fasten belts tighter" have returned. The content and the tone of Chinese propaganda have reverted to what they were several decades ago.... Even if the gap between the economy and politics diminishes, this won't be because of an acceleration in the rates of democratization but because of a partial return to command methods of economic control.

In the Soviet Union the first reforms were political. The economy is falling behind. The situation in this sphere has only gotten worse. Deficits and inflation are wrecking the consumer market. Planning, technological and labour discipline has badly deteriorated. Shortages of goods are everywhere. People are embittered. The result is what we know from China" a dangerous tension between economic and political spheres that continues to mount in society. This tension increases, passing through the prism of interethnic clashes. Luckily, there have been no tanks yet in Red Square. But armoured vehicles have already appeared in the streets in Yerevan, Tbilisi, Baku and Dushanbe...they've also appeared in Vilnius.

The Chinese example is catching, because it is simple and traditional. No doubt, the state has the right and is obliged to use force in reply to anticonstitutional, violent actions.

But does the end justify the means? If yes, then, naturally, one can get to "genuine socialism" in tanks, one can maintain the "friendship of peoples" by force or threat of force. Especially by the one variety of "socialism" we have already built: (and others) once and for all that violence cannot make anyone happy. Individual freedom, sovereignty, the right to social justice and dignity: These are the supreme values of socialism.

The Soviet-Chinese talks in Moscow may be rather evasive and complimentary because the truth hurts. Nevertheless, only clarification of conceptual and principled provisions (agreeing to disagree on one position or another) can create a firm basis for trust and cooperation.

This applies to domestic affairs and foreign affairs. Sometimes it seems that China could play a more active role in the solution of the world's more complicated problems.

The unification of Germany is undoubtedly related to such problems. Europe is far from China. But politics is not determined by geography. As a participant in the anti-Hitler coalition, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and as a power with global interests, China cannot be indifferent to the fate of Germany, to the situation in the heart of Europe.

I would like to hope that the talks with Li Peng will push our policy in the Asian and Pacific regions ahead. For the time being, the United States, Japan and new industrial countries dominate there. At the same time, we have a good chance of joining the "Pacific civilization." But the first fiddle, for unknown reasons, is being played by China. Thus the importance of principled, if only tentative, agreements with Beijing ruling out the likelihood of counterproductive rivalry.

Many points will be discussed in Moscow but it is hard to predict the ratio of "politesse" to comradely frankness.

PRC Military Delegation Ends Visit

LD1204092690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0727 GMT 12 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 12 April. (TASS)—"An additional new impetus has been given to Soviet-Chinese relations in the military field," declared Rear Admiral Vladimir Khuzhokov, head of the External Relations Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense [title as received]. He gave an interview to a TASS correspondent in connection with the end today of the 10-day visit by a PRC military delegation led by Major General Song Wenzhong, head of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the PRC Ministry of National Defense.

According to Vladimir Khuzhokov, this official military visit is the first from the PRC in 30 years. "Meetings and conversations with my Chinese colleague have been extremely useful for developing and strengthening our friendly relations," he said.

In the rear admiral's view, the improvement of relations in the military field has to be seen in the context of the general improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations as a result of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the People's Republic of China in May 1989. But it so happened, Vladimir Khuzhokov noted, that the Armed Forces of the USSR and the PRC remained in isolation for some time longer. "Following the visit to the USSR

by my colleague General Song Wenzhong, we can both say boldly that the ice has begun to break," the bureau head emphasized. In Vladimir Khuzhokov's opinion, one may hope that further contacts will soon follow between military circles of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the PRC.

Trade Agreement With China Signed in Beijing

OW1004100490 Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia 1100 GMT 20 Mar 90

[From the "Taking the Road of Friendship and Cooperation" program]

[Text] Konstantin Katushev, minister of foreign economic relations of the Soviet Union, told TASS reporters in Beijing that there is broad potential for expanding Soviet-Chinese relations in the economic and trade spheres and that this should be more comprehensively tapped to serve the interests of the peoples of both countries.

The Soviet minister led a Soviet delegation to China for talks on economic cooperation and trade and to sign a protocol in Beijing on the 1990 trade volume and payments between the Soviet and Chinese Governments. According to the protocol, the trade volume between the two countries will rise by 36 percent over the 1989 level. In addition, the machinery and equipment the Soviet Union provides to China will rise by 55 percent. For its part, China will increase the supply of its industrial products, foodstuffs, and articles of everyday use to the Soviet Union by 80 percent. Of these goods, electronic equipment for everday use comprises a fairly large percentage.

PRC Embassy Protests Prodemocracy Exhibition

OW1004053290 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Text] According to a report, a photo exhibition on the student unrest in Beijing last summer has been opened in Paris. In this regard, the Chinese Embassy in Paris lodged a protest to the French Foreign Ministry.

Entitled "A Moment of Spring in Beijing," the exhibition is sponsored by the Human Rights Foundation. Former French Foreign Minister Cheysson is the chairman of the foundation. Displayed at the exhibition are pictures taken by various press agencies and photographers. A number of meetings and symposiums in connection with the first anniversary of the incident at Tiananmen Square will be held during the exhibition.

According to another report, the Goddess of Democracy ship, which is affiliated with the China Democratic Front, is currently in the Indian Ocean and sailing toward the South China Sea. The radio station on the ship will broadcast around-the-clock programs to China.

USSR-PRC Border River Panel Meets in Harbin

PM0504142190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general headline: "Official Reports"]

[Text] The 32d conference of the Soviet-Chinese Joint Commission for Shipping in the Border Regions of the Amur Basin Rivers was held in Harbin (PRC) 16 through 30 March. The sides agreed plans for route work whose implementation will make it possible to improve shipping conditions on border river routes. Questions of the further enhancement of shipping safety were also discussed.

A corresponding protocol was signed on the results of the conference.

Gorbachev Sends Congratulations to Jiang Zemin

PM0904101390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

[USSR President M. Gorbachev undated cable to PRC's Jiang Zemin]

[Text] To Comrade Jiang Zemin, chairman of the PRC Central Military Council

Please accept my sincere congratulations in connection with your election as chairman of the PRC Central Military Council.

I wish you success in your activity in this lofty and responsible post for the sake of the Chinese people and in the interests of strengthening peace throughout the world.
USSR President M. Gorbachev.

Northeast Asia

Gorbachev Hints of ROK Diplomatic Ties in '90

SK1204003290 Seoul Domestic Service in Korean 2300 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] Mr. Sun Myung Moon, who is attending an international journalists meeting in Moscow, visited the Kremlin and met Soviet President Gorbachev at 2200 last night [1300 GMT 11 Apr], Korean time.

Correspondent Kim Chin-hwa reports from Moscow on this.

[Kim Chin-hwa] Rev. Sun Myung Moon, who is known as a dyed-in-the-wool anticommunist, held a tete-a-tete meeting with Soviet President Gorbachev for 30 minutes at the Kremlin in the Soviet Union, the suzerain of communism.

Rev. Mun, who came to Moscow to attend the international journalists meeting, held a tete-a-tete meeting with Soviet President Gorbachev in the latter's office at 2210

last night, Korean time, with only each side's interpreter on hand. They discussed a broad range of issues.

At the meeting, President Gorbachev said that it is only a matter of time before the establishment of diplomatic relations with the ROK, that there is absolutely no obstacle to establishing diplomatic ties, and that an atmosphere is being created for this at an earlier date than expected. Thus, he strongly hinted at the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations before the end of this year.

In connection with the question of the reunification of the Korean peninsula, President Gorbachev said: It is only a matter of time before the reunification of Germany. So, the countries surrounding Korea will now make efforts for the reunification of the Korean peninsula. The Soviet Union is thinking about what it can do toward this end.

By making these remarks, he hinted that the Soviet Union has the intention to play the role of a mediator between the North and South.

President Gorbachev also said that it is possible for the ROK and the Soviet Union to expand the scientific and technological exchanges between them and to jointly participate in development and construction projects throughout the world.

Soviet Media on DPRK Elections, People's Life

SK1204040890 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 10 Apr 90

[Unattributed talk]

[Text] We will now briefly explain about Soviet publications and media on the DPRK.

PRAVDA carried an article by (Sergey Kikonolov) on the industrial management system in the DPRK. Reporter (Kikonolov) writes as follows:

I requested the Korean National Economy University give us a detailed explanation of the financial (?situation) of the Korean national economy. Comrade Pak Pyong-ho, who teaches in the Industrial Department of this university, said as follows: In 1961, the respected and beloved leader Comrade Kim Il-song created an industrial guidance system, which has been called the Taean work system, while giving on-the-spot-guidance to the Taean Heavy Machines Complex for two weeks. This system is based upon collectivism in adopting decisions. What controls a complex is not its manager but its (?party committee).

This work system will mark the 30th anniversary of its formation next year. However, since it is not static, the national economy has undergone various disadvantageous conditions. This reporter asked whether, as was in the industrial sector [words indistinct], agriculture is in a difficult situation because of the Taean work system. To this question, Professor Pak Pyong-ho in the National Economy University answered as follows: No. That is not true. The Taean work system has nothing to do with this the difficult situation. The question is that some guidance functionaries cannot work according to this great work system. Regrettably, the change of generations also serves as a hindrance. Reporter (Kikonolov) writes that he thought that [words indistinct].

IZVESTIYA, under the title "Father and Son First Candidates," carried a KCNA report on the campaign for elections to the Ninth DPRK Supreme People's Assembly [SPA]. The paper continued as follows: The nomination of candidates of deputies has begun in the country. The DPRK President Kim Il-song has been nominated as the first candidate. He was nominated in the Nagwon Constituency as a candidate for deputy to the parliament of the republic. Kim Chong-il, son of Comrade Kim Il-song, was nominated in the Musan Constituency as a candidate for deputy.

As is well known, he has been officially declared Kim Il-song's successor. In an interview with the reporter of IZVESTIYA, Comrade Yang Hyong-sop, chairman of the DPRK SPA, said as follows: Inasmuch as the revolution is inherited from one generation to another generation, then the leader should be replaced according to the same principle. If the leader's successor has been improperly prepared, that would be a misfortune. But this problem does not exist for us because alongside the great leader [widaehan suryong], there is the great leader [widaehan chidoja].

The work of nominating candidates for deputies is continuing. The elections will be held on 22 April.

Quoting a KCNA report, TRUD writes about the price (?control) system implemented in the DPRK. The unit price for consumer goods has been designated in Korea, and the price of goods between the capital and local areas is the same. The prices of mass consumer goods including rice, fabrics, shoes, stationery, and food are very low. Nearly all of these items are being sold according to a preplanned schedule in a centralized manner.

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, a weekly magazine, writes about [passage indistinct] related to the concept of the DPRK. The author continues: The Soviet Army played a decisive role in liberating Korea in August 1945. [Passage indistinct] Some Korean partisan units began combat by coming into the Soviet Army. According to what has been passed on, Comrade Kim Il-song, president of the DPRK and general secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, commanded a partisan unit as a captain in the Soviet Army. However, such an (?event) has been recorded in a different way by the scholars of Korean history. In other words, the partisan unit commanded by Comrade Kim Il-song liberated North Korea from the Japanese militarists through a lightning attack after establishing ties with Soviet Army units. The unconditional loyalty to the leader has become the major merit of [word indistinct],

and through mass media, all the Korean people are aware that they live most richly and they live in the happiest country in the world, and many people firmly believe this. However, (?problems) can be seen in the difficult lives of the ordinary people. The atmosphere of anxiety, worry, and weariness can be seen more often among the residents as the time passes.

The weekly magazine carries views of foreign experts. [passage indistinct], and they think that such an (?atmosphere) has been created by the chronic shortage of power and materials, by inefficient management, and by the large military expenditure reaching 30 percent of the state budget. The DPRK leaders are not unaware of such political and economic problems. But rather, they pay great attention to resolving these problems. While noticing the reform taking place in East Europe, Pyongyang proceeds from the viewpoint that the issue of the successor to power can be guaranteed in the structure of the state in which comprehensive political stability is attained.

Memoirs on Lenin-Korean Communists Meeting

SK0604022990 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 1 Apr 90

[Talk on "Memoirs" on meeting between Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and Korean Communist Party members on 28 November 1921 from the "Review of Library" program]

[Text] On the occasion of the 120th birthday of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, the founder of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet state, and the master of the Russian revolution who exercised immense influence on the progress of revolution in many nations of the world, we are going to recollect historic events which have not been clearly revealed to the world.

Today we will present the memoirs on the meeting between members of the Korean Communist Party and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. This meeting was held on 28 November 1921. The Korean delegation was composed of (?Yi Tong-hui), Hong To, Pak Chon-chun and [names indistinct], who were outstanding activists of the movement of the Korean Communist Party and [name indistinct] who wrote the memoirs. He actively participated in the Korean revolutionary movement until 1921 and worked as secretary of the party Committee in the (Osies) district of the Soviet coastal kray. However, just as many other Koreans, he died in the thirties as victim of Stalin's repressive politics. We have inherited as the only legacy the memoirs written by (Kim Abanasy) who witnessed the event. This memoirs was carried in 1929 by (THE STAR OF THE PACIFIC) paper. Now let us hear about the memoirs of (Kim Abanasy) on the meeting between Lenin and the Korean Communist Party members. Our announcer, (Lochigery) will read these memoirs for you:

[Begin recording] It was in the evening on a November day in 1921. I was then staying in Moscow as secretary of the Korean delegation which came on business with the Executive Committee of the International Communist Party. Having resolved all questions concerning activities of the communist party, we were preparing for departure for [name indistinct].

However, we decided to meet with Vladimir Ilyich before we left Moscow. Our decision met with success. In reply to our request by telegram, Lenin replied that he would be very glad to meet with Yi Tong-hui, head of our delegation and Korean revolutionary.

An appointment for the meeting was made at 0800 in the morning, but we left for the Kremlin much earlier. There were four of us. As the time of the appointment neared, we arrived in Lenin's office. Comrade Yi, whose hair turned grey while carrying out fierce combat on the battlefield, was in a state of excitement. I was also experiencing deep emotions because I had an important mission to act as an interpreter during the meeting.

As the door opened, Lenin appeared. Vladimir Ilyich began to speak in a kind voice. He said: I am very glad to meet with Korean communists. Then, he told us to take seat on the opposite side. In appearance, Vladimir Ilyich seemed very energetic. Although he was not tall, he looked very healthy. His back was somewhat bent and his head was large. His [word indistinct] was clean and his expression was tender. His animated eyes with keen insight attracted our attention.

We were very glad that Lenin seemed not to have any grey hair. He looked as if [word indistinct]. I wanted to look at him more carefully. We immediately started to converse with him lest we waste the precious time of 30 minutes that was allowed for us. Yi Tong-hui said to him that since we were all Lenin's disciples, we would talk over everything frankly and candidly. With a smile on his face, Lenin said that he would gladly accept our proposals. With his unique suggestive and [word indistinct] voice, he said that he was not well aware of the basic situation in the Far East. Then, Lenin asked us to inform him of details of the situation in Korea and neighboring countries.

We briefly explained to him about the political and economic situation in our country. Our explanation was halted at times by unexpected questions by Lenin. In the course of conversation, new amicable mutual relations were being formed between Lenin and us. After the questions, he keenly listened to our talk about the colonial rule implemented by Japan over Korea. Opening a map on the desk, we explained to Lenin about how the railway is laid on the soil of Korea and how many stations were built. We informed him that the Japanese imperialists brought electric cars and that they were building plants and manufacturing facilities.

Hearing this, Vladimir Ilyich made prophetic remarks that the railroad workers and operators of electric cars

would play the great role in their impending revolutionary work. He then called them "the vanguard of the masses in the East" who advance by opposing the imperialists.

Lenin's prophecy had come true in many ways when the Korean workers went out on strike two years later, in 1923. Vladimir Ilyich paid attention to how the clandestine movement organizations and circles were organized. He listened with keen attention to our talk about the progress of the 1 March independence movement and factors in its failure. After asking a question to (Yi Tong-hui) about the conditions of struggle of the Korean revolutionaries, Lenin said: We lived in the zone of civilization. However, you wandered in forests and mountains to avoid the Japanese imperialists' chase. Thus, I think that we should extend international support to you.

Although the time allowed for us had passed, Lenin did not make haste with parting. We talked over many other issues for a long time with him. At the end of the talks, Vladimir Ilyich asked an unexpected question of me. "How many Koreans have the fluent command of Russian?" This question was indeed an abrupt one. Thus, I mechanically answered. "Perhaps there are more than ten."

While nodding his head, Vladimir Ilyich said in a somewhat reproving voice that none of the Korean Communist Party members who have a good command of Russian has published a single book about the revolution in the East [tongbang hyongmyong].

He continued: Please write this book by your (?team). We will translate your book into languages of many European countries and make a report on the book. The entire world should be aware of the revolutionary events taking place in the Far East. When you come next time, please take it with you. Without such a book, you do not have to come.

We were about to part. Vladimir Ilyich shook hands with (Yi Tong-hui) for a long time. This meeting left an unforgettable trace in our hearts and inspired our determination to continue struggling for the freedom of Korea.

Old Korean Publication on Lenin Recalled

SK1104035190 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 8 Apr 90

[Text] [Male announcer] Vladimir Ilyich Lenin was the founder of the Comintern and the Soviet state, and was the (?leader) [?suryong] of the international proletarians. His contribution to developing the revolutionary theories on the reform of society was indeed enormous. Everywhere on this planet, his name has been made known among the international proletarians and his immortal ideology has been studied and put into practice.

Lenin is still among the ranks of those who struggle for social progress, peace, and socialism on the globe.

Sometimes I even forget the birthday of my mother, the woman who reared me.

Still, do I ever forget anywhere in the world the day of glory when Vladimir Ilich Lenin was born?

In the dark prison cell at daybreak, warriors, as awakening from sleep, shout: Comrades! It is 22 April.

His name, which is more frightening than thunderbolt or earthquake to enemies, always means triumph and love to us.

Our Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, our teacher!

His feat and our great might he has given, let us praise and let us boast."

This is the poem "Daybreak" written by celebrated Korean poet (Pak Sang-myong).

[Female announcer] Lenin's name has been inseparably linked with the Korean people's life. His name was a banner and a (?faith) in the struggle of the patriots of the country, waged to achieve independence during those miserable days of the Japanese imperialists' colonial rule.

The heroic 1 March uprising in 1919—a result of the influence of Lenin's ideology and a direct repercussion of the Great October Socialist Revolution of Russia—played a great role in the history of Korea.

Lenin himself directed deep attention to the revolutionary events which were taking place in Korea. When he spoke at the meeting of the activists of the Moscow Group of the Russian Bolshevik Communist Party in December 1920, he condemned the Japanese imperialist occupiers with indignation. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin said: We have heard about many (?articles of Korean newspapers) telling about the atrocities of the Japanese which are a curse to them. [passage indistinct]

Because of Leninist-style (?interference), because of his remarks which exposed the hidden intention of the U.S. policy toward Korea, because of the peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet state, because of his unyielding struggle for the people's rights and interest, the progressive circles of Korea firmly believed that (?alliance) with the first worker-peasant state of the world was one of the decisive conditions to achieving the independence of Korea.

This fact was reflected in the work of many Korean writers as well. For example, Korean poet (Yi Pong-hak) wrote as follows:

[Male announcer] Moscow: You have become the (?capital of hope) for mankind!

Owing to Lenin's name and talent, you have become the palace of science where new people are nurtured.

Though I was not born in your bosom, you are the beloved cradle of my adolescence.

[Female announcer] Following the popular uprising in 1919, the Marxism-Leninism ideology started to spread in the Korean national liberation movement, and the socialist ideology gradually mingled with the mass movement.

Saying that the Leninist theory showed the correct path of the mass struggle to victory, Comrade Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Workers Party of Korea [WPK], wrote as follows: Many Korean patriots already started to study Lenin's books at that time. (?His books) were the power and the guiding star which encouraged and supported the Korean people's just struggle for liberation.

In the twenties, Korean newspapers and magazines carried many renowned Korean writers' articles on the October Revolution, on Lenin, and on the events unfolding in Russia.

The group of personages with patriotic ideas directed undoubtedly (?deep) interest to the ideology of the leader [suryong] and to its inheritance, and sought an answer to the question of achieving independence. They expressed genuine admiration toward the achievements won by the Soviet people who were headed by the Leninist party.

Among others, the article "Who Is Lenin" carried in 52 installments by TONG-A ILBO, one of the most authoritative Korean newspapers, from June to August 1921, was of particular interest.

The newspaper linked Lenin's name with the opening of the new era in the history of the world, and said that the Korean people should (?study) the (?nature) and essence of Lenin's theory.

The article said: Tens of millions of people support Lenin and there are also many of those who oppose him. While the oppressed working people admire Lenin, the others treat him with animosity. Lenin's greatness is demonstrated by all this.

Based on this article, the book "The History of the Russian Revolution and Lenin" was published in Korea in 1922.

The Korean people were heartbroken over the news on the sudden death of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

Reflecting the ideological sentiment which prevailed in the advanced societies at that time, TONG-A ILBO wrote as follows: "Lenin has passed away. However, before mankind, his immortal ideology is going to be embodied even more refreshingly and brilliantly with each passing day. Lenin was not only an ideologist but also a father, an older brother, a leader, and a teacher of the proletarian masses. He was the guiding star of hope for the oppressed peoples of the world, and was a great man.

[Male announcer] Oh, Lenin! There is nothing that can be compared with your benevolence; neither the sea nor the mountain.

I will only have to regain my lost adolescence and struggle along with my young motherland for at least another than 100 years without aging.

My voice is hoarse and weak. But I will raise my voice to praise your benevolence.

Lenin, my sun: May your name be remembered forever!

[Female announcer] This poem, "Beneath Your Rays," was written by contemporary Korean poet (Yi Sung-hui).

It has been a long time since the dark colonial days ended. But, even today when the people of the DPRK are successfully building socialism, the Lenin's ideology is still the banner of their struggle.

Lenin's ideology has also helped the South Korean patriots who struggle for democracy.

Precisely in the main area of Seoul, an underground printing house worked boldly. The local police authorities endeavored to ferret out the printing house for more than one and a half year. Underground agents published many books banned by (?law). The largest portion of the books published were Lenin's works.

The South Korean authorities smashed the underground printing house and arrested the underground agents who were publishing the illegal books.

However, no suppression can bury the words of justice shining in every page of the Lenin's works.

As is the case with the working people of all countries of the world, the working people of Korea consider Lenin a model in their life.

Lenin is always with us and his theory is everlasting.

The poem "The First Morning" by renowned Korean poet (Kim U- chol), which we will introduce at the end of this program, tells you precisely about this.

[Male announcer] Being reborn on this hill and on this rim, I greet my motherland in the morning and in the evening and praise the overflowing love.

The calendar of adolescence that makes our blood boil! As I tear off its first sheet this morning, I see Lenin's smile.

Even on the road of harsh struggle and in the days of rehabilitation, Lenin leads us to victory.

His name, an eternal banner!

Near East & South Asia

Iranian Ambassador Heirani-Nobari Interviewed

PM1104152190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with Naser Heirani-Nobari, Iranian ambassador to the USSR, by L. Mironov: "Neither West nor East, but Islamic Republic; Talk with Iranian Ambassador to USSR"; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] Only quite recently Soviet-Iranian relations were in a stagnant state. The possibility of their improvement in the foreseeable future seemed unlikely. But in 1989 as a result of the exchange of high-level visits progress was outlined in bilateral relations. Published below is an interview with Naser Heirani-Nobari, Iranian ambassador to the USSR, which reflects the views of the present Iranian leadership of the paths of that country's development and its relations with the outside world.

[Mironov] It is well known that the behest of the late Imam Khomeyni exerted great influence on Iran's policy. Mr Ambassador, could you briefly describe the thrust of this behest?

[Heirani-Nobari] Imam Khomeyni, the leader of the Islamic revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, signed his political behest that is sacred to us 5 February 1983. After his death it was read out by the new leader of Iran, Ayatollah Sayed Ali Khamene'i.

The behest is based on confidence in the divine nature of everything that exists, belief in Allah the all-merciful and all-seeing, and a recognition that he is in everything and that everything done in this world he created emanates from him. It was thanks to the gracious leadership of the Most High that the Iranian people have been able to overcome their internal and external enemies.

Imam Khomeyni shares his thoughts on independence and urges the Iranians and the peoples of other countries and all oppressed and dispossessed in the world to acquire it in reality and not to wait without taking action for the rulers of their foreign countries and of foreign powers to bestow freedom on them. The Koran, he reminds us, has predestined that we advance toward an Islamic state.

[Mironov] Today Iran has to accomplish a number of urgent reforms, without Imam Khomeyni now. How are these reforms being implemented?

[Heirani-Nobari] The eight-year war imposed on us, the economic blockade by the Western powers, and various plots against the existing Islamic system have caused considerable harm to our country. The programs of transformations and reforms have two main aims: restoring and strengthening the state's economic, social, and cultural foundations by relying on the people's inexhaustible strength and continuing the Imam's plans with regard to the Islamic revolution.

It should be noted that the foundation of the present transformations, which marked the start of a new stage in our country's history, were laid by Imam Khomeyni himself. The changes in the Constitution connected with the expansion of the president's powers and the consolidation of legislative, executive, and legal power were implemented on his instructions. The five-year development plan was elaborated with his participation. And even the candidacy of Al Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani for the post of president of Iran was put forward at his recommendation. Thus the architect of our perestroyka at its new stage, too, is Imam Khomeyni.

[Mironov] Last year USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze visited Tehran and Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani visited Moscow. Important documents were signed. Probably the new political thinking is being implemented in this process. What is your opinion, Mr Ambassador?

[Heirani-Nobari] After the accomplishment of the Islamic revolution in our country relations between the USSR and Iran took shape unevenly. The ideals of independence born of the Islamic revolution were reflected in the course "neither West nor East, but an Islamic republic," which defines the nature of our relations with other states, particularly neighboring ones. From the outset the Islamic Republic of Iran has formulated the principles of its independent existence in the world: not resorting to foreign aid, having relations with other states based on equality, mutual respect for national sovereignty, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

The start of perestroyka in the USSR and the emergence of the new political thinking in the international arena prepared the ground for our two countries' rapprochement. President M.S. Gorbachev states that the Soviet Union is seeking to establish relations with other states without ideological primacy. This creates a new image of the Soviet Union. After the radical rethinking of each other's ideas and actions we can say that good prospects have appeared for our bilateral relations.

[Mironov] One of the results of the new political thinking was the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. But the war in that country is not abating. What cooperation can there be between the USSR and the Islamic Republic of Iran in settling the Afghan problem?

[Heirani-Nobari] We welcome a solution of the Afghan problem whereby one unfailing condition will be observed—the participation of representatives of that country in the determination of its fate. We are convinced that this problem can be resolved only through cooperation between the countries of the region and with a consideration for the will of Afghanistan's Muslim population. We will welcome any solution of the problem on this basis. In our approach we proceed from the premise that guarantees must be ensured of noninterference in Afghanistan's affairs, that the Islamic

nature of the Afghan state must be recognized, and that its people must be granted the right to determine their motherland's fate for themselves.

The reason for the continuation of the war in Afghanistan lies in the fact that it remains the arena for rivalry between foreign powers for influence in the region. On the other side of the ocean they are particularly eager to obtain control over Afghanistan. But we know well the Afghans' valor and courage. They are struggling for their independence and will never agree to foreigners interfering in their internal affairs.

Cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the USSR in resolving the Afghan problem should also be aimed at ensuring, by their joint efforts, that there is no outside interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs and at rendering all-around aid in creating a truly independent and nonaligned Afghan state based on the country's entire Muslim people.

[Mironov] How is Iran reacting to the events in Soviet Azerbaijan? In connection with the violations of the Soviet-Iranian border by citizens of both countries there is obviously a need to establish some kind of procedure convenient to the population.

[Heirani-Nobari] Guided by its Islamic duty, the Islamic Republic of Iran feels a sense of responsibility for the fate of Muslims throughout the world. That is one of our unfailing principles in the field of international relations. Counter to the West's assertions, this principle can in no way become the reason for interference in other states' internal affairs.

Iranians followed with alarm the events in Azerbaijan which led to loss of life. The reasons and circumstances which caused them are not our business. We reckon that measures will be taken which will ensure the problem is settled. From the outset we offered our assistance to its peaceful solution.

We believe that the solution of any questions, however complex, is possible through the exchange of opinions and the attainment of political consensus. That, incidentally, is also an idea from the arsenal of the new thinking.

The fact that over a considerable sector of the Soviet-Iranian border it has been crossed from both sides has confirmed yet again the need to create conditions facilitating communication between citizens of the two countries. And these conditions are now being created in accordance with the memorandum on mutual understanding signed in Tehran this February. We would welcome the development of economic, trade, and cultural relations and commodity exchange between the Iranian provinces and neighboring Soviet republics. I think the existing level of our bilateral political ties opens up broader opportunities in this field.

Bessmertnykh Receives Heirani-Nobari

LD1004214390 Moscow TASS in English 1814 GMT 10 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 10 TASS—First Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh today received Iranian Ambassador Naser Heirani-Nobari at the latter's request.

They discussed further development of Soviet-Iranian relations, as well as some international and regional issues.

Iranian Gas Deliveries to Soviet Union Begin

LD1004124990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0855 GMT 10 Apr 90

[Text] Tehran, 10 Apr (TASS)—"The start of deliveries of Iranian natural gas to the Soviet Union elevates the large-scale accords attained during the 1989 Soviet-Iranian summit to the level of practical implementation", Mohsen Nurbakhsh, Iran's minister of economic affairs and finance, said at a solemn ceremony in the town of Astara (Iran) yesterday.

In accordance with an intergovernmental agreement, which is to last 15 years, the Soviet side will receive 3 billion cubic meters of gas annually, primarily for the Transcaucasian republics. In its turn, the USSR will deliver to Iran sets of equipment and machinery for power engineering, machine building, and other national economic projects. The agreement also envisages the Soviet Union's participation in building power engineering projects in Iran with a total capacity of about 8,000 mw, reconditioning the Esfahan metallurgy plant to increase its output to 4 million tons of steel per year, constructing railway lines, machine building, and other projects.

The implementation of these agreements will make it possible to considerably expand the mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries and to give it a long-term and a stable character.

Commentary Views Iran's Fight Against Drugs

NC1104125090 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1100 GMT 10 Apr 90

[Yuriy Andreyev commentary]

[Text] Reports from Iran indicate that large-scale operations took place there in the fight against drug addiction. During the recent week, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps [IRGC] arrested hundreds of drug smugglers and addicts in various parts of the country. Our commentator Yuriy Andreyev writes:

The figures published during the current week in Iran on the fight against drugs and addiction are truly alarming. For example, in Khorasan Province 140 drug smugglers were arrested and 312 kg of drugs were confiscated. The IRGC also arrested 290 suspect addicts. In the country's

central areas, more than 600 kg of heroin was found and confiscated and 67 merchants of white death were arrested. Nearly 66,000 addicts have been sent to special camps for rehabilitation or compulsory treatment. The mass and open execution of drug traffickers and the intensive propaganda against addiction and smuggling continues in the mass media.

If phraseologists and linguists were to analyze the items being published in the Iranian press recently, they would conclude that the most commonly used word by the press is drugs.

Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan form part of the so-called golden crescent, the most important center for the production of heroin in the world. History shows that not only is this region one of the most major areas narcotics export, but it ranks among the highest on the list of drug use. If we use opium, or drugs like cocaine and heroin, as a yardstick, we can see that, based on Western experts' opinions, 85 percent of the opium and 75 percent of the other opiates are used in the golden crescent. Even on the basis of current official figures, there are at least 1 million addicts in Iran. But independent experts believe that this figure should be doubled.

All facts show that the Iranian Government is well aware of the threat that emanates from this. But the rapid intensification of suppressive measures shows that the Iranian Government is trying to solve the problem of drugs merely through administrative measures. According to Mokhtar Kalantari, head of the Drug Enforcement Committee, the population fully supports the strong steps against the drug mafia. He reported that last year Tehran residents filed 18,000 complaints to the committee against drug traffickers and addicts.

Also, one should consider that using violent measures to uproot drugs is not new. Even though this might appear contradictory, nevertheless world experience has shown that the extreme harshness of laws not only does not reduce crime, but on the contrary increases it. Therefore, it is not accidental that the world conference on drugs which started its works on 9 April in London called for new steps and new ideas in the fight against drugs. During the organization's news conference in London it was pointed out that success in fighting drugs does not depend only on extreme law-enforcement measures and on harsh and pitiless laws. I think that this is a logical approach. It seems illogical to be able to get rid of savage habits by resorting to savage patterns and steps.

Rogachev, Indian Foreign Minister Hold Talks

LD1104144890 Moscow TASS in English 1429 GMT 11 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Karmality]

[Text] New Delhi April 11 TASS—Indian Foreign Minister Inder Kumar Gujral received on Tuesday Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev, who is currently on a working visit here.

During the talk, which proceeded in a friendly atmosphere, both sides noted that Soviet-Indian cooperation remains constant against the background of stormy world changes.

Gujral supported the reforms carried out in the USSR and the Soviet leadership's efforts to overcome difficulties cropping up on their way. The minister said India favoured the unity and territorial integrity of the USSR.

The sides noted the identity or proximity of Soviet and Indian views on key international issues. They discussed a Cambodian settlement and the situation in Afghanistan. Both sides reaffirmed their intention to help solve these problems.

They expressed the readiness of both countries to further develop good-neighbourly relations with China. They confirmed their view that the question of Kashmir should be settled between India and Pakistan by peaceful political means on the basis of the simple agreements.

Regular Soviet-Indian consultations on problems of the Asian-Pacific region were held here on Monday and Tuesday. They were conducted by Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR Igor Rogachev, First Deputy Foreign Minister of India Shilendra Kumar Singh and Deputy Minister Chandrashekhar Dasgupta.

Rogachev met a large group of leading Indian political scientists in the Indian International Centre on Tuesday. They discussed problems of ensuring security in the Asian-Pacific region.

CPSU Delegation Leaves for Bangladesh 9 Apr

PM1104154090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Delegation's Departure"]

[Text] A CPSU delegation consisting of A.S. Kamay, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee and second secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, and F.N. Yurlov, leader of a group at the CPSU Central Committee International Department, left Moscow for Dhaka 9 April at the invitation of the Communist Party of Bangladesh Central Committee.

On the same day the delegation arrived in Dhaka.

Lifting of Ban on Parties in Nepal Reported

PM1104161990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Apr 90 Second Edition p 6

[Own correspondent V. Baykov dispatch: "From Absolutism to Democracy"]

[Text] Delhi, 9 Apr—Exultation reigns in Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal—the Himalayan mountain kingdom. The roads are full of people rapturously greeting the restoration of political freedoms in the country—King Birendra has announced the removal of the ban on the activity of political parties.

The will of the people forced the monarch to take this step. For almost 30 years, since 1960, Nepal lived within the strict confines of absolutism—all political activity was forbidden, trade unions and creative associations were prohibited, there was no freedom of the press, or guarantees of human rights or civil liberties. But in the life of all peoples there come turning points, when, like a spring that been compressed as far as it will go, they no longer want to reconcile themselves to oppression and to the past, and resolutely arise to usher in changes.

In February of this year a nonviolent movement for the restoration of democracy began in Nepal, on a multi-party basis. It was of a mass nature, embracing all strata of Nepalese society—the intelligentsia, the workers, student youth, and the peasants. The struggle for democracy was headed by the Nepali Congress Party, the Nepal Communist Party, and a number of left-wing groupings which decided to act as a united front on the basis of a common program.

The authorities used force against the demonstrators who came out onto the streets. As a result of the use of weapons by the police, over 20 people were killed, and many were injured. Over 7,000 people, including the leaders of the newly formed People's Front, were thrown into prison.

But fire and repression failed to suppress the movement. Its second phase unfolded after the first few days of April: A wave of rallies, general strikes, and demonstrations under the slogan "We want democracy!" swept over the whole of Nepal. The movement reached such a scale that the king finally deemed it the right thing to do to listen to the opposition's demands. After two days of talks with leaders of the democratic movement, the king's palace issued a proclamation: Henceforth the law prohibiting political activity in the country is abrogated, a multi-party system will be introduced, and the appropriate amendments made to the Nepalese Constitution.

"Our aim has been achieved and political freedoms have been restored in the country," K. Bhattarai, chairman of the Nepali Congress Party stated, appearing on state television on behalf of the National Front.

The winds of change have reached the mountain kingdom.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Commentaries View Suspension of ANC-RSA Talks

'Provocative Actions' by RSA

MB0404070790 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Vladimir Valentinov commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] A spokesman of the African National Congress [ANC] of South Africa in Lusaka, Zambia, has announced the leadership of that organization has put off temporarily the meeting with the government of the South African Republic. Listen to what Vladimir Valentinov writes in this connection.

As it has been reported, the meeting was scheduled for 11 April, and that has given rise to hope for a long expected beginning of a peaceful dialogue between the liberation forces of the country and the official leadership. However, the meeting has been put off indefinitely, and that was made on the initiative of the ANC.

You can understand that there must be a weighty reason for the move, because the ANC has always been a supporter of peace talks with Pretoria about the future of the country, and that reason does exist. First of all, according to an official statement of the ANC, the move was made because of the provocative actions of the South African police that had arranged a bloody massacre in the settlement of Sebokeng, south of Johannesburg. Thus, a preliminary agreement on ending all hostilities until the bilateral talks was violated, while the ANC strictly abides by it.

The South African security forces ignore that gentlemen's agreement, and not only in Sebokeng. It is not for nothing that Archbishop Desmond Tutu, even before the ANC statement in Lusaka, publicly accused the minister of law and order, Adriaan Vlok, of being incapable of controlling the actions of the police, and in this way placing the upcoming talks in jeopardy.

However, a question arises here. Is Adriaan Vlok incapable or unwilling to exercise his rather strong power? Because an extremely mighty wave of violence has swept the whole of South Africa today. This is the political actions, demonstrations, and meetings dispersed by the police using teargas and arms. This is also differences on ideological and ethnic grounds among the conflicting groups and movements inside the African community.

It has long been established that the differences are provoked largely by the secret agents of the security forces. In these conditions, the concern of the ANC for the fate of its delegation is quite justifiable, since, besides Nelson Mandela, there are also Alfred Nzo, Thabo Mbeki, Joe Slovo, Chris Hani, and many others on the delegation. Is there any guarantee of their inviolability?

Besides, the outbreak of blind violence that was being fanned up puts to doubt the readiness of the authorities to continue the democratic transformations in the country, and discredits the very idea of the struggle for liberation. There are also other versions of the causes of changing the date of the meeting, but they are secondary, so to say, though rather important, too—settling scores inside the antiracist movement, for one, and also a direct threat to the peace dialogue from both the extreme right circles of the whites, and from the left radicals among the blacks. Being aware of all that, the ANC is coming out for unity of the democratic forces.

On 5 April, the South African president, Frederik de Klerk, will meet with the vice president of the ANC,

Nelson Mandela, and discuss with him the question about an official meeting between the government and the ANC leaders that was scheduled for 11 April. The future of the country will largely depend on their coming to an agreement.

People's Reaction

MB0604191290 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 5 Apr 90

["South Africa Today" by Aleksandr Fedorov—read by announcer]

[Text] There is neither the need to dramatize the situation that has occurred following the African National Congress [ANC] decision to put aside the meeting with the country's government nor to affect indifference.

It is like returning to the period when at every opportunity labels were stuck on the ANC right and left, accusing it of being bellicose and intractible. This is the tactic that has been chosen by those on the right, headed by the opposition Conservative Party.

I would compare the reaction in the country to the ANC's decision to stay away from the talks to that of a prophecied second coming of Jesus Christ. Both the prophets and the believers are guilty first of deceit and second of creating an illusion of hope for a better future without making any efforts on their behalf.

It is possible today to accuse President Frederik de Klerk of making some sort of political capital out of announcing his intention to demolish apartheid. In its turn, the government is right in saying that changes cannot be introduced without the establishment of a suitable political climate by all the people. It is possible to understand the South African president's anxiety and agree with his approach.

He has [words indistinct] the date set for the beginning of the proposed preliminary talks, there must be nothing to influence them, even if there exists a definite basis addressed toward the police. The president feels discussions will help to avoid similar incidents in the future. The president has a point, but it did not prevent the death of demonstrators in Sebokeng, and it is possible only when the police receive clear and unequivocal orders and not wishes.

The other thing is evident, in my opinion. The guards of law and order must be decisive in the events similar to those which became tragic realities in the Natal Province. Instigators of the slaughter care the least for the fate of their fellow countrymen.

Professor and political analyst at Cape Town University (Robert Shrier) feels that a delay in beginning peaceful dialogue between the ANC and the South African Government could cause the opposition movement much more heavier damage than to Pretoria. It is possible only to agree with this if the delays play into the hands of the extreme right or it gives them a chance to collect the forces of their supporters.

It would be wrong to believe that the lack of reaction by the ANC to the police action would boost the authority of this organization. It is a different matter as to what form the protest could take. The South African president, Frederik de Klerk, and vice president of the ANC, Nelson Mandela, need to discuss the situation that flared up following the decision of the ANC to put off the talks. I think that positive agreements would be in the interest of all who condemn the apartheid system.

I would be glad if the topic of this commentary is out of date in the light of new facts. If this is the case, then let it be a reminder that any tense moment during the talks has the ability to move them away from the final aim.

That, I am afraid, would not be in the interest of our listeners living in South Africa.

Chances for Future Talks

MB0704173490 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Igor Potovskiy commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] As we have already reported, the three-hour meeting between President de Klerk and the ANC [African National Congress] vice president, Nelson Mandela, in Cape Town yesterday resulted in an agreement about the new date for a preliminary meeting, with the aim to discuss the obstacles on the way to talks about the future of the country.

Commentary is by Igor Potovskiy:

As is known, the preliminary talks scheduled for 11 April will not take place.

The ANC considered it impossible to hold them in the conditions when the police is again resorting to violence in suppressing disorder. As a result of the police action, 10 persons died in the settlement of Sebokeng. Following that event, the ANC announced its decision.

Evidently, the problem has been resolved, since after the meeting in Cape Town both the president and the ANC leader declared that the settlement process in the country has returned back to its channel.

According to Mr. de Klerk, the new date for the meeting will be announced shortly. After a meeting with Mandela, the president declared that a mutual understanding has been reached on another most important issue, that of ending violence in the country.

It stands to reason that one and the same problem may be viewed from different angles. Optimists may welcome the result of the talks in Cape Town and the fact as a whole that the success of the current political processes in South Africa continue to be the aim of all the sides involved.

This is important in any case, and especially now, when the political situation in the country has aggravated sharply. It has become more contradictory and, consequently, less stable. Unrest and police action have intensified and also mutual accusations of incapability to put an end to violence in Natal.

The difficulty lies with something else. Is such an optimism justified? The reason for delaying the preliminary talks cannot be explained only by the ANC protest against police actions. The situation is much more complicated. To be more precise, the ANC did not object to using police force for normalizing the situation in Natal. The ANC is dissatisfied that the government had not consulted that organization before using force.

Many observers consider that the main problem is that time and conditions are needed to unite the black forces and ensure its leading role among them. The meeting in Cape Town was proof of that. As a matter of fact, it had not been planned as a meeting between the president and Nelson Mandela. Besides the government and the ANC, representatives of all the three chambers of parliament took part in it.

The participation of the leaders of all the six bantustans was also envisaged. However, only two of them attended, and that fact caused the president's irritation. According to him, the other four refused to attend under pressure from the ANC. Many analysts view it as the ANC's struggle to ensure its leadership.

On the whole, everything boils down to this:

Who is to define the pace and the character of the changes in the country? On whose conditions a compromise will be reached? Whose influence will be the greatest, either of the government or of the ANC?

Just as before, the Zulu wars in Natal continue to be the touchstone.

East Europe

Jaruzelski's First Day of USSR Visit Detailed

LD1104230390 Warsaw PAP in English 1818 GMT 11 Apr 90

[By PAP correspondent Piotry Jazwinski]

[Text] Lvov, April 11—Polish President Wojciech Jaruzelski arrived today in Lvov, the first leg of his four-day official visit to the Soviet Union paid at the invitation from President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Visit to Lvov

Jaruzelski started a tour of places of interest in Lvov with a visit to the Lichakovski Cemetery where he laid flowers on the graves of famous Poles: writers, scientists and heroes of Polish uprisings against tsarist Russia in the 19th century.

He also went to a cemetery where the defenders of Lvov were burried, mostly teenagers who fought in 1918 for keeping Lvov in Poland.

At the Lvov Cathedral, Jaruzelski met with Father Rafal Kiernicki who was colonel of the Home Army intelligence service during the 2nd World war.

Meeting with Lvov Authorities

Speaking about the future of the Polish-Ukrainian relations at a luncheon given by the Lvov authorities, the president appealed for lifting the barriers in development of good-neighbourly cooperation between the Ukraine and Poland.

He assured that Poland will not spare efforts to make the Ukrainians living in Poland feel at home. I also believe, Jaruzelski added, that Poles, living in such large numbers in Lvov, in your republic, will meet with full understanding for their needs, for building their identity.

Meeting With Poles

Poland—our motherland, the Ukraine—our sister, Chairman of the Polish cultural and educational society in Lvov district, Professor Leszek Mazepa recalled the words during President Jaruzelski's meeting with representatives of Poles living in the Ukraine.

During the meeting many words of gratitude for assistance in training Polish language teachers, for Polish books were voiced.

Mentioned were also expectations, concerning mainly lifting barriers in free travelling of Poles-USSR citizens to Poland, and of Ukrainians with the Polish citizenship to the Soviet Union. The postulates were included in a letter conveyed to the president by Professor Mazepa.

Addressing the meeting Wojciech Jaruzelski said in part:

We know you sustained a lot of bitterness and we, the Polish authorities feel responsible that over past decades we did not manage to, but probably also could not, make Poles outside Poland feel well.

Today, owing to the deep transformations going on in Poland and the Soviet Union, there are possibilities to broader and fuller open up borders, Jaruzelski continued.

Here, in Lvov we strongly feel friendliness, sympathy and respect for our nation. It is a great achievement of these times—the reforms in Poland and the perestroyka in the Soviet Union, the president stated.

The meeting with Poles was the last point of Wojciech Jaruzelski's stay in Lvov. In the evening the president arrived in Kiev where he is to hold talks with the Ukrainian authorities on Thursday.

Tour of Kiev Reported

LD1204083490 Moscow TASS in English 0746 GMT 12 Apr 90

[Text] Kiev April 12 TASS—President Wojciech Jaruzelski of Poland continues his visit to Kiev. He laid a wreath at the tomb of the unknown soldier this morning.

The guest inspected the memorial complex "Ukrainian State Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945".

Article Examines Yugoslav Communist Divisions

PM1004100990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 7 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[Article by TASS correspondent A. Bocharov "specially for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA": "Not Avoiding Dialogue: Why the Principle of Federalization Led to a Split in the LCY"]

[Text] Belgrade—No one in Yugoslavia today makes a secret of the fact that the disruption of the work of the 14th (Extraordinary) LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] Congress was the result of serious disagreements in the party regarding the approach to fundamental, conceptual problems concerning radical reforms in society and the LCY. Moreover, the split did not just surface at the congress but deepened there. The process of federalization as an erosion of an LCY sapped from within led to a gradual transformation of its detachments into republic parties and national disunity. The most acute disagreements, which have assumed the form of ideological conflict, are maintained between Serbia and Slovenia, recently joined by Croatia.

What is the crux of them? It should be noted that each side sees itself as reformers and its opponents as conservatives. There is much in common in their stances and approaches to reforms: the establishment of a market mechanism in the economy, the deepening of the process of democratizing society, the development of political pluralism, and so forth. While advocating democratic socialism, however, they differ fundamentally in their vision of the role and place of the party in social transformations and the thrusts of the reforms of the political system. The Slovenes want the transformation of the LCY into a "league of leagues"—that is to say, a kind of coalition of party organizations of republics and provinces—and the conversion of the federation into a confederation, or at least confederative status for their own republic; while the Serbs want to preserve the leading role of the League of Communists in society, unity in the party based on the principles of democratic centralism, and a strong federation.

Events since the suspension of the 14th congress have developed at terrific speed. Stressing their desire for independence and without consulting with the organizations of other republics, the Slovene Communists announced at their party conference at the beginning of February their transformation into an autonomous political organization called the LCS-PDR [League of Communists of Slovenia-Party of Democratic Reform] with its own program and statutes.

This step was determined to a considerable extent by the political situation in Slovenia, which is in the runup to parliamentary elections, the first round of which will take place on 8 April. This republic was ahead of the rest in introducing a multiparty system and it was there that Communists first felt on their necks the hot breath of an opposition with sights very firmly set on winning the power struggle. Given this, the LCS was forced to actually restructure itself on the move.

What is the LCS-PDR offering the electorate? Much is, if not borrowed for, then very close to the programs of the social democratic parties. The election manifesto "For a European Quality of Life" promises a new republic constitution, parliamentary democracy, and cuts in the army. "We will fight," it records, "to transform Yugoslavia into an effective confederation with a market economy, democracy, and all the basic human rights and freedoms." The party is counting on its candidate, M. Kucan, former leader of the republic party organization, winning the contest for the post of president [predsedatel] of the Slovene Presidency—the republic's "president" ["prezident"].

A similar situation exists in Croatia, where Communists are also busily engaged in preparing for the parliamentary elections in the republic, scheduled for end of April.

Here I want again to return to the question of the 14th (Extraordinary) LCY Congress, for the evolution in the stance and actions of Slovene and Croatian Communists has considerably altered the possibility of its resumption. Under the new conditions the LCY leadership, in the shape of the Central Committee Presidium, has sought compromise bases in order to preserve a single national party on the country's political stage. A Presidium working party has drafted a document to solve undecided questions in the party. The essence of it is that the 14th congress should be continued on "new program bases and organizational decisions, which will make it possible for all LCY detachments to get involved in its work." The focus of attention is on the task of "immediately transforming the LCY into a modern political party, relations within which should change by being democratized, while the program's political aims in general should be brought into line with the multiparty model of a political system and the development of democracy."

However, this compromise plan has not had any substantial impact in altering the state of affairs in the LCY. The Slovene Communists, who are refusing to take part in the work of LCY leading organs and rule out any possibility of the 14th (Extraordinary) LCY Congress resuming with its particpation, are sticking to their old position. Moreover, the LCS-PDR has put forward the idea of establishing a constituent congress with the aim

of creating a "league of democratic socialist parties" based on autonomous republic organizations.

Croatian Communists, who have advocated the convening of a regular 15th LCY Congress on new program bases, have stated that for them the 14th congress is over. I. Racan, leader of the LCS-PDR, considers that the attempts being made to revive the activity of the Yugoslav Communist organization could lead to new confrontation between them and deepen the crisis in society.

The stance of the party organizations of Serbia, Montenegro, and the Army is to insist on the resumption without fail of the 14th congress.

The party organizations of Bosnia, Hercegovina, and Macedonia have become more inclined toward the "Croation option" and in order not to be out of "vogue" are also considering changing their titles.

The fact that the position in the LCY remains difficult and contradictory has also been shown by recent events. Twice since the suspension of the 14th congress the LCY Central Committee Presidium has tried to set up a Central Committee plenum with a single item on the agenda—the possible continuation of the congress—and each time efforts have been unsuccessful. Finally, on 30 March members of the Central Committee gathered in Belgrade, but not as a full body—the representatives of Slovenia and Croatia naturally did not go. Literally hours before the opening of the session the Macedonians declined to take part, stating that without the Slovenes and Croatians the plenum was not authorized to adopt any decisions. After trenchant discussion it was resolved to call the plenum a consultative working session of the LCY Central Committee. Nevertheless members of the LCY Central Committee from Bosnia and Hercegovina made an ostentatious exit.

The crisis in the party, M. Pancevski, president of the LCY Central Committee Presidium, noted in the report he delivered to the session, has put down very deep roots, which are the consequence of problems built up in society. "If we put off completing the 14th congress," he stated, "that will not only exert an unfavorable influence on party members but will also open the doors to political nihilism regarding everything that has been achieved."

The participants in the LCY Central Committee consultative working session sent a letter to Communists, 14th congress delegates, and party organizations. They urged them to give their opinion and suggestions regarding the resumption of the congress, which, depending on this, could be either a continuation of the 14th congress or a constituent congress of a new party inheriting the positive values of the LCY. It is proposed this congress be convened at the end of April.

"In expressing our concern over the fate of our political organization and the development of democratic processes in society," the letter stresses, "we deem it necessary to do our utmost to ensure that the LCY remains the most influential political force in the country, despite the current difficulties and disagreements among the leaders of individual republics."

What next: A new outburst of emotion, which could worsen the general situation in the country, particularly in the highly sensitive sphere of ethnic and interrepublic relations, as happened after the interruption of the work of 14th (extraordinary) congress, or well-considered dialogue and a search for acceptable solutions to overcome the split in the LCY?

In any event an unprecedented situation has arisen in the Yugoslav communist party. The final word here now belongs to rank-and-file Communists, whose voice has quite often been muffled of late and not heard behind the high-faluting "verbal skirmishing" of ambitious "national" leaders. The fate of the communist movement in Yugoslavia will depend on them, the rank-and-file party members.

'Viewpoint' Program Views East Europe Changes

LD0604101690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 05 Apr 90

["Viewpoint" program on international affairs with Political Observers Victor Levin and Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin]

[Text] [Levin] Hello comrades. The changes in Eastern Europe are giving rise to very great interest—one, which, let us be blunt, is far from idle interest, either. A whole number of questions emerge. The first and, perhaps, the uppermost question of concern to many Soviet people is the question of ensuring the Soviet Union's security.

The process of German unification occupies a special position here. With political observer Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin in our broadcast today we will endeavor to reply to the main question: how do the processes taking place in Eastern Europe affect guarantees of the Soviet Union's security; how can they affect our life in future?

[Shishlin] It seems to me that the changes, the radical changes which have taken place in Eastern Europe, as well as the process of unification of both German states—all these phenomena have several dimensions, none of them simple. In the first place, there is the political dimension, since our listeners are naturally interested in what will take place in the Eastern European countries which had earlier been geared toward socialist development. There is the economic dimension, since these countries are organically tied up with our national economy. I cannot say that this cooperation stood out every year by high effectiveness. But, on the whole, it used to be mutually advantageous, although it was badly balanced.

The past, no matter how far away from us, forcefully makes itself felt, and this is the case with almost every

Soviet family. The special sensitivity, the political sensitivity, the moral sensitivity of the Soviet people toward the process of unification of the two German states is therefore something that is natural. Fully sharing these feelings, I want to say that, all the same, it is necessary to analyze and judge these changes in a very balanced and disciplined manner. Let me begin with the most painful question: the question of our country's security. Let us, all the same, proceed from the fact that as far the Soviet Union's military, defensive potential is concerned, it is more than impressive. After all, in the course of the arms race into which we are dragged, a situation finally emerged in which the Soviet Union and the United States are able to destroy each other many times over. Even though this situation is, of course, perfectly absurd and completely unjustified, political impasses lead precisely to this. That is why it is important to understand that the reduction of armed forces being carried out by the Soviet Union and the defensive doctrine adopted as the basis of the development of our armed forces does not even by one iota weaken the Soviet Union's security as a state; nor does it weaken by one iota the Soviet Union's ability to stand up for its interests. You do know that as far as our armed forces are concerned they have first class equipment. Foremost attention has been paid and is being paid to the development of armed forces.

One must, of course, be aware that the line to overcome confrontation, the line of getting peaceful cooperation going does not, in itself, mean at all that the Soviet Union, the Soviet state is of the view that we have already entered the peace period finally and irrevocably and that our task is merely to transfer literally all the resources used to strengthen the country's defense capability to peaceful construction purposes. No. The Soviet Union does, indeed, have at its disposal all the necessary resources to protect, as we say, the peaceful toil of the Soviet people and to safeguard perestroyka within the terms of reference of foreign policy.

[Levin] Nikolay Vladimirovich, you will, at the same time, agree that for many years we used to say that the Warsaw Pact organization is a reliable shield of peace and socialism. We paid quite a lot of attention to this organization. It used to occupy in our policy one of the very important, not to say foremost positions. At the same time, it is now becoming more and more difficult to refer to the Warsaw Pact organisation as a military organization.

[Shishlin] Perhaps that's so, although, nevertheless, the Warsaw Pact remains for the moment, and it remains actually as a military-political alliance, although the task has been set to transform the Warsaw Pact into a political-military alliance, and then, perhaps, simply into a political alliance, and then, perhaps, to embark in general on the elimination of the Warsaw Pact, but within the framework of a common European process, within the framework of the transformation of the NATO bloc, too, from a military-political alliance to a political-military alliance, to a political alliance, and then, in the process of forming a single system of European security, we can, after all, conceive, as a real prospect, the elimination of the two blocs, the total surmounting of confrontation, and Europe's entry, a single Europe, a common home, into an era of really peaceful, equal and mutually beneficial cooperation.

[Levin] In that case a question occurs to me here, and I understand that this question also occurs to many of our radio listeners: the common European process opens up very substantial and broad prospects, and I think that, when we were only just advancing the initiative of building, or creating the common European home, we didn't even have a very clear idea how developments would proceed, and where, ultimately, this could lead. I have myself in mind. Those architects of the common European home probably had quite a clear idea. But the process began during the existence of both the Warsaw Pact Organization and of NATO. Won't the processes under way in Eastern Europe have a negative influence on the common European process?

[Shishlin] I would like to believe in the reverse, although I understand the reasoning that leads you to raise the question in precisely this way. Because, if we think in purely arithmetical terms, then, it would appear, there was a single, monolithic bloc, with very strict, mutual discipline, with strict obligations, but now the picture is entirely different. The leaders of Eastern European states come to the Soviet Union, the conversation is conducted differently, in a different tone, different problems are discussed—it concerns the radical restructuring of our relations with our neighbors. Well, it would appear that there are grounds here for concern, there are grounds for asking ourselves various questions, including difficult ones. Nevertheless, I would repeat that this is arithmetical counting, but in politics it is preferable to use not arithmetical counting but algebraic counting. Because the changes in Eastern Europe are creating a new European climate overall, and it will be much easier for the common Europan process to develop in this new European climate. And it seems to me that it is no accident that even now we can say that the idea advanced by the Soviet Union to convene a Helsinki-2 in 1990, which was received with a certain reserve in the West, this idea is now accepted, in point of fact, without reservation. And more than that: look, what are they saying in Paris, what are they saying in London, what are they saying in the other European capitals? Everyone is saying that the actual process of the unification of Germany has to be harnessed to the common European process, that there must be no haste. It is another matter that this united Germany really must not create a threat to its neighbors, really must not bear a military challlenge, and here, of course, lies the vexed question: where should it be?

[Levin] Where should it be, and how can it be ensured that not a single neighbor of the unified German state feels threatened?

[Shishlin] I think that this is a very legitimate way of putting things, and in this case, as our listeners know, there exists the "two-plus-four" formula--this can be

said in either order—that is, the two German states and the four great powers, including, naturally, the Soviet Union, but probably it is more correct to speak, all the same, about the formula "two plus 33 European states plus the United States and Canada", because the problem of actually ensuring lasting peace in Europe is of equal concern to all, and in connection with this, the unification of Germany itself must be on condition of practical, very specific and strict obligations that would exlude the possibility of any political revanchist ambitions arising again on German soil, thus introducing elements of alarm and threat into the European situation.

[Levin] But at the same time, we know that such revanchist tendencies exist in certain quarters in West Germany and, let's be honest, in the GDR as well. True, I think that in this, we have sometimes shifted the accent somewhat in deference to the former political purposes, and given these tendencies more attention that they deserve. Although at the same time, one could not have closed one's eyes to them. I am judging, for example, by this figure: a public opinion poll was recently conducted among the representatives of various lands, that is, those Germans whose forefathers lived on the territories which became part of Poland, the Soviet Union, or lived, for example, in the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia. It emerged that only eight percent of those asked talk about being ready, in certain circumstances, to return to the so-called original lands. For this reason, of course, natual processes make themselves felt, young people have already put down roots where they live, but there are such tendencies. There are also neo-Nazi ones—in Germany, both Germanies, they prefer to talk about radical rightwing forces, as if to say that this is not neo-Nazism at all, but these are nuances. But such forces do exist. Could they, in certain circumstances, again play a dominating role? I think that it is not possible to exclude such a possibility 100 percent.

[Shishlin] You know, perhaps, of course, if it is so intelligent to call them right-wing radical forces, perhaps, at some time, they will be fairly discernible and audible on German soil, but it seems unrealistic to me that they should gain the upper hand in the visible future. But, or course, there is one thing that I am in no doubt about, that the territorial changes which have taken place as a result of World War II, including the eastern border of Germany, be it the GDR or a unified Germany, are inviolable. This is an absolute, unanimous demand of the whole of the world community. Furthermore, I would like to say that when we talk of security, we should not measure everything according to the concepts that we came out of World War II with, and one must understand that should a modern war break out, it would be totally incomparable even with the hell that reigned on European soil in the years of World War II. It would truly be a catastrophe, a worldwide catastrophe. And in this case, I think that the very understanding of this has also struck the political forces which today determine the leading world tendencies. An understanding of it has given rise to this process of slackening of tension, the overcoming of the cold war, and the emergence of what we could call the truly peacetime period upon which we are embarking.

And from this point of view the year 1990 is a very important one, particularly when one takes into consideration the changes which have taken place in Eastern Europe and the changes which continue to build up in the course of the rapprochement of the two German states.

[Levin] I think that, of course—and here I want to return to the thesis you have been talking about—the process of the unification of Germany is a natural process and we have to be fully aware of this. The Germans have the right to live in a single state. This is an anxiom, so to speak, but their neighbors also have the right to see in Germany not a rival but a normal neighbor, the kind of state that will be closely written into the processes of overall European development and that is capable of playing a very beneficial role. And given all the conditions, despite the fact that manifestations are sometimes taking place in the GDR now which are distressing for us—to put it mildly—you do indeed throw up your hands when you come across so-called Republicans in the GDR who preach what are essentially neo-Nazi views, but time and the 45 years which have passed since the end of World War II have nevertheless in my view done their work and now we have very many friends—I can say this with complete confidence—in the GDR; and we have a lot of friends in the Federal Republic of Germany. And when we talk about the security of our country we for some reason or other have hitherto always concentrated attention upon its military might. But military might is only one of the factors in ensuring national security. Economic might, the influence of the ideas which this country is radiating and implementing—in my opinion now is indeed a time when the authority of the Soviet Union in the world is very high. This also strengthens our national security.

[Shishlin] I agree with this and I do indeed think that our radio listeners also understand perfectly well that the might of a state is determined not only by the number of missiles, not only by the number of tanks, not only by the coordination of the action and interaction of the arms of the services, but rather the might of a state is determined by its spiritual strength, by its confident economic development, by its political stability. And it seems to me that those pressing issues on today's agenda of the Soviet Union, which the new presidential rule is striving to resolve, in economic matters, in interethnic relations, in strengthening the political structures of society and in the further affirmation of democracy in our country, to a decisive degree will determine the future of the Soviet Union, the future of Europe, and the future of the whole world, too, to a certain extent.

[Levin] So I think that, despite the complexity of the issues which our country is now coming up against,

despite the acute nature of these problems, we do have grounds for looking forward calmly and confidently. Do you agree?

[Shishlin] Yes.

[Levin] Thank you.

West Europe

Further Reportage on UK's Hurd Visit to USSR

Shevardnadze, Hurd Talks Reviewed

PM1204122990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian Second Edition 12 Apr 90 p 4

[TASS report: "Minister's Visit"]

[Text] Talks were continued in the Soviet Foreign Ministry today between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Douglas Hurd, British secretary of state for foreign and Commonwealth affairs, who had arrived in the Soviet Union for an official visit.

The two foreign ministers' dialogue centered on the state of affairs in Europe. It was pointed out with satisfaction that the general evolution on the continent creates favourable prerequisites for a constructive solution to the existing problems and for the strengthening of security and stability.

The two sides had a frank exchange of views on the course of affairs connected with the building of German unity. The two ministers pointed to the coincidence of the Soviet Union's and Britain's fundamental approaches to a settlement of problems that arise in this connection: the drawing of the two German states closer together and the building of German unity should evolve in a peaceful democratic way with due regard for the legitimate interests of all the countries, within the context of realities that took shape in post-war Europe, and with the inviolability of the existing borders remaining as indispensible condition.

It was emphasised that the "two plus four" mechanism plays an important role in resolving the external aspects of German reunification and that its work should be intensified.

It was reaffirmed that the Soviet Union favours the synchronisation of the formation of a unified Germany with a positive evolution of the all-European process and the formation of a fundamentally new European security structure which will replace the blocs.

A war risk prevention center in Europe, the idea of which was put forward by the Soviet Union and supported by a number of European countries, could become an important element of such structure.

Shevardnadze disagreed with Hurd's remark that NATO membership of a reunified Germany would best ensure the security of the whole of Europe. From the Soviet Union's point of view, such a version of solution would upset the military and political balance that has taken shape in Europe.

The two foreign ministers considered matters connected with holding in 1990 a summit meeting of the leaders of 35 countries which participated in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

The two sides are convinced that the CSCE summit should become a major stride in the development of the all-European process and be crowned with a tangible political document reflecting the realities of the present-day development of Europe.

The sides agreed that the CSCE summit should do as follows:

—Note the increased spirit of cooperation in East-West relations,

—Sign an agreement on conventional arms and if possible an accord on confidence-building measures, and determine future arms control steps and means to strengthen security in Europe,

—Solemnly to reaffirm the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference, primarily those provisions which concern the inviolability of borders and develop some other principles, including such as non-use of force either between blocs or inside blocs, raise the role of conference mechanisms in settling disputes, to strengthen democratic structures through universal commitment to free elections, and deideologise international relations,

—Develop the process of economic cooperation between CSCE countries, and study means so that it is possible to hold more intensive political consultations at various levels within the CSCE framework. The two sides are convinced that the CSCE summit requires thorough and comprehensive preparations.

When discussing regional issues, the two foreign ministers favored a continuation of international efforts to achieve a settlement in Cambodia, specifically the joint action of five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and of other countries concerned. The two ministers expressed common confidence that there is a real possibility to achieve progress in a Cambodian settlement process.

Describing the situation taking shape in Afghanistan, Shevardnadze poined out that a number of new reassuring elements have appeared there and the possibility of holding free elections is emerging. The attention of the British side was drawn to the proposal made by the Republic of Afghanistan to hold elections under U.N. control, as was the case in Namibia. The Soviet side believes that this proposal could be effectively implemented with an appropriate international support.

Analysing the situation in Africa's south, the two foreign ministers welcomed positive trends that are gathering

momentum in the region and agreed to cooperate with a view to consolidating and developing those trends.

From the viewpoint of preparations for a Soviet-British summit in June this year during a Britain festival in the USSR, the two ministers analysed the state of bilateral relations. It was pointed out that the new quality that the two countries' political contacts are acquiring and the achieved level of mutual understanding in approaches to a wide range of international and bilateral problems make it possible to set the task of putting the entire aggregate of Soviet-British relations onto the track of cooperation and partnership.

The two ministers heard and endorsed reports by the leaders of bilateral working groups that had been set up on the eve of the visit to elaborate in-depth specific matters of European politics, disarmament, regional settlement, transnational problems, bilateral relations, and humanitarian cooperation .

The talks were held in a business-like and constructive atmosphere.

On the same day Douglas Hurd laid a wreath at the Unknown Soldier's Tomb near the Kremlin wall.

The British guest had a talk with Aleksandr Dzasokhov, chairman of the Soviet Parliament's Committee for International Affairs. Matters aimed at developing Soviet-British relations, including those through parliamentary channels, all-European and international aspects of the German reunification process were touched upon during the meeting. Welcoming British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union, Hurd and Dzasokhov expressed hope that the visit would promote an intensification of bilateral economic, trade, scientific, and technical relations.

Hurd left Moscow for Leningard in the afternoon. At the airport he was seen off by Eduard Shevardnadze and other officials. In the evening Hurd arrived in Leningrad.

Spokesman Summarizes Talks

LD1104163890 Moscow TASS in English 1609 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 11 TASS—Matters connected with the future of the European continent, a reunified Germany in particular, were the main subject of discussion during the second day of Soviet-British talks, a high official of the Soviet Foreign Ministry told a briefing here today.

The sides, he said, emphasised the importance of actively utilising the two-plus-four mechanism, holding an experts' meeting after an East German government is formed, and then a foreign ministers' meeting.

Ths Soviet side pointed out the need to work out an agenda for such a meeting.

The talks revealed a certain coincidence of the Soviet Union's and Britain's positions on legally sealing some matters connected with German reunification, the spokesman said.

In particular, he emphasised, the sides feel no doubt about the need for the legal formalisation of the borders of a reunified Germany. The Soviet Union, for its part, believes that the question of a peace treaty with reunified Germany should not be removed from the agenda either.

Such an important international legal document, the spokesman said, would draw the line beneath the post-war period of European history.

During the talks Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze subjected Britain's position on the possibility of reunified German's NATO membership to a critical analysis.

He pointed out in particular that such an approach would not necessarily ensure the european people's peace of mind about their future.

A reunified Germany may reach out to such decisions, to which the NATO framework would not be a restraining factor.

It is believed in the USSR that the only guarantee of European security is to build a collective security system, in which Germany would be a full and equal member.

During the discussion of transnational problems, the Soviet minister put forward an idea of creating a Soviet-British ecological association similar to the already existing Soviet-American one.

Matters aimed at settling regional conflicts were also discussed during the second day of the talks. The Afghan problem was touched upon separately.

The British foreign secretary's attention was drawn to the Afghan government-suggested idea of holding free elections there under the auspices of the United Nations.

The Soviet side believes that free elections under international control justified themselves in Namibia and Nicaragua. To Afghanistan, such a solution would also be promising, it was pointed out at the talks.

Hurd Sums Up Talks With Leaders

LD1104144490 Moscow TASS in English 1434 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 11 TASS—The very close Anglo-British [as received] relationship enables both countries to discuss problems of a new Europe frankly, visiting British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd told a news conference in Moscow today.

Summing up his two days of talks with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and a meeting with President

Mikhail Gorbachev, he said they had focused on arms control and disarmament as well as on European security.

He described the three priority diplomatic tasks involving the Soviet Union and Britain in 1990 as "Two Plus Four" German reunification talks, Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe, and preparations for the Helsinki-II summit.

Hurd said in reply to questions that the situation in Lithuania had been discussed confidentially. He said he had been given explicit information about the Soviet leadership's policies vis-a-vis Lithuania.

He added Britain would continue monitoring the situation which remained a cause of friendly concern.

Speaking of Anglo-Soviet political cooperation in the Middle East, Hurd said both countries should give maximum support to U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's and Egyptian President Husni Mubarak's efforts to set up dialogue between the Palestinians and the Israelis. He added that Britain did not reject the idea of an international conference on the Middle East.

Commenting on the resettlement of Soviet Jewish emigres on Israeli-occupied lands, he said Britain thought it wrong and objected to those Israeli actions as undermining a settlement.

Asked by TASS about the possibility of Britain rejoining UNESCO, he said the issue had recently been considered by the government, which had decided the time was not yet ripe. However, Britain would continue giving direct financial backing to a number of projects in "Third-World" countries.

Hurd said Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was looking forward to her visit to the Soviet Union next June, hoping it would be a landmark event in bilateral relations.

Hurd Interviewed on Moscow Talks

LD1104210990 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1900 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Interview with British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd by correspondent Yuriy Minayev after Hurd's news conference in Moscow on 11 April—recorded]

[Minayev] Sir, you've come to the Soviet Union when this country and the world as a whole face many serious problems. Some of them were discussed by you during the talks with the Soviet leaders, and as you said at the press conference Soviet and British positions on a range of issues have become closer. But, what are the issues where most serious differences still remain?

[Hurd] I think we still have a difference of opinion about the right place for Germany in the security structure of Europe. We believe that it is important for the stability of Europe as a whole that a united Germany should belong to NATO, which means it will be part of an integrated command and is the way in which Armenian troops are stationed on our continent. We think that's important for everybody but equally we are quite clear that nobody wants to neglect the legitimate anxieties of the Soviet Union about this. And we think there are ways of meeting those anxieties.

[Minayev] What kind of compromise do you think can be reached to meet Soviet anxiety over the united Germany becoming a part of NATO and Western desire to see Germany as a part of NATO?

[Hurd] Well, to take one example, I think it might be possible to agree that there would not be NATO stationed forces on, in the eastern part of Germany. I think it might be possible to agree on quite a long timetable for the withdrawal of the present Soviet garrisons in the eastern part of Germany. I think it should be possible to agree on the basis of the ideas which Mr. Gorbachev has put forward, which my own prime minister, Mrs. Thatcher put forward, to agree on a structure building on the Helsinki Final Act which could help to reassure countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

[Minayev] Now, as far the Baltic republics are concerned, certain groups in the Baltic republics are asking Western leaders to curtail economic ties with the Soviet Union as a means of pressuring Moscow. Do you think this would be helpful under the current circumstances?

[Hurd] I don't think so. I mean, we are concerned about the position, particularly in Lithuania, and I expressed that concern. Our relations with the Soviet Union are now such that...so good that we can express these concerns without causing offense, at least I hope so. And so I [word indistinct], we are concerned, we are concerned because there is much at stake here. Not just as regards the Soviet Union itself but as regards the whole conduct of relations between East and West.

[Minayev] Some of Western countries, Britain included, do not recognize that Lithuania is a part of the Soviet Union. But there is a big territorial difference between the Lithuania that became part of the Soviet Union half a century ago and the republic whose efforts to become independent Britain supports now. Lithuania has become much bigger as a result of joining the Soviet Union. What are the borders of the independent Lithuania Britain visualizes?

[Hurd] I don't think that is primarily a matter for us. You are perfectly right—we believe that juridically speaking the annexation of the Baltic republics in 1940 was illegal, we don't accept it. But the actual questions of borders, economic relationships, security relationships between Lithuania and the rest of the Soviet Union, are matters which have to be discussed in a dialogue between them and our whole concern is that there should be such a dialogue and that no one should suppose that the aspirations in Lithuania can be, can be smothered or forgotten, they will not be. There has to be a dialogue in dealing with a nationalist movement.

[Minayev] Yes, I see Britain has a lot of experience in dealing with nationalist movements.

[Hurd, interrupting] We do, we didn't always have sympathy for the Soviet Union while we were dealing with them but it is very difficult to do. You have plans, you have ideas which are quite sensible for the future of a particular territory which is under your flag. You have poeple whom you think are the right standard bearers for that territory, and then suddenly it's swept aside, you have to change your plans and you have to speak and listen and talk and talk, and your patience has to be inexhaustable, that is the leeson which we learned.

[Minayev] But don't you think serious problems may arise as a result of the Lithuanian move to leave the Soviet Union, such as Belorussian claims to the part of its territory which was included in Lithuania when it joined the Soviet Union for example?

[Hurd] Sure, that is indeed a problem. It's been pointed out to me. There are big legal problems about Soviet investment in Lithuania, about the infrastructure which the Soviet Union has installed. I understand all that. These are certainly intractable problems and they will be solved in the end by discussion.

[Minayev] Soviet-British relations have had their ups and downs in the past, even in the recent past, but as you said at the press conference the current Soviet-British relations are good. Do you see any special role for Britain in relations between the Soviet Union and the West as a whole?

[Hurd] I think there is a feeling here in Moscow that Britain, and particularly Margaret Thatcher, were the first to understand and publish to the world outside Russia the importance of perestroyka. I think that does give us a position where we can continue both to speak to our Soviet friends in terms of frankness, but also to speak our allies, our partners, not as an intermediary—because the Soviet Union doesn't need intermediaries—but I think we do have, perhaps, an understanding which certainly my discussions here have helped to strengthen.

[Minayev] And the last question, Mr. Hurd: What will be the message you will bring to Britain as a result of this visit?

[Hurd] I had the strong impression from my talk with President Gorbachev yesterday of a man and a government which faced formidable difficulties which it was not in any way underestimating but which was nevertheless facing these difficulties in a positive spirit. It was using the accelerator to get out of a difficult position rather than using the brake. And personally I am sure that that is right.

Gidaspov Meets British Ambassador Braithwaite

90UN1274C Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1 Mar 90 p 1

[Leningrad TASS report: "Conversation With the British Ambassador"]

[Text] The first secretary of the Leningrad CPSU Obkom [oblast party committee] and Gorkom [city party committee], B.V. Gidaspov, yesterday in the Smolny received the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Great Britain in the Soviet Union, R.K. Braithwaite, and his wife.

The visitor expressed his gratitude for the opportunity to meet and talk with the leader of the Leningrad party organization. They had, he said, a fine reason to get better acquainted with Leningrad, which has always been and is a very interesting city. They would be happy to get a better impression of the political life of the people of Leningrad and of their problems.

The ambassador said that the people of England follow the events and changes in the Soviet Union with great interest. When the Soviet delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet led by CPSU Central Committee Politburo member V.A. Medvedev visited the British Isles it could be seen how full of good wishes the British were toward the perestroyka processes in Soviet society. The ambassador said that they all wished us luck on this difficult road.

B.V. Gidaspov characterized the sociopolitical situation in the city as being rather complex. It demands more unity from the party members who have to realize their immense responsibility for the destiny of perestroyka. Various informal public organizations, politicized factions and groups are coming forward now. So far there are none that can be qualified as parties. But the conscience of the people now, at this transition stage, has already embraced the idea of many parties coexisting in Soviet society. This is a normal course of events.

The Communist Party members also have their own ideas about the perestroyka processes within the party. Several days ago the adherents of the so-called CPSU democratic platform held their conference in Leningrad. Some of the positions they offered need to be evaluated from the point of view of a constructive political dialog.

B.V. Gidaspov continued by saying that the economic situation was also far from being propitious. The weakened leverage of centralized planning and newly created structures caused an efficiency decrease in various industries. The Leningraders are also quite concerned about the future of their city. The authorities together with the people of the city are taking measures now to restore the city to its former reputation as a center of world culture.

After that detailed answers were given to the ambassador's questions. They touched upon the division of the government and party functions; they pertained to the multiparty system and the role of trade unions at the current stage of perestroyka; they dealt with the food problem, construction of the flood prevention dam complex, and the work of cooperatives.

The representative of the USSR Foreign Ministry in Leningrad, V.A. Lopatnikov, was present at the meeting.

The visitor was shown the V.I. Lenin memorial museum in the Smolny.

On the same day the ambassador had a conversation with the chairman of the Lensovet [Leningrad city council] Ispolkom [executive committee], V.Ya. Khodyrev.

Biryukova Addresses London Drugs Conference

LD1204031990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1315 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] London, 11 Apr (TASS)—Today saw the end here of a three-day international conference on cocaine and reducing the demand for drugs, organized at the initiative of the British Government and the United Nations. Representatives of over 110 states and influential international organizations discussed a package of measures capable of reducing the production, proliferation, and consumption of drugs.

A speech made by Aleksandra Biryukova, the head of the Soviet delegation, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, evoked a big response from those attending this representative forum. Noting the need to reduce the demand for drugs, she proposed the strategy in that directions should be made more concrete, proceeding from the view that "drug addiction is generated primarily by the social and cultural living conditions, and only later in the coca and poppy plantations and in chemical laboratories." The Soviet delegation suported a UN proposal for setting up a data bank on the forms and methods of activities in this direction in various states.

Those present at the forum today approved a draft political declaration stressing the urgent need for broad cooperation between government institutions and the public in all countries to combat the illegal circulation and consumption of narcotic substances.

Sitaryan Attends Bonn Economic Conference

LD1104090390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1950 GMT 10 Apr 90

[Text] Bonn, 10 Apr (TASS)—TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Gulkin reports: The conference on economic cooperation in Europe has been a step towards the development of the CSCE process, and has played an important role in the preparation of Helsinki-2. Such was the appraisal given of this event by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, FRG foreign minister, Stepan Sitaryan, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, during a conversation which took place today. The Soviet representative is taking part in the economic forum being held in Bonn.

As pointed out in reports by the FRG Foreign Ministry, Genscher noted that the process of reforms in East European countries provides great opportunities for the all-round development of these states and also of the partners cooperating with them. Political realism and good sense, he stressed, demand the fullest use of the favorable conditions.

Addresses Economic Forum

LD1004220290 Moscow TASS in English 2055 GMT 10 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondents Yevgeniy Gulkin and Vladimir Serov]

[Text] Bonn April 10 TASS—Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Stepan Sitaryan who addressed the Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe, described the Bonn forum as an important milestone on the road to a new stage in economic East-West cooperation.

He said that the conference worked against the background of large-scale, deep-going and rapid changes in Europe. In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, the forum successfully tackled the tasks it faced.

The Soviet representative told forum participants about measures taken by the USSR to accelerate the economic reform through controlled and stage-by-stage transition to market relations.

In the USSR there are already over 200,000 cooperatives and about 250 associations of producers. The number of joint ventures topped 1,500. Small and medium businesses are also taking root. The Soviet participation in the international division of labour will help this process.

Dealing with the task of the rouble's convertibility, Sitaryan noted that favourable outside conditions are also important for this purpose, as well as support by the Western business community for changes in the USSR.

He also pointed to the importance of international cooperation in the conversion of munitions industries, which will embrace about 400 enterprises in the Soviet Union.

Pointing to the need to remove artificial restrictions on East-West trade, the deputy prime minister suggested that consultations should be started on the rules for the transfer of technology of dual designation. They should provide, if need be, for a procedure of inspection of its post-purchase use.

He stressed that the COCOM's [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] activities should not remain a "sacred cow".

West German Economics Minister Helmut Haussmann praised the results achieved by the conference. Identity of opinions shown by forum participants concerning the principles of international economic cooperation was an important move towards the integration of East European countries into the world economic system, he emphasised.

These countries recognised the principles of the market economy at the conference. The minister stressed that it

is time now to apply them in practical activities and to make them a component part of business relations.

The market economy, as the basis for a new economic order in Europe, will create more favourable conditions for the development of international cooperation.

Supreme Soviet Delegation Visits Cyprus 9 Apr

LD0904190890 Moscow TASS in English 1549 GMT 9 Apr 90

[Text] Nicosia April 9 TASS—A delegation from the USSR Supreme Soviet, headed by Parliamentary Group Chairman Aleksey Yeliseyev, began an official visit to Cyprus today.

The delegation was received by President Yeoryios Vasiliou, who spoke highly of the Soviet Union's "consistent support for the Cypriots' drive for a just solution of the Cyprus problem."

The president wished success to perestroyka in the Soviet Union and said that "the expanding economic cooperation between the two countries is a real contribution to perestroyka."

The delegation also met with Vassos Lyssarides, president of the House of Representatives. He expressed satisfaction with the state and prospects of interparliamentary ties between the two countries.

IPU Discussion of Cyprus Problem Reported

NC0604205590 Moscow in Greek to Greece 1900 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Notes by Spartak Alekseyev on the discussion of the Cyprus problem at the 83d IPU Conference in Nicosia]

[Text] The conference once again affirmed that the Cyprus problem is not significant only locally. It is not a domestic quarrel between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, as President Yeoryios Vasiliou has observed. Most countries and IPU [Interparliamentary Union] members view the Cyprus problem as an international problem, as confirmed from the talks by some of the heads of the delegations to the conference.

The international character of the Cyprus problem stems from two basic factors. One is that any instability and tension on the island is immediately reflected in the area and is directly linked, as the U.S. delegate to the conference stressed, with the problem of the preservation of peace and security in the Mediterranean. The other factor lies in the margin of international rules, international law, and human rights. It is precisely on these that the problems of the Cypriots and their state, the Cyprus Republic, should be solved.

The method for its solution stems from the international character of the Cyprus problem. First, Cypriots, Greeks, and Turks, should be guaranteed at the international level the right to decide for themselves, without any outside intervention or pressure, the way they should exist and cooperate in an independent and sovereign state. Second, the settlement of all external aspects of the Cyprus problem should be safeguarded through corresponding guarantees of the Cyprus Republic's international status. A special international conference on Cyprus under UN auspices would be best for finding a solution and for its safeguards.

Preparatory consultations of various kinds could take place for such a conference and for defining the corresponding mechanisms for the solution to the Cyprus problem. The United Nations and the personal efforts of its secretary general could play a great role in this respect. The Soviet Union has proposed that the Cyprus problem should be included among the regional problems to be discussed at the Soviet-U.S summit meeting.

Very useful steps could be taken within the framework of the European procedure, for instance, at the EEC level where the problem of the Cyprus Republic's participation in the community is being discussed. Italian Prime Minister Andreotti spoke of such a possibility during his recent visit to Cyprus. The current 83d IPU conference in Nicosia is a good step toward finding an international sulution to the Cyprus problem. This international organization is one of the oldest and is prestigious.

Consequently, the international atmosphere is exceptionally favorable so that at last both the Cypriot and all the world may be rid of the problem which has clouded the situation in Cyprus and around it for 16 years. However, the Cypriots themselves must plant the seed from which the solution to the problem can begin. A constructive dialogue in good will between the two Cypriot communities that will correspond to the international atmosphere must be crowned with agreement. Whether the solution will be a federation, as the IPU conference has recommended, or some other form, should be decided by the Cypriots themselves. In ancient times it was said that the Babylonian road will not take you to Jerusalem. I think only the Cypriot road will lead to the solution to the Cyprus problem.

Finland Offers Airport for Israel-Bound Jews

PM0604142390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Shmyganovskiy dispatch: "Transiting to Tel Aviv"]

[Text] Helsinki—Finland has agreed to offer one of its airports for transit purposes to Soviet Jews emigrating to Israel. This was announced at a meeting between Foreign Minister P. Paasio and Minister of the Interior J. Rantanen on the one hand, and S. Dinits [name as transliterated], leader of the World Zionist Organization, and A. Na'im, Israeli ambassador to Finland, on the other.

The press is reporting that the first group of emigrants leaving Leningrad—around 100 people—will receive transit visas. On arrival in Helsinki they should immediately fly to Tel Aviv.

As is well known, Hungary's Malev airline has temporarily suspended such shipments of Soviet emigrants via Budapest owing to threats from certain terrorist organizations. The choice of a new transit airport in the Finnish capital is partially due to the fact that this country represents the USSR's interests in Tel Aviv. Moreover, Finland's religious organizations will provide assistance to the emigrants.

UUSI SUOMI stresses that it is just a question of Jews living in Leningrad, Leningrad Oblast, and Estonia. According to Israeli figures, there are more than 100,000 such people (in total, according to the same figures, 500,000 Soviet Jews have currently applied for exit visas).

This agreement has prompted quite a sharp reaction in the Arab world. Z. al-Wazir, PLO representative in Finland, immediately lodged a vigorous protest with the Foreign Ministry. He told journalists that mass emigration is in itself an "unfriendly and provocative act vis-a-vis the Palestinian people, who are suffering from the occupation."

The newspaper HELSINGIN SANOMAT writes that, following the appearance in the Arab press of articles on the new transit center, the Finnish Embassy in Lebanon is expecting possible attacks on Finns in Beirut and throughout the country.

It is also reported that Finland retains the right to demand that Israel not settle the "Helsinki" wave of immigrants in the occupied Arab lands. As is well known, it was this fact that caused the new wave of tension in the region.

Gorbachev Greets Finnish President on Anniversary

PM0904120990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Apr 90 Second Edition p 6

[Undated message from USSR President M. Gorbachev to Finnish President M. Koivisto on treaty anniversary]

[Text] To His Excellency Mr. Mauno Koivisto, President of the Finnish Republic

I cordially greet you, Mr. President, and the friendly people of Finland on the 42d anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Between the USSR and Finland.

This document reliably serves to develop the multifaceted cooperation between the USSR and neutral Finland, which has gained a new quality and dynamism as a result of the agreements reached in October last year at our meeting in Helsinki.

I am convinced that the Soviet-Finnish declaration—new thinking in action in conjunction with the 1948 treaty—is creating the most favorable preconditions for collaboration between our countries in the interests of stability and security in a Europe that is undergoing renewal, peace, and fruitful cooperation in the northern and Baltic regions.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev

Ryzhkov Greets Finnish Counterpart

PM0904123590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Apr 90 Second Edition p 6

[Undated message from Soviet Prime Minister N. Ryzhkov to Finnish Prime Minister H. Holkeri on treaty anniversary]

[Text] To His Excellency Mr. Harri Holkeri, Prime Minister of Finland

Please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, my sincere greetings on the 42d anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and Finland.

Today, when there is a rising tide of positive changes in the world arena, the treaty continues to express the desire of our two neighboring states to build their relations on the basis of trust, friendship, and respect for one another for the good of our countries' peoples and in the interests of collaboration on the continent.

Our relations have a great future. I am sure that the realization of the constructive potential of the accords and agreements reached during the Soviet-Finnish summits in October last year will make it possible to raise cooperation between the USSR and neutral Finland to new heights.

[Signed] N. Ryzhkov

Swiss Joint Venture To Decontaminate Chernobyl

LD0304153690 Moscow TASS in English 1400 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Kiev April 3 TASS—By TASS correspondent Alexey Petrunya:

"The joint Soviet-Swiss joint venture Combitec will decontaminate up to five tonnes of metal every day from radioactive substances within the 30-kilometre Chernobyl zone," Yevgeny Senin, 48, director of the Chernobyl International Research Centre, told TASS.

"An agreement to establish the venture was recently signed by representatives of the Pripyat scientific and production amalgamation and the Swiss firm Recytec," he said.

A very large amount of metal has accumulated in the zone, established around the Chernobyl nuclear power station by a decision of the Soviet Government, following the April 1986 accident, Senin said.

There are 20,000 tonnes of rustless steel alone. The assembly of equipment will be started in summer this

year. It will make it possible to use the most-up-to-date technology, including complex chemical reactions.

"As far as research contacts are concerned," Senin said, "We have prepared a treaty with the International Atomic Energy Agency to the effect that our laboratories will employ foreign specialists who will work in research branches that are of interest to them, primarily radiobiology.

"Two hotels are being built for them in Zeleny Mys settlement. Joint programmes are being prepared for implementation. The first international conference on the biological aspects fo the Chernobyl accident is expected to be held in September. About 100 foreign specialists of world renown are expected to attend.

"The Pripyat Amalgamation was established in December last year in place of the Kombinat Association which was in charge of decontamination operations. The Pripyat personnel are monitoring the condition of ground waters and supervising all hydraulic engineering facilities and the flood plains of rivers that flow within the zone.

"The amalgamation is in charge of dumping radioactive mud. There are several hundred dumping grounds in the zone. The construction of a plant to process radioactive substances will be started soon. Pripyat personnel also engage in research in seven branches, including radiobiology and the effect of radiation on human beings, fauna and flora."

Senin, who is also deputy general director of Pripyat, pointed out that the work done over almost four years had made the zone much cleaner compared to the period immediately following the accident.

'United States of Europe' Idea Receives Impetus

PM0604084790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 5

[B. Moskvichev dispatch: "EEC: United States of Europe on Agenda"]

[Text] Brussels—The idea of turning the "Common Market" into a United States of Europe has recently received powerful new impetus from the leaders of the "Twelve."

Whereas previously people talked about the need to set up a unified currency system and a single market, now the question of political union has been brought to the fore. The rapid changes in East Europe, German unification, and the problems of the future single market—problems which require rapid resolution—are prompting the EEC countries to accelerate the process of consolidating, above all, political union among the states of the "Common Market." Over the past few days many leaders of the "Twelve" have declared themselves to be supporters of this idea.

A plan drawn up by Belgian Foreign Minister M. Eyskens for setting up a European political union has been disseminated at the European Parliament. The Belgian draft is aimed first and foremost at resolving practical tasks connected with building political union, and it proposes a number of specific reforms aimed at creating the actual political system for a future union.

Eyskens devotes great attention to the adoption of decisions by a set majority rather than requiring complete unanimity. Belgium also advocates the development of supranational institutions in a future Europe. In its opinion this will ensure the maintenance of common interests and the possibility for small countries to achieve equilibrium among their more powerful neighbors.

The second main point of the Belgian proposals is to give the European Parliament a new status which will really allow it to become the leading organ of a future United States of Europe. The draft notes that this will make it possible to provide real democratic control over the activity of the EEC Council of Ministers and the decisions it makes. The adoption of the main laws and the alteration of existing laws would be done via the European Parliament. The members of the European Parliament, whose election procedure remains the same, would elect the president of the Commission of the European Communities by secret ballot and ratify the remaining commissioners.

The draft proposed by Eyskens is also aimed at strengthening unity among the "Twelve" in implementing the EC's overall foreign policy course—first and foremost as regards Eastern policy.

As the Belgian press is noting, there is also an Italian draft similar to the Eyskens plan. But the desire to set up a unified political union is meeting with resistance from Britain, which is insisting on the retention of a Europe based on cooperation among independent national governments. The creation of a United States of Europe is moving out of the sphere of political projects onto the practical plane. It will be placed on the agenda of a special EC session in Dublin 28 April.

Latin America & Caribbean

Top Soviet Diplomat Shot Dead in Suriname

LD1104205990 Moscow TASS in English 1808 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] Washington April 11 TASS—By TASS correspondent Oleg Polyakovsky:

In Surinamee a Soviet diplomat Stasis Obaskauskas, second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Paramaribo, was killed by unidentified persons.

A.I. Kavalerov, first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Suriname, reported the details of the tragedy to TASS by telephone:

"On April 9 I left Brazil by air together with mail. The plane arrived at the Zanderij International Airport at 22.15. Obuskauskas was to meet me. It's a one-hour's ride from Paramaribo to Zanderij—55 kilometers. Obuskauskas left shortly after nine but did not arrive at the airport.

"His body was found at seven in the morning the next day in a roadside ditch on the 31st kilometer from Paramaribo.

"Police established that a blue taxi Mazda-626 carrying two or three people overtook his car and blocked the road. Stasis had to stop. He was shot in the head. The attackers fired at point blank range, threw his body into the ditch and drove the car away.

"The police are considering two versions. It may have been an act of terrorism. But they think it was armed robbery. Two similar crimes were committed in the area before the attack on Obuskauskas.

"Two suspects were arrested the same morning in the town of Nieuw Nickerie, 250 kilometers away from Paramaribo, the site of a Corantijn River ferry crossing. A car with Soviet diplomatic plates was seen there.

"There is a lot of unrest here in general, but this was the first murder of a diplomat in the country's history. The entire diplomatic community is taking the murder very close to heart. It has been tragic for us.

"The embassy staff is very small—five diplomats, including the ambassador. The telephone is ringing off the hook, with acquaintances and strangers expressing condolences. The country's president also conveyed his condolences and demanded a special commission to investigate the crime as soon as possible.

"Obuskauskas was 41. His wife, Natalya Obuskauskene, has been here with him. We are sending her home in a week's time. They have [a] daughter Dalya, 10, who remained in the Soviet Union," Kavalerov said.

In conclusion the TASS correspondent asked Kavalerov to convey condolences on behalf of Soviet journalists to the widow of the diplomat.

U.S.-Cuba Dispute Over TV Marti Viewed

PM1104090390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Apr 90 Second Edition p 7

[Own correspondent A. Moiseyev dispatch under rubric "On the Spot": "Dangerous Confrontation. U.S. 'Electronic Warfare' Against Cuba"]

[Text] Havana—As hitherto, the republic's tenacious resistance to attempts by the American "TV Marti" to occupy Cuban television's official channel without permission remains the main political topic here.

Every day, starting from the first transmissions 27 March, all the island's newspapers and its radio and television have been keeping a unique chronicle of the confrontation. Moreover, it is reported that Cuba's technical services are operating effectively. Whereas on the first day "TV Marti's" signals were successfully jammed within 10 minutes of their appearance on the air, on the second day eight minutes were needed, on the third day it took four minutes, and during the latest attempt to occupy television airtime the signals have been stopped inside two minutes...

It is quite obvious that the U.S. aspiration to conquer the Cuban television screen is proving futile. Incidentally, a few days ago the Cuban authorities for the first time afforded foreign journalists accredited to Havana the opportunity of visiting the Revolutionary Armed Forces Air Force base in Baracoa, a small town not far from the capital [as published]. All its personnel are participating directly in jamming the "TV Marti" signals.

Lieutenant Colonel T. Martinez recounted that the Pentagon's role in waging "electronic warfare" against Cuba is no secret to anyone. This is evident if only from the fact that the balloon used for relaying "TV Marti's" signals was put into the air over a USAF base in Florida.

The organization and test transmission of "TV Marti" will cost the United States $7.5 million. By all accounts the U.S. authorities do not intend to stop at this stage, but to proceed further. Just what is Washington trying to achieve?

Judging from the statements of U.S. official spokesmen, the main aim of "TV Marti" is to broadcast to the island via a television signal information which is "otherwise inaccessible to the Cuban population." But how in that case are we to regard the round-the-clock broadcasts of "Radio Marti," which has been broadcasting to Cuba under the auspices of VOA for five years now and which is not being jammed here at all?!

In my opinion, the main stumbling block in this "electronic conflict" lies more in the moral and ethical sphere. The first ever television broadcasting in history beamed to a country which for three decades has jealously guarded its sovereignty and independence could not fail to offend and injure national feelings and the dignity of its people. This is not to mention the legal aspects of "tele-aggression."

The "electronic confrontation" between the two countries is causing alarm and threatens a multitude of additional problems. One of them is disruption to navigation and the threat to flight safety. Nor can the interference on the airwaves please the numerous owners of commercial radio stations in the southern states of America.

The Cuban press has published a letter from Minister of Foreign Relations Isidoro Malmierca to his opposite numbers in the countries of the Rio de Janeiro group, which includes Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, Uruguay, and Peru. The message expressed Cuba's gratitude to these states for their support in Cuba's television confrontation with the United

States. The letter points out that "Cuba has expressed its readiness to discuss with the United States the possibility of searching for forms of freely exchanging radio and television programs on the basis of reciprocity and respect for international laws."

Central America Summit on Area Conflicts

90UF0035A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

[Report by A. Korzin, Novosti correspondent in Managua, and A. Cherepanov, IZVESTIYA correspondent in Mexico: "Nicaragua: Seventh Meeting of Presidents"]

Text] The seventh meeting of the presidents of five Central American countries—Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and El Salvador—opens on 2 April. The venue is the resort locality of Montelimar on Nicaragua's Pacific coast, 60 km from the country's capital.

The region's heads of state will meet in Somoza's former villa: the bungalows, casino, bars, restaurants, night club, and pools which have been built in the vicinity in recent years have created a certain "oasis of prosperity" in Nicaragua. The participants will discuss Central America's "hottest" problems. One of them is the immediate disarming of the contras. According to Nicaraguan President D. Ortega, the accomplishment of this task as quickly as possible is a most important goal for the achievement of peace in the region.

The final date for the disarming of the contras—20 April—was enshrined in the "Toncontin Agreement" concluded in Honduras by members of a special mission of elected Nicaraguan President V. Chamorro and representatives of the leadership of the insurgents. At the same time, however, many contras are, to all appearances, unwilling to come to terms with what they themselves are calling "the deciding of our fate behind our backs." Observers noticed immediately that among the signatories to the "Toncontin Agreement" one very important one was missing. We are talking about I. Galeano, chief of staff of the "Nicaraguan Resistance" and the contras' top military leader. Simultaneously, the Nicaraguan press is asking how the mass incursion into Nicaragua of contra detachments from the camps on Honduran territory should be viewed. According to some sources, there are already about 8,000 of them in the country.

To judge by a statement of representatives of the insurgents—a highly contradictory statement, incidentally—they have no intention of starting offensive operations but are at the same time prepared to ward off any attack by the Sandinista People's Army.

Sandinista newspapers, which are reporting from issue to issue on the army's clashes with the contras, are calling this development a threat to the peaceful handover of power. At the same time, the scales in the unblocking of the conflict in this country are tilting increasingly toward political methods.

On 27 March in Managua representatives of the present and newly elected presidents signed a protocol which the newspaper LA PRENSA called "exceptional." Indeed, it recorded provisions which recently seemed unattainable, primarily as regards the army controlled by the Sandinistas. According to the protocol, the army, yielding to the civilian authority of the president, will be reduced in accordance with the country's economic capabiltiies and social requirements, and also with the Central American accords. The army will emerge from party control, and its leaders will not be able henceforth to simultaneously hold high office in political parties.

The document confirms that the disarming of the contras is a "key component of the creation of a climate of peace and stability in the country." It also enshrines the legal inviolability of the property of Nicaraguans obtained from the state prior to the 25 February elections. It speaks of support for the "stable continuance in office of civil servants" and poses the task of unifying the efforts of the old and new authorities in obtaining international financial support for programs of Nicaragua's economic stabilization.

The positive experience which Nicaragua has accumulated in the pursuit of a policy of national reconciliation affords many observers reason to consider it acceptable in other countries of the region, El Salvador specifically.

Negotiations will begin on 4 April in Geneva between representatives of the Salvadoran Government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. Although President Cristiani recently declared that "this does not mean a resumption of dialogue," UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar will take part in the Geneva meeting. Simultaneously, the Salvadoran Army has for the first time advocated dialogue with the insurgents and begun a purge of its own ranks.

The process of national reconciliation has shifted from standstill in Guatemala as well. The insurgents had on more than 30 occasions suggested that the V. Cerezo government sit down at the negotiating table, but were turned down. Now members of the National Commission for Reconciliation and the leaders of the armed opposition have assembled in Oslo. After four days of intensive consultations, a document has been signed according to which the guerrillas will within the next three months conduct a political dialogue with parties, public organizations, and the church, and then with the government of the country.

Discussion of the problems of dialogue in El Salvador and Guatemala and also a reduction in Armed Forces in Central America will occupy an important place at the meeting in Montelimar, which is due to end on 3 April.

Parliamentarians' Venezuelan Meetings Reviewed

LD0804060690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0925 GMT 7 Apr 90

[Text] Caracas, 7 Apr (TASS)—On Friday [6 April] President Carlos Andres Perez received the delegation of Soviet parliamentarians, headed by N.A. Nazarbayev, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, chairman of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet, who are in Venezuela on an official visit.

The head of the Soviet delegation conveyed a personal message from USSR President M.S. Gorbachev, to C. Andres Perez.

In the conversation, which took place in a friendly atmosphere, the president was informed about the pace of perestroyka in the USSR, and tasks that are facing the Soviet society regarding further implementation of political and economic reforms and resolution of the issues of the radical renewal of the Soviet federation.

For his part C. Andres Perez stressed the political processes of renewal in the USSR enjoy the profound sympathy and support in Venezuela. He expressed a belief that perestroyka in the USSR, which is the necessary renewal of socialist society, would be progressing successfully in the interests of the Soviet people and for the common welfare of the whole international community.

There was a constructive exchange of opinions on the topical international problems that covered disarmament and improvement of political situation as a whole, the necessity to step up joint efforts for establishing a more just and democratic economic order in the world and for paying closer attention to the problems of the world ecological safety.

The president of Venezuela noted the growing influence of perestroyka in the USSR and new political thinking on the positive changes in the world, which accord with the interests of all members of the international community.

Both sides gave a positive assessment to the growing dynamics of the development of the Soviet-Venezuelan relations, the deepening of political dialogue between two countries and their relationship in the UN and on the international arena as a whole. The presence of long-term opportunities for the comprehensive expansion of cooperation between two countries and the positive significance of stepping up interparliamentary exchanges for the links between the USSR and Venezuela was noted.

USSR, Brazilian Ministers Exchange Messages

PM0604150190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Exchange of Cables"]

[Text] In connection with the 45th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Brazil, the two countries' foreign ministers exchanged cables of congratulations.

E.A. Shevardnadze's cable expresses profound satisfaction at the friendly nature of Soviet-Brazilian ties, which are founded on principles of mutual respect, noninterference, and partnership. The mutual desire to further consolidate these relations was confirmed once again during the recent meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and F. Collor in Moscow. Coincident approaches to key international problems create a firm foundation for cooperation between our countries for the good of the peoples of the USSR and Brazil and in the interests of mankind's peaceful development and the consolidation of the positive trends in the international situation.

The cable from Brazilian Foreign Minister Jose Francisco Rezek expresses the Brazilian Government's satisfaction at the high level of ties with the USSR. It points out that the dynamic and substantive political dialogue which has been established between our governments is undoubtedly an important contribution to the creation of a system of international relations aimed at strengthening lasting peace and security. The minister confirmed Brazil's readiness to further broaden its ties of cooperation with the Soviet Union in most diverse spheres.

Ambassador to Mexico Retires, Replacement Named

PM1004083990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 6

["Diary" report on appointment of Mexican ambassador]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has appointed Comrade Oleg Tikhonovich Darusenkov USSR Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United Mexican States.

The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has relieved Comrade Rostislav Aleksandrovich Sergeyev of the post of USSR Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United Mexican States on his retirement.

Supreme Soviet Session

Moscow TV Carries 11 Apr Supreme Soviet Session

Socialist Enterprise Law Passed

LD1104213790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1800 GMT on 11 April begins to carry a recording of the proceedings of the Soviet of the Union session on 11 April in the Kremlin in Moscow. The session is chaired by Ivan Laptev, who opens the proceedings.

At 1802 GMT Boris Vasiliyev, vice chairman of the council's industrial commission, speaks on the draft law on the socialist enterprise. He presents the document, article by article. There are alternative versions of some articles, and he reads a list of amendments.

At 1824 GMT a debate on the draft law begins. A.I. Chabanov notes the plethora of different kinds of enterprise, with their differing tax rates and different degrees of reliance on a free-market system. A fixed system for ensuring mutual deliveries of materials must be organized as soon as possible in order to ensure that a free market really does develop. Labor discipline must also be tightened through a code of conduct.

At 1831 GMT Yu.Kh. Kalmykov says that the law is intended to set up fair and equal conditions for enterprises of all kinds. However, much of what it says is of a "declarative character" and does not look at the specific nature of each kind of enterprise. Then there is the question of how the law coheres with the various legal enactments that are in existence, as well as with other laws. The law is geared wholly toward the needs of the state enterprise, he says and asks: What about the others? They all represent different forms of ownership. He believes it is inadvisable to adopt the bill in its current form.

At 1841 GMT Deputy V.N.Kisin outlines his reasons for believing the bill should be approved at its first reading, followed by deputy V.A. Volkov who says the bill should be free of ideological postulation and there should be free market competition between East and West. He favors those sections of articles which enable workers' collectives to have a say in how their enterprise is run. He believes the draft can be adopted at its first reading.

At 1851 GMT Deputy N.G. Bobritskiy dwells in detail on the different aspects of state and social enterprises and the niceties of forms of ownership. Then Deputy M.I. Shaydulin looks at the bill from the viewpoint of labor and war veterans, pensioners, and the disabled, and believes that more should be done in this direction. Deputy A.F. Zhuravlev says he does not believe there is a basis for adopting the law in the form presented, adding that there is too much talk about enterprises and organizations instead of a law on labor activity.

At 1858 GMT Deputy V.V. Bushuyev takes up some of the points raised by previous speakers and tries to strike a balance between a law on the enterprise and a law on enterprise (predpriyatiye and predprinimatelstvo). He recalls the ANT case and the dangers of the same thing happening again unless the bill is passed. He calls for it to be passed at the first reading. Local organizations should be solely responsible for the registration of enterprises.

Deputy V.Ye. Kurtashin then praises certain aspects of the bill, particularly those referring to management and self-management of enterprises, and the opportunities which it gives to workers.

At 1905 GMT Laptev reads the Soviet of the Union's decision on the law on socialist enterprise, followed by A.V. Reshetnikov and V.Ya. Stadnik who make brief comments on this.

At 1909 GMT Laptev calls for the bill to be put to the vote: It is adopted by majority vote.

At 1909 GMT Justice Minister Yakovlev speaks briefly.

At 1910 GMT the Soviet of Union session ends as the chamber submits amendments to the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on the arrangements for the redemption of damages caused to workers as a result of pneumoconiosis.

At 1911 GMT Moscow Television Service continues with a recording of the Soviet of Nationalities session. Vasiliyev briefly presents a report, and then Yakovlev speaks, reiterating most of his comments in the previous chamber session. He also refers to increased violations of labor discipline at enterprises and cases of egoism in the appointment of managers. He adds that the free market will require the privatization of state enterprises. However, the accountability of managers to the work force via state bodies is to be retained.

At 1927 GMT the debate begins on the two laws, the state enterprise, and the appointment and dismissal of managers. Deputy Lisitskiy says that, as enterprises look after their own interests, so the interests of society as a whole are catered to. However, there are concessions to the administrative-command system. Deputy (?Katsura) urges that the draft law should pass its first reading.

At 1940 GMT Deputy Kiselev notes the contradiction between the generally socialist orientation of Soviet society and the free-market trend of the legislation under discussion. If passed, the law will make the departments and ministries redundant. They must be given a new role so as to serve the new kinds of enterprise. He says that the Commission on Economic Reform found that the bill did not adequately reflect the enterprise's responsibility to the state budget.

At 1947 GMT Deputy Lapygin talks about the unjustified growth of wages among the industrial work force. He urges that the draft laws should both be passed together. Deputy Medeubekov talks about the relationship

between science and the new, market-orientated enterprises. Deputy Tatarchuk says that no one law can ensure free enterprise in the USSR. The law on the socialist enterprise is just one of a package of laws that must all be passed. The absence of any one will weaken the others. The law on the enterprise will help the exchequer to collect money; most of the Supreme Soviet's laws have required vast expenditure. Deputy Abuladze urges adoption of the law.

At 2004 GMT Laptev urges a vote on the law on the socialist enterprise. For: 154; against: 27; abstained: four. The law on the socialist enterprise is passed. They then vote on the law on the appointment and dismissal of managers. For: 144; against: 30; abstained: 11. Finally, they vote on an amendment to a decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on the procedure for recompensing workers who have contracted pneumoconiosis in the course of their work. For: 175; against: one; abstained: 11.

At 2008 GMT the recording of the session ends.

Supreme Soviet Chambers Debate Enterprise Bill

LD1104085790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0630 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] The houses of the Supreme Soviet are today in separate sittings. The Soviet of the Union started work at 1000 [0600 GMT]. The draft law on the socialist enterprise and the draft law on appointing and releasing the heads of enterprises and other senior officials are being examined. The bills are being sponsored by the Council of Ministers, and much work has been done on them in committees and commissions.

Deputy Vasilyev, deputy chairman of the Soviet of the Union's commission on issues of the development of industry, power engineering, equipment and technology, delivered a report on these bills. He remarked that the bills have been drawn up in line with the basic concept of radical economic reform. Their aim is to create the conditions necessary for the functioning of the primary links in the national economy. This is connected with the fact that at the present time the law on the state enterprise is virutally inactive, while the labor collectives at state enterprises are virtually bereft of proprietorial rights. These bills are also to be discussed today at the sitting of the Soviet of Nationalities.

Council of Union Passes Bill

LD1104144190 Moscow TASS in English 1431 GMT 11 Apr 90

[by TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow April 11 TASS—The Council of the Union (one of the two houses of Soviet parliament) today approved in the first reading the bill on socialist enterprises which, together with the previously adopted laws on property, land and leasing, forms the legal foundation for a regulated market economy in the USSR.

Submitting the bill, vice chairman of the council's industrial commission Boris Vasiliyev said it provided equal conditions for the competition of all types of enterprises: individual, collective and state. They are given full independence in planning their operations and deciding their future development and forms of labor remuneration. The bill lays down the rights of state administrative bodies in respect to enterprises.

The discussion revealed a wide range of view. The parliamentary legislative committee, for instance, objected to the bill's approval in the first reading. Its chairman Yuriy Kalmykov believes the bill leans towards the old model of state enterprise. He proposed a package of bills on various types of enterprises. However, the council finally decided to approve the initial bill in the first reading.

Today's meeting also discussed the bill on the appointment and dismissal of heads and other managers of enterprises. It was proposed to appoint directors of state enterprises by decision of state bodies instead of electing them. The method of electing managers, enacted at the beginning of perestroyka, showed that personnel often did not elect the best person for the job, preferring those who suited them.

However, the council refused to approve this document without recommendations from parliamentary committees.

The Council of Nationalities will discuss the same bills this afternoon.

TASS Rounds Up 11 April Supreme Soviet Session

LD1104184190 Moscow TASS in English 1750 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 11 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

Both chambers of the Soviet parliament—the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities—today endorsed the bill on enterprises in the first reading. The bill aims to foster equal conditions for competition between all types of enterprises, whether run by individuals, collectives or the state.

The document gives enterprises full independence in planning their operations, and deciding development and forms of labour remuneration. The bill lays down the rights of state administrative bodies and bans any interference in the economic activity of enterprises.

During the discussion at the Council of the Union, many deputies and even the parliamentary legislative committee objected to the bill's approval in the first reading, saying the bill leans towards the old model of state

enterprise and is unacceptable for other forms of ownership. Nevertheless both councils finally decided to approve the bill in the first reading.

Today's meeting also discussed the bill on the appointment and dismissal of heads and other managers of enterprises. It was proposed to appoint directors of state enterprises by decision of state bodies instead of electing them by labour collectives. The method of electing managers was enacted in 1987.

Soviet Justice Minister Veniamin Yakovlev, who presented the bill, said the election of managers led to the "squandering" of state property, the growth of consumption funds at the expense of production development. The director often became a "hostage" of egoistic interests of the collective that elected him. At the same time, heads of joint-stock, cooperative and other enterprises could be appointed on a competitive basis or elected by the collective.

The Council of the Union refused to approve this document without recommendations from parliamentary committees. The Council of Nationalities overwhelmingly supported this bill and approved it in the first reading.

Supreme Soviet Committee Discusses Unemployment

PM1104135390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by S. Chugayev under the rubric "In USSR Supreme Soviet Committees and Commissions: "He Who Does Not Work...."]

[Text] It looks as though one more fundamental principle of our existence—the obligation of every able-bodied citizen in the country to work—is receding into the past. The principle enshrined in many documents—from the moral code of the builder of communism to the criminal code with its article on parasitism. The principle which for many years made it possible to speak of the existence of enforced labor in our society.

We are not waiving the principle for the sake of it. The postulate extolled for decades—the postulate of the greatest achievements of socialism, the elimination of the social evil that is unemployment—proved upon checking to be a myth. Actually, in the opinion of historians and economists, concealed unemployment has always existed in the country—in the period of collectivization and industrialization and later. But the problem has become particularly acute recently. Today, according to specialists' assessments, six percent of the able-bodied population—about 8 million people—are in fact unemployed in our country. Who will venture to call them parasites?

It is not very serious to seek the reasons for the existing situation in today's changes. They are far deeper. First of all in our socialist economy's chronic desire for extensive development, in the persistent priority of departmental interests over man's interests, in the absolutization of the state form of economic management and ownership. In brief, today we are repeating what we sowed for dozens of years. And the processes of decentralization, the transition to various forms of ownership and to market relations in the economy—all this breaking of old dogmas is merely the catalyst for a natural reaction.

Although that does not make it any easier for us. To judge by the forecasts, in the next five-year plan unemployment will double. How prepared are we to meet this blow? The words "labor exchange" and "free labor market," returned from oblivion, are to be heard increasingly frequently on the lips of economists and sociologists....

They were also heard at the recent sitting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Youth Affairs. Those taking part in the sitting decided to study the problem of employment among young people. That was no accident, of course. Economic relations are becoming tougher with every passing day. The enterprises which have switched to economic accountability [khozraschet], just like those which have been leased and also the cooperatives require highly skilled manpower. That is natural. Just as the appearance for this reason of a kind of "risk group" in the labor sphere is natural. In addition to young people it includes elderly people, invalids, women with children—all those who are the last to be taken on and the first to be dismissed. Experience shows that the practice which exists to this day of exerting administrative influence on hirers of labor with a view to ensuring these people's social protection is ineffective.

Committee member S. Kalashnikov said that the aim of the sitting was primarily to provide information on the state of affairs with regard to youth employment in the country and hence to seek ways for the Committee on Youth Affairs to take part in the solution of the employment problem. To this end it invited specialists studying the problem—lawyers, sociologists, and economists.

A large amount of alarming information was presented. With every passing year it is increasingly difficult for the graduates of schools, vocational and technical colleges, and specialized secondary schools to find work. Increasingly frequently they are being joined by higher educational establishment graduates. This summer the situation is expected to be aggravated. The reduction in the number of institute graduates is causing anxiety. In other words, a mass of young people with neither qualifications nor education is rapidly forming in our country. The danger of this "social bomb" is obvious.

Various ways out of the situation were proposed—from toughening administrative pressure on enterprises by forcing them to take young people to work to emphasizing the self-regulation of the free labor market. The proposals of the representatives of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems can quite rightly be regarded as the most comprehensive approach toward the problem's solution. It is no accident that they

gave rise to the greatest interest and most of all to questions. Ye. Afanasyev, deputy chief of the manpower resources and employment administration, acquainted those assembled with the draft of the Fundamental Principles of Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics on Employment—the legal basis for the state program for the population's employment which is being elaborated for the 13th Five-Year Plan.

Much in the draft looks unusual. For instance, article six headed "The Unemployed." We call things by their names. But perhaps the draft's main distinguishing feature is the declaration of the right (not the obligation) to work. In any freely chosen sphere of activity. If you have legal sources of income you need not work. For those who have neither legal sources nor work, it is planned to include among the measures for social assistance and protection the creation of an employment service with training and retraining centers. Of particular interest is the idea of organizing a state fund for vocational guidance and assistance for the unemployed population. It is proposed that it will be formed with five-percent deductions from enterprises from their payments for manpower resources and will among to R3 billion. One-third of this sum will be spent on reeducation and retraining, about one-third on the organization of voluntary work, nine percent will go on financing the employment service, and approximately the same amount on paying unemployment benefit. As we can see, the draft law is geared more to encouraging labor activity than toward charity.

It is expected that at the fall session of the USSR Supreme Soviet the draft will be submitted for the deputies' examination. The Committee for Youth Affairs will also take part in finalizing it. Much has to be finalized and specified since it is perfectly obvious that hard times await us and the slogan "He who does not work does not eat" is becoming inappropriate to say the least.

Committee Discusses Espionage Against USSR

PM1104114790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Committee Session"]

[Text] Closed hearings on the activity of capitalist states' special services against the Soviet Union were held 5 April in Moscow under the chairmanship of V.L. Lapygin in line with the plan of work of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions. V.F. Grushko, deputy chairman of the USSR KGB, delivered a report on this subject. He also answered questions put by committee members. Then they viewed an exhibition of intelligence equipment used by foreign special services against the Soviet Union. The USSR Supreme Soviet committee adopted an appropriate resolution on the basis of the results of the discussion.

Political & Social

Komsomol Leader Addresses Congress

LD1104210490 Moscow TASS in English 2022 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 11 TASS—"We remain a communist youth organisation," Soviet Young Communist League (YCL, Komsomol) Central Committee First Secretary Viktor Mironenko said today, addressing the 21st YCL Congress.

Mironenko stressed that the Komsomol leadership does not claim the monopoly on the youth movement and hails the formation of a wide spectrum of democratic organisations uniting the country's youth.

Characterising the situation in the Komsomol, Mironenko said that the more resolutely and boldly the Komsomol rejects bureaucratic methods, the clearer becomes many of its organisations' inability to live without habitual instructions and "financial injections from above".

The Komsomol loses its prestige with the Soviet youth. Anti-Komsomol sentiments are growing in the Baltic republics and in Trancaucasia. "Sociological research shows that the Komsomol can count now on a firm support of ten per cent of youth," Mironenko said.

In such conditions all Komsomol activities "should be directed, first of all, at creating conditions for a free development of each person today, without waiting for communism", he said.

If a young man has lost his belief in the "great ideals" and in people, he should try to believe in himself, at least, in his own ability to organise his life reasonably and justly, Mironenko said, adding that the Komsomol wants to help millions of young people in this.

"We understand that many problems our youth faces are caused by problems of all our society", Mironenko said. That is why the youth should take a considerable part of responsibility for the country's future.

Congress Ends 11 April Session

LD1104193290 Moscow TASS in English 1855 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 11 TASS—The first day of the 21st congress of the Young Communist League reflected the urgency and diversity of problems faced by the Soviet Youth. YCL First Secretary Viktor Mironenko said the congress could be considered extraordinary—it is being held during radical reforms in all spheres of Soviet life which also affect its most active part, young people.

The first day was largely devoted to ensuring the democratic nature of the forum's work and decisions that will be adopted at it. After a long debate a paragraph of the regulations guaranteeing the rights of the minority was endorsed. From now on any major document, to be

endorsed by the congress, may have an alternative if it is voted for by not less than one eighth of the delegates.

The work of the congress received added urgency when a representative of the delegation from the Lithuanian Komsomol, which is part of the nationwide organisation, demanded that Alfonsas Matsaitis, first secretary of Lithuania's independent Young Communists Union, be expelled from the congress. Democracy was observed. The majority voted against the proposal.

The delegates livened up when the presidium announced that a man with a placard "down with the spongers of youth" stood outside the building. The deputies decided to invite him to the congress. The "protestor" however, rejected the proposal and left, leaving behind his placard.

By the end of the day the delegates solved organisational issues and heard Mironenko's commentary to the earlier published "report of the YCL CC to the congress".

Tomorrow the congress will continue its work.

10 Apr TASS Preview

LD1004104990 Moscow TASS in English 1026 GMT 10 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Galina Vinitskaya]

[Text] Moscow April 10 TASS—The 21st congress of the USSR Young Communist League (Komsomol) opens here on Wednesday. Its purpose is the renovation of the biggest youth organisation of the country. The agenda of the congress includes the adoption of a new YCL programme and rules. Perestroyka, which began in the USSR in April 1985, roused the youth movement. The first step to the renovation of Komsomol was made at the 20th YCL Congress in 1987. After that it directed the efforts of young people to participation in political, economic and social transformations in the country, began to defend more vigorously the rights and interests of the young in all spheres of life and to work out the fundamentals of youth policy.

Starting from last year, 75 people's deputies have represented Komsomol in the Soviet Parliament. The Committee for Youth Affairs has been formed at the USSR Supreme Soviet and the bill "On General Foundations of the State Youth Policy" has been submitted to the Supreme Soviet.

However, the indecision of the YCL Central Committee in reconsidering the relationship between Komsomol and State and Party institutions and the absence of a clear stand with regard to supporters of the radical and the conservative courses of the restructuring of the Communist Party resulted in a loss of confidence in the Komsomol on the part of politically active young people. A report of the YCL Central Committee to the 21st congress, published in the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper two weeks ago, pointed out that forms of the relationship between the Party and Komsomol had remained unchanged.

The Soviet mass media pointed out on more than one occasion in the past several months that Komsomol, "a loyal supporter of the party", has lost prestige among the majority of the young. Its membership has been reduced by ten million in comparison with 1985.

The "Surgut Alternative" democratic movement was formed inside Komsomol in January 1989 (it was named after the Siberian city where it emerged). Its supporters favour the creation in the USSR of youth organisations advocating socialist, social democratic, Christian and other ideas. According to Viktor Mironenko, first secretary of the YCL Central Committee, Komsomol should continue to be Leninist and Communist, because this is the essence of this youth organisation, of its allegiance to certain convictions.

The drive for independence in some union republics brought about centrifugal forces in Komsomol. The Lithuanian Komsomol organisation split into two wings, one of which continues to be integrated in the USSR Young Communist League. Estonian Komsomol proclaimed its independence. The Youth Union of the Russian Federation was created last February.

Historian Galagan Discusses Komsomol's Future

PM1104115090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Apr 90 Second Edition p 4

[Candidate of Historical Sciences A. Galagan article: "Do Not Be in Too Much of a Hurry To Bury It: Polemical Notes on the Fate of the All-Union Lenin Komsomol [Communist Youth League]"]

[Text] One of the paradoxes of an ideologized society is that self-evident truths are the last to be recognized. An illustration from life. A timid hint from the platform of the 20th All-Union Lenin Komsomol [Communist Youth League] Congress that the Komsomol is on the verge of crisis provoked a sharp reaction. The guardians of the immutability of our principles were carried away with righteous wrath: Slander, they said, undermining the foundations, and so forth. Although it was quite obvious that the crisis had reached its peak long before. But the organization's policy was still based on an optimistic note.... Only three years have passed, and now people keep saying, aloud and in print, that the Komsomol has collapsed, disintegrated, become obsolete, even died.... Some say this with anxiety and distress, others with glee.

It is curious that among those who are most eager to "bury" the Komsomol you will find the names of people who achieved high career positions and prosperity precisely because they tirelessly extolled the perfection of the All-Union Lenin Kosmomol and expressed admiration of the leaders' wisdom, in the people's name. The wind has changed, and every one of them is once again in the forefront (what enviable constancy) on a spirited horse, brandishing the sword of retribution.

But we are not talking about them now—we are talking about the Komsomol. We are about to see the start of the 21st All-Union Lenin Komsomol Congress. And possibly the last. At least, the last in the history of the All-Union Lenin Komsomol as we have hitherto known it. Here a number of questions arise: What will become of the Komsomol? What form will it take? How will it organize its relations with other youth structures? What are its new functions? These questions are the subject of a heated debate in the press, in Komsomol committees, and even at rallies, but the truth is still shrouded in darkness. The 21st All-Union Lenin Komsomol Congress is not likely to clarify matters greatly: The diversity of opinions is too great, while the fundamental documents submitted for the congress' approval, although patently new, bear the imprint of old ideas on the Komsomol's place in society's political system. I therefore think that the quest for an optimum model for the youth league will not end with the congress, but will continue. Success in this will come more quickly, it seems to me, if we evaluate the Komsomol's past and present more accurately.

We must renounce forever the Stalinist historiographical tradition, which prescribes that the Komsomol's history be seen as a triumphal progress from victory to victory. The Komsomol remained true to its original conception only for the first decade. By the end of the twenties it was already deformed in all the basic characteristics (as an independent, sociopolitical, organizationally autonomous, voluntary...and so forth organization) and had virtually turned into its own opposite. It remained in that state unil our own day. Yet we are zealously continuing to impose the myth that this amorphous structure, devoid of any indication of autonomy and cluttered with bureaucratic paragraphs, is the heir to the glorious deeds of the romantic youth organization that was formed in October 1918.

And another thing. It is necessary to renounce the old ideas that the Komsomol is something monolithic, permeated from top to bottom with the spirit of an indivisible commonality of interests. This is one of the most perfidious and shameless myths, designed to turn any attempt at dissidence into a mortal sin. As a historian who has studied thousands of documents on Komsomol history, I can testify to the falsity of this ideological paradigm. The Komsomol, structured on the model of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), began, first slowly, and then with increasing rapidity, to divide into two main levels: "league officials" and the "league masses," that is, the managers and the managed. In essence the Russian Komsomol was split into two Komsomols: the apparatus league and the real league, and this division, historically consolidated, was one of the most mysterious properties of the youth organization. We said "Komsomol," but what we usually meant was the Komsomol apparatus. Pick up any of the 150 "Outlines of All-Union Lenin Komsomol History," to say nothing of dissertations, and you will find, in most cases, the story of directive decisions and apparatus "initiatives," rather than the story of the life (!) of the generations.

Now to the inborn defects of the Komsomol, which with time developed into chronic ailments. The first, in scale and significance, is centralism, which until very recently was passed off as the Komsomol's greatest merit. From the centralist ailment there stemmed others of the same kind: unitarianism, monopolism, and so forth.

Let us mention another ailment of, so to speak, a genetic nature. Conceived as an organic component of the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Russian Komsomol as a political organization was incorporated from the very first into the system of power. Hence, correspondingly, the edict methods of activity, intolerance of dissidence, and constant readiness to engage in coercion. The Komsomol as a whole, especially the top, command level, rapidly recognized the advantageous nature of its position, becoming a kind of magnet attracting seekers of social privileges. Described as the party's reserve for the young generations, the Komsomol became at the same time a school of careerism. And no wonder, because the Stalinist system left young people basically only one way to become involved in future administrative posts—via the Komsomol.

The Komsomol apparatus submitted without a murmur, indeed, cheerfully, to state control of the All-Union Lenin Kosmomol, and became involved equally willingly, with apparent enthusiasm, in the execution of the punitive and instructional functions entrusted to it by the Stalinist regime.

The two-tier structure, and in effect the dual nature, of the Komsomol has long since engendered a dual morality among its functionaries: one for "among ourselves," another for the league's masses. Historical documents preserve telling examples of the mass moral degradation of Komsomol officials and shameless social demagoguery, and all this was carried over to the party with them.

Finally, one last thing. The cause of the All-Union Lenin Kosmomol's main ailments lies in party leadership of the Komsomol, that is, in the very thing that until recently we saw as the source of its strength and of all its victories without exception. The fact is that the Leninist concept of party leadership of the youth league—trust, assistance, comradely criticism of possible mistakes—was replaced by a Stalinist interpretation expressed in a triad of dogmatic "principles": 1) The party formulates a political line for the Kosmomol (and hands it down for strict implementation); 2) the party forms the cadres (that is, the top "level") of the All-Union Lenin Komsomol; 3) the party monitors the All-Union Lenin Komsomol; 4) the party monitors the Komsomol's execution of its directives. In this interpretation of party leadership, the Komsomol was transformed from the subject of history to its passive object.

The Komsomol ship, lifted off the sandbanks by the flood tide of perestroyka, moved from its familiar place. It became clear at once that, while being well adapted for ceremonial rituals and jubilee parades, it is useless at sailing. The hull has rusted through in many places and leaks; the motor is laboring. The engineroom crew will not listen to orders and leave the ship at the mercy of makeshift controls. A fight has broken out on the captain's bridge. But all the time the water is rising, and if you do not reach the far shore, which is shrouded in mist, then.... But what lies in wait on that shore? One thing is more or less clear now: The old ship cannot be repaired, it will have to be written off. But then? I will not comment on the draft All-Union Lenin Komsomol Statutes and Program submitted for discussion by the 21st Komsomol Congress. I will only share a few ideas.

First. I am deeply distressed that it is primarily the Komsomol functionaries who are taking part in the heated debates on the Komsomol's future, while ordinary Komsomol members and young people who do not belong to the league are silent. The people, so to speak, are silent, and that is a worrying symptom.

You know the saying: "When you ride into battle, take care of your spare horse." And the Komsomol apparatus did take care of it, hastily setting about forming a new structure—the Russian Komsomol. Is it necessary? It certainly was necessary. Yesterday. As an ardent supporter of the idea of a federalist structure for the country's youth movement, I advocate that the federation should be based not on nationality, but on a league of special-interest leagues. At a time when the whole world is integrating, we are dividing our Komsomol into different national apartments. Is this sensible? I think we should now think about abandoning the old Komsomol structures, rather than adding to them.

Second. The diverse interpretations of the social purpose and functions of tomorrow's Komsomol are causing confusion. One All-Union Lenin Komsomol Central Committee secretary calls eagerly for a commercial thrust to the Komsomol's activity. But surely young people can do this without the Komsomol? Others talk about stepping up the Komsomol's protective functions. But independent trade unions are already being formed and we can expect the appearance of youth trade unions, as in some Western countries. So what will then be left for the Komsomol? In short, the quest is for a suitable job for tomorrow's Komsomol, for its place in young people's lives.

The CPSU, like any other party, cannot count on longevity without the support of youth reserves. This is justification for the continued existence of a youth communist league. And so, in my reasoning, the Komsomol stays. But now the last question arises: What should tomorrow's Komsomol be like? The most rational views here are the views of those who see the Komsomol of the immediate future in the form of a young communists' party, narrow in structure. This is not a new proposal, but it is the most expedient with regard to the present stage in our development. In fact, the Komsomol has always existed in this capacity (remember the definition "helper and reserve"). This view is based on the fact that the Komsomol is no longer entitled to claim to satisfy all the interests of young people, because the former claims on this score were never fully realized. The Komsomol as a political organization can only claim to satisfy young people's political interest, leaving the satisfaction of other youth interests (social, cultural, and so forth) to other youth organizations, of which there will evidently be many very soon.

By continuing this line of reasoning it is possible to calculate approximately the possible numerical strength of tomorrow's Komsomol. Taking into account the number of people for whom political interests are dominant (according to various figures, they amount to between two and eight or nine percent), the place and role of the CPSU (and its reserve) in Soviet society, and also the indisputable fact that many young men and women, in the conditions of free expression of will, will prefer other youth political leagues, it may be assumed (highly hypothetically, of course) that 3-5 million young people will associate their future with the Komsomol. This will lead to radical changes in the Komsomol's structure and functions and in the conditions of its practical activity.

Gorbachev Allegedly Linked With Bribes

LD1204092590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 12 Apr 90

[Text] The sajudis Information Agency reports:

Aleksandr Fedorovich, deputy editor of the newspaper GRAZHDANSKIY REFERENDUM, has informed the Sajudis Information Agency that a meeting took place yesterday [11 April] at Manezhnaya Ploshchad in Moscow. It was attended by some 30,000 people. The meeting demanded that USSR People's Deputies Telman Gdlyan and Nikolay Ivanov should be protected. They are being threatened with arrest on 19 April and the withdrawal of their deputy's mandates.

The meeting was organised by the Committee of Soviet Citizens for the Self-Determination of the Soviet People and the Provisional Committee of Soviet Citizens for Lithuania's Sovereignty. Participants in the meeting expressed themselves strongly against the Soviet president's attitude and actions toward Lithuania. Mikhail Gorbachev was warned that if he does not listen to the voice of reason, a general political strike will start on 19 April in Moscow city and Moscow oblast.

Since the 11 April meeting was not approved, the Moscow City Soviet ordered that those assembled should be dispersed. The Moscow militia refused to carry out the order.

During the meeting, Deputy Gdlyan's agent, Tatyana (Koryanina) stated that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev is linked with bribes mentioned in the so-called

North Caucasian case. At the same time the speaker noted that there is no evidence of Mikhail Gorbachev's participation in the events described in the Uzbekistan Kremlin's case.

More on Supreme Court Bribery Ruling

PM0604131790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Apr 90 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Calling to Account! At the USSR Supreme Court"]

[Text] A routine USSR Supreme Court plenum was held under the chairmanship of Ye.A. Smolentsev.

In view of the continuing rise in the number of crimes for gain in the country (they accounted for more than one-half of the total number of crimes in 1989), the plenum discussed the state of judicial practice in cases of bribery, speculation, and crimes by officials.

In a resolution on cases of bribery the plenum stressed that the threat posed by bribery is still growing in view of the weakening of the principles of planning in economic management, the absence of normal market relations, and the widespread existence of the "shadow economy" in which the activity of cooperative members and leaseholders, as well as individual labor activity, are to a certain extent dependent on the discretion of officials. Bribery, as a form of money-grubbing which sponges off the work of state, economic, and social institutions and organizations, is furthermore often connected with embezzlement, official malpractices, speculation, and other crimes for gain.

In view of this, the courts are obliged to rigorously observe the demands of the law on the comprehensive and objective study of the circumstances of each case so as to ensure that no one guilty of bribery evades the responsibility prescribed by law.

In particular, courts must check whether it is correct that bribe givers, who often appear in cases merely as witnesses, should escape criminal liability and whether note has been taken of cases of the unwarranted separation of criminal cases relating to bribery, which makes it harder to resolve them correctly and in a number of cases has the result that individuals against whom separate proceedings are being instituted escape responsibility unjustifiably. When such facts are established, courts must discuss the question of returning cases to be consolidated by the preliminary investigation agencies for the purpose of their examination as a single legal case.

The plenum ruled that elements of a crime exist both in the giving of a bribe on condition that a previously agreed specific action is performed and in the instance when the terms governing the giving of the bribe are not specified but the parties to the crime are aware that this is being done to satisfy the interests of the bribe giver.

The object of the bribe may be not only money and other material assets but also services which are either fully or partly payable but which are performed free of charge.

A voluntary statement to the militia, prosecutor's office, court, or other state organs on the giving of a bribe releases the bribe giver from criminal liability.

The plenum pointed out to the courts the obligation to highlight the causes and conditions which promote bribery and, by interim orders, to demand their elimination while drawing special attention to instances of red-tape, bureaucracy, and favoritism.

After analyzing judicial practice in cases of speculation, the plenum noted that despite the growth in the number of these crimes and their adverse effect on the socioeconomic situation and on the population's supply of goods, many people guilty of speculation remain outside the purview of law enforcement agencies and evade responsibility.

In this connection, courts are instructed to show greater exactingness toward examination and preliminary investigation organs to ensure that all people involved in speculation are brought to book appropriately. Specifically, in cases connected with malpractices in trade, the courts must establish whether the examination and preliminary investigation organs have taken measures to identify and call to account trade and public catering workers who have knowingly and unlawfully sold scarce goods for the purpose of speculation, and must give a principled response to shortcomings in trade organization.

When examining criminal cases of speculation, courts must carefully study the nature of links between speculators and the people who help them to obtain and store goods bought for resale, to find customers, and so forth. In the case of prior collusion for the purpose of speculation between individuals, those who merely bought the goods and those who resold them, this action must be deemed a joint act of speculation.

It is drawn to the courts' attention that leniency is intolerable when determining the punishment of malicious speculators, the organizers of group speculation, or individuals guilty of speculation on a particularly large scale. The requirements of the law on the confiscation of the culprit's property and the transfer to the state of money and assets amassed by criminal means must be unswervingly observed here.

After discussing judicial practice relating to cases of abuse of power or official position, transgression of authority, and official negligence, the plenum drew the courts' attention to the fact that the solution of the tasks facing the country requires an activation of the struggle against official crimes because they significantly disrupt the normal working of state and public organizations and cause considerable damage to citizens' rights and legally protected interests.

To ensure the correct and uniform application of the law, the plenum ruled that responsibility for official crimes may also be borne by people who perform official duties in addition to their professional duties (a doctor who unlawfully issues a sick note, a teacher who abuses his position as member of a certification or examination commission, and so forth).

Significant injury as the essential indicator of the existence of official crime may be expressed not only in the causing of material damage but also in the violation of citizens' constitutional rights and freedoms, undermining the authority of the organs of power and state and public organizations, the violation of public order, and so forth.

The plenum pointed out that in the event of the establishment of cases of mismanagement, flagrant overadministration, and failure to monitor the activity of subordinate workers, resulting in the disruption of the normal work of enterprises and organizations and the causing of substantial losses, the courts must pass interim judgments with the requirement that the shortcomings that have come to light be eliminated and that criminal proceedings be instituted where grounds exist.

The plenum also discussed the practice of the courts' application of the law in the examination of cases connected with the activity of horticultural associations, which have become widely established everywhere. Whereas in 1985 they numbered a little over 6 million, in 1989 that figure had risen to almost 12 million.

In connection with the great number of normative acts affecting the activity of horticultural associations, the plenum gave a ruling on many questions occurring in judicial practice (on the appeal procedure against a decision to refuse to register an association's statutes, the settlement of disputes between a divorced couple on the right to use a plot of land and outbuilding, disputes among the heirs of a deceased member of a horticultural society, and so on).

The plenum examined appeals by the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Court and the USSR Prosecutor General on criminal cases, including those relating to a large group of people who were unlawful victims of the repressions of the thirties, forties, and early fifties. All these people have been rehabilitated.

The plenum instructed the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Court to send to the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet a report in connection with the ban prohibiting Comrade I.P. Misyunas, chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Court and ex officio member of the USSR Supreme Court, from taking part in the plenum's work.

Taking part in the plenum's work were USSR Prosecutor General A.Ya. Sukharev and USSR Minister of Justice V.F. Yakovlev.

'Seizure' of Leningrad TV Studio Condemned

LD1104195790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 11 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] The seizure of the Leningrad television studio by a group of people's deputies—the aim was to give the floor to Deputy Ivanov live on the airwaves—without exaggeration is being discussed now by the whole country. Means of communications have not been seized in our country since 1917 and, no matter how noble the intentions were which the participants of this action gave as the motive, extremism is extremism. But are such things possible, as we say, in civilized countries? I want to draw your attention to a publication in the latest issue of NEDELYA, where staff of various television systems answer that question put by our foreign correspondent's: In London Mr. Williams, a BBC staffer, answers: I do not recall similar episodes which could be compared to what happened in Leningrad. [passage omitted]

At a routine press conference today, Nenashev, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting, met with journalists and the Leningrad incident was naturally the main question.

We respect the deputies of the Leningrad city soviet, the chairman of the state committee said. However, at the same time, we are resolutely against such types of actions toward the central television of the USSR. In reply to a journalist's question, Comrade Nenashev stressed that the Leningrad television is not only the city's oblast's, but also the union's. Back in 1979, the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a decision to create in 1983 a fifth experimental program of central television on the basis of Leningrad television. It was namely for this aim that resources were allocated for the priority development of Leningrad television. The chairman of the state television and radio committee said, that letters are already coming in from television viewers and staff of the television condemning that fact. However, a special commission of the state committee which has gone to Leningrad is to give a fundamental evaluation of what happened.

It is possible that you will read a report of that press conference in some newspapers tomorrow morning. We will broadcast it tomorrow evening right after the Vremya program.

Akhromeyev, Logunov Predict CPSU Split

LD1104231490 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party has made a desparate attempt to put an end to a deep crisis in the party. On Wednesday the Central Committee published an open letter to the Soviet Communists, urging them to rally around the party leadership and strongly criticizing dissidence leading to a split. Maksim Tkachenko reports:

The Central Committee's open letter says that certain members of the party have been trying to divert it from the strategical course. Some reject perestroyka, describing it as betrayal of the socialist values and a return to capitalism. Others proclaim the socialist choice a mistake, call for Western values and side with the antisocialist forces.

Although the Central Committee letters criticize both the right- and left-wing opposition in the party it is clear that the main thrust of the attack is against the radical left wing, calling itself Democratic Platform. That wing seeks to turn the CPSU in a parliamentary party in the context of a multiparty system, the freedom of factions and platforms inside the party, the rejection of orthodox Marxism, and the turn to social democratic values.

Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, a member of the CPSU Central Committee, is one of those who signed the open letter to the Soviet Communists:

[Begin Akhromeyev recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] If these people have been misled the party locals must help educate them. As for those who not only disagree with the party's policy but also work against it, the party must rid itself of such people. This is the reason why the letter was sent to Communist Party locals. I believe there will be a split in the Communist Party because those who are against its policies will withdraw from the party or be expelled. I believe that this will only make the party stronger. The left wing radicals see the Central Committee's message as a counterattack of the conservative forces, seeking to retain power and win victory at the 28th Congress of the Communist Party due in July. [end recording]

A member of the nation's highest legislature, deputy editor-in- chief of the daily MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, Valentin Logunov, says:

[Begin Logunov recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] The leadership personnel and structures in the party are worried about the plurality of opinions in the Communist Party. They fear that the congress may gather people who would like to change the party's strategy and tactics towards further democratization. Besides, and that is very serious, the conservatives are afraid of the need to split the party's property. And that problem will inevitably arise if the party itself is split. To my mind the Central Committee is concerned not about preventing a split but about keeping today's leaders in office. When I read the letter I kept asking myself: Why should I leave the party? I haven't discredited myself by any kind of abuse. I've never abused power or committed any other wrongdoing. Probably it's those who made society plunge in a crisis who should go. [end recording]

The Central Committee's open letter says that its aim is to consolidate the party and prevent a split—something the top party leadership is afraid of the most. However, it is very unlikely that a split can be avoided. Apparently the letter will only ferment that process.

NEW TIMES Previews CPSU Congress

PM0604163090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No. 14, 3-9 Apr 90 pp 6-7

[Leonid Mlechin article: "Renewal for the CPSU"]

[Text] Will the CPSU come out of its impending 28th Congress divided? On the other hand, if able to stay united, what platform will it adopt, that if the Central Committee or some other alternative? It is not only the party membership that wants to know.

Of the Russian Federation Parliament's new membership, 86 percent are CPSU members. So how can one say the party is bedevilled by a crisis? indeed, any other party would only be too happy to have such a representative body in parliament. However, though Russia has a one-party system, the regional committees of this republic's one and only party are none too happy about the returns, which is quite understandable. Indeed, a large proportion of the electorate voted for candidates who take a highly critical view of the CPSU's policies and its Central Committee's activities. This was perticularly obvious in the bigger cities where competition was fierce. Indeed party committee intervention in the elections and attempts to back their own men as a rule ended adversely, which only demostrates that the clout party committees of different levels enjoy has contracted amazingly so, and also that their programmes and candidates failed to rally support even from the party rank-and- file. Surely this reveals a crisis in he party.

Many regional party committee first secretaries lost out; indeed some speakers at the CPSU Central Committee's March plenum complained that the party was baited. "The party is I" habit is in the blood of many starting from district level, and adroitly draw upon its authority. Thus, whenever a party committee secretary is censured for agricultural mismanagement, bare shop shelves and costly follies, he retorts: "This is an attack against the party. I won't go, because I want to continue in the job." But what does the party have to do with that? True, as time passes a definite link is forged, especially when the party leadership takes its time in sacking an incompetent. Then resentment against one or another party boss is projected upon the entire party and people by no means to blame have to pay.

The fiasco many party bosses sustained at last year's and this year's elections, plus their inability to win popularity and put forward appealing programmes evoked serious doubt as to whether the party, as it is today, will be really able to successfully compete. What the party needs are strong leaders, but where from is anyone's guess, as the decades-long system employed to select and nominate such bosses left absolutely no room for overly independent and outstanding figures.

Some party secretaries are genuinely alarmed by the hatred people are wont to show towards the party apparat. They believe the journalists, the extremists, the informals, indeed anyone you please except themselves,

are responsible for that. They are motivated not by any "loyalty to Leninist principles" - which, as far as I remember, was characteristic of the harangues uttered mostly by party secretaries whom the populace subsequently booted out for corruption and complete incompetence - but a craving to preserve their own well-warmed chairs at all costs. Though no one has dared to say so out loud, by now it is already quite clear that these men have no chances at all in open honest competition. inability to diagnose the malady and prescribe the right remedy and lack of self-criticism only harm the party.

The platform the present Central Committee has adopted on the eve of the party congress is heavily debated. Better known of the alternative programmes proposed is the "Democratic Platform."

The Central Committee platform suggests modernizing the obtaining structure, strategy and tactics, but hanging on to the old concept that the CPSU is society's political guide representing the interests of the entire people.

On the other hand, the "Democratic Platform" is more radical, claiming that the party should strive for popularity through parliamentary elections, for which reason needed is a flexible structure allotting room to factions and the deliverance of party members from the shackles of the current party Rules. Some of these proposals are taken into account in the new draft of Rules.

The Central Committee platform is rebuked for its haziness, which is, of course, inevitable given a frank wish to reconcile directly opposed views. On the other hand, the "Democratic Platform" is criticized for offering no well-integrated programme of change which thus far is declared only in a most general way.

Nevertheless, both platforms differ much less than they have in common. Neither do the architects of the "Democratic Platform" propose any radical overhaul; they rather seek to adapt the party to the obtaining situation in hope of making it a viable competitor. As I see it, both platforms take an overly optimistic view of the situation.

If we take the Lithuanian Communist Party, we see that it split not only because the majority wanted to break away from the CPSU, while the minority sought to stay within one party. Its 20th Congress in Vilnius abandoned the Marxist-Leninist ideology, the principle of democratic centralism and the declared vanguard role. On the other hand, party members regarding these changes as complete heresy created Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU platform). The Communist parties of Estonia and Latvia are undergoing a similar schism. In the Baltic republics, the processes occurring within their communist parties have been expedited by the national factor: in short, political survival depends on the attitude these parties take towards republican independence.

Just before the Estonian Communist Party's 20th congress, its leadership was invited to Moscow, and, as the Estonian telegraph agency reported, had a serious discussion "as to the likely models of the Estonian S.S.R.'s future. The central authorities proposed for discussion a new federal agreement with varying 'degrees of freedom' for the constituent republics up to a Baltic 'special order' in Estonia.... Indrek Toome proposed an 'Estonian pyramid,' implying political and economic negotiations followed by a political solution. Although during the talks with the CPSU Central Committee the people with whom the republican delegation discussed the matter strove in every conceivable way to avoid the term 'negotiations,' they agreed that it was necessary to enter into a dialogue."

The talks did not help. The Communist Party split as it did in Lithuania, again due to the national factor.

Though still unorganized, stratification is to be observed in some other republican communist parties as well, which may bring about the CPSU's split at its impending 28th Congress. The CPSU membership is made up of people adhering to diametrically opposed views, thus forming two factions. At the same time, it includes politically active people espousing, paradoxically enough, a diverse range of views from anarcho-syndicalism to monarchism. They are now in a position to state their views, seek allies and canvas the electorate. Some intend to quit the CPSU and establish a party of their own. Others plan to win over as large a following as possible within the CPSU in the hope thereby of possesing part of its property and organizational structrues. Presumably more detailed stratification will come later; in the meantime we shall see two or three trends contesting the issue.

The readiness shown by the various republican Communist parties, even though professing loyalty to Moscow, to be independent is likewise altering the situation within the CPSU. Will it be an alliance of parties? A new Communist international within one country? That to all practical intents is bound to occur should a Russian Communist Party arise. After all, can one imagine the CPSU without Russia's Communists? Moreover, nowadays several party organizations are trying to rush through the creation of a Russian Communist Party, espousing an ideological platform akin to the philosophies of the United working People's Front and the Leningrad regional party committee. As far as one can judge, these principles, enunciated at the first Leningrad rally, in no way measure up to what a rather large number of party organizations in Russia want.

The recent elections have revealed that Russia is tired. This is dangerous. The more politically active city dwellers voted for the candidates of the democratic bloc. However, on the periphery, voters were apathetic as there is still no movement or party that would express the Russians' national interests. The bloc integrating Pamyat (Memory), Otechestvo (fatherland) and the leaders of the Russian Federation Writers' Union that styles itself "patriotic" and claims to voice popular interests, lost out at the elections. Indeed, despite a

powerful electoral drive, its candidates polled an average of but 2-4 per cent of the total ballot.

No doubt such an immense land as Russia cannot have one united popular front as in the Baltic republics or the Ukraine. Most likely she needs several parties capable of pinpointing the national interests of the various groups and classes of this great nation, whose trategy is that ruler after ruler sacrificed its interests on the altar of empire ambitions. The Russians' national interests are not to serve as a binding agent that would fill in all cracks in the state, but to extricate the country from its plight.

The reformers in the party must take sober stock of the situation and reckon with the line-up that exists not only inside the party, but above all, in society as a whole. The struggle the reformers wage against the conservatives might not necessarily win popular approval, as the people think the party's progressive wing not radical enough. However, to be disappointed in the outcome and abandon hopes of reforming the CPSU, to quit it would not only manifest spinelessness, but represent a blunder. In that case the conservatives and retrogades would control a powerful apparatus that could easily be swivelled against perestroyka and strangle it. Consequently, not reforms, but the opponents of change should withdraw from the party. More and more people, including many in the party itself, seek such a "split"

'Several Thousand' Rally for Gdlyan, Ivanov

LD1104203190 Moscow TASS in English 1939 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 11 TASS—By TASS correspondents Dmitriy Polunin and Sergey Postanogov:

Several thousand people took part in an unsanctioned rally in downtown Moscow tonight.

They protested plans to institute criminal proceedings against parliament deputies Telman Gdlyan and Nikolay Ivanov, who had investigated cases of corruption in the top echelons of power in Uzbekistan.

The city council did not allow the rally, because its organisers notified the city authorities about their plans only two days in advance, a council official told TASS.

The rally was organised by a committee for the defence of Gdlyan and Ivanov, who are widely popular in the country for their efforts to combat corruption and organised crime.

The First Congress of People's Deputies last year set up a commission to investigate the activity of the Gdlyan-headed investigation group of the USSR prosecutor's office.

The commission's report to the second congress said that investigators from Gdlyan's group unlawfully arrested members of the families of the accused and built their accusations, above all, on confessions of those arrested.

Participants in the rally chanted slogans in support of Gdlyan and Ivanov and demanded that members of the commission investigating the activity of their group resign, describing the commission's findings as "biased".

The organisers of the rally called on those present to hold a political strike and other non-violent actions of civil disobedience in support of investigators Gdlyan and Ivanov.

Party, Movement Representatives Meet in Moscow

PM1104135190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Gayaz Alimov and Andrey Afanasyev report: "Meeting at Same Table"]

[Text] Representatives of the CPSU, the Liberal Democratic Party, the Union of Constitutional Democrats, the Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic Movement, and other party groups and movements sat down at the same table for the first time 9 April at the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace.

The meeting, which was held for information purposes, was in itself an unusual event in the capital's current political life. To the authors of these lines—a communist and a nonparty man—it appeared equally important from all points of view. First, from the viewpoint of the establishment of a pluralist civic society.

Dialogue is always creative. The struggle for power must not be without compromises. In a country where a multitude of political groups and organizations is emerging and beginning to operate, a mechanism to ensure collaboration among them is needed. This meeting can be described as a first attempt to tackle the elaboration of such a mechanism. The meeting participants briefed those present on the platforms of their parties, comparing them and exchaning opinions on forms of permanent dialogue.

So what did the meeting reveal? First, that the positions of the meeting participants have much in common. Second, as we were able to see for ourselves, that there is a sound basis for collaboration and cooperation. The main thing is to listen to and hear each other and refrain from making statements on the basis of emotions and exaggerations. Emotions, after all, lead nowhere.

It was decided that such informal meetings should be continued.

Primakov Addresses Radio Workers at Ceremony

LD1204103190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 12 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] We do not often get to show reports on our own colleagues and so it is all the more pleasant to include this report in the program because it is devoted to the presentation of orders and medals of

the Soviet Union to a large group of Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] employees. [passage omitted] [video shows reportage on the work of Moscow radio broadcasting to foreign countries, showing employees at work, and the ceremony at which awards were presented by Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov, member of the Presidential Council and a former Moscow Radio correspondent]

[Primakov] We have nothing to hide today. We are moving, yes, we want a federation, and not only and not simply a federation. We are talking about moving toward a federation without universalizing the relations between the center and the union republics. The entire country, all of us, are going through a very difficult moment in our country. That is quite clear. Now the question of whether perestroyka is to be or not to be in the future is, in effect, being decided. This is a crucial moment for us now. We need the truth, we need the truth in our positions. [words indistinct] [video shows Primakov speaking]

Presidential Council Members Discuss Role

Valentin Rasputin

90UN1401A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 14, 4 Apr 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Valentin Rasputin, Presidential Council member, by Irina Rishina, editor of the Literary-Social and Political Journalism Department of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA: "A Member of the President's Team"]

[Text] [Rishina] The artist and authority and the artist and politics are primordially incompatible concepts, which you yourself have spoken about more than once. What compelled you, a natural author, to don political garb?

[Rasputin] I continue to think even now that an author and authority are incompatible things, and that when an author becomes a politician, the artist in him will at best retreat, if not disappear altogether. But the situation in our country today is such that, apparently, amendments will have to be made to this rule. Even without this there was little time for creative work, and I understand well that now there will be even less time. It will be necessary to forgo something, possibly even talent, the gift that was given, so that there may be definite hope that we will endure, that people may feel more confident, we will endure the pain that has befallen us and those misfortunes that are now apparent to everyone. I do not see myself as a politician. I see myself here as a person delegated by the ecologically-minded part of society.

[Rishina] "Mobilized and called" by ecology?

[Rasputin] Exactly. It is very likely that I will never master political language. I even think that it will not be bad if at the Presidential Council, where most of course will speak a political language, another language—a writer's language—will be heard: Aytmanov's or mine, if I relate the suffering, for example, of some old village woman in a language that I am used to. Although today there is talk about the fact that there is need for an instrument of social protection of the poor, this instrument has not been created yet, and to this day the old woman continues to suffer as she has done, and no one knows what trials await her in the future. Thus, if I talk about this in my own language, perhaps it will be appropriate and timely.

[Rishina] Everyone, of course, is interested in the president's team—who is on it and why? What do you think, why did the president choose you? Did your foreign trip together, where Mikhail Sergeyevich, very likely, got to know you better play a role in this?

[Rasputin] I think that the trip to China is not applicable here. More likely my speech at the First Congress of People's Deputies, a frank speech, but now all speeches are frank. But more, apparently, that I express specific Russian interests. Probably what also played a role is that twice—in November and recently—right before the elections for president I importuned Mikhail Sergeyevich to receive me and requested that the Baykal question be put to the Politburo. Perhaps my continuously talking about ecological matters and about Baykal appealed to him.

When Mikhail Sergeyevich gave his first interview about the Presidential Council, he said that he selected its members on the principle of support. Actually, everyone supports him, although not the same way in all things, and for a certainty. But support from different elements is perhaps what is most necessary today, and it will help him in his decisions. Fortunately, if you judge by the first meeting, there are a lot of differences between the members of the council. We expressed ourselves very frankly, and each one spoke about how he sees the situation in the country, how it will be necessary to employ initial measures, and on the whole we did not argue.

[Rishina] A free and frank exchange of opinions presupposes disagreements. If everyone sings the same tune then this probably is good in theory, but in practice we have already experienced the consequences of a similar unanimity, which we cannot get rid of now in any way. Now, it seems, very few want to echo each other, above all the president.

Do you consider yourself capable of defending your position, even if it will be sharply at odds with that of the president? That is from one aspect. And from another—you signed the famous letter of the writers of Russia, the so-called letter of the 74, which is by no means supported by everyone and, moreover, invites disapproval—my point is that you yourself should have a broader outlook on everything. What is your opinion?

[Rasputin] Well, first, there will be no unanimity in the council. There will not be any, if for no other reason than that the people are not incidental, they are all personalities and each of course will assert himself. If there are sensible reasons, then a single point of view is also

possible. As for me, if I am positive of something, if my confidence in it is tried and tested, then I will stand up to anyone to the end, even to the president, even to the Lord God. But at the same time I know I have another quality: I am capable of hearing different opinions, and if any are convincing I can change my point of view. Here we will all have to agree on the interests of society and of the country.

[Rishina] Do you think the Presidential Council will be able to stay ahead of events? Because this probably is the main thing that is expected of it—to forecast events, their course, and their repercussions, so that measures are taken "before" and not "after" something happens. Is this realistic?

[Rasputin] We really have been at the tail end of events until now, and we had to take measures to neutralize them, whether problems of interethnic relations or others. It is very important that the Presidential Council anticipates the probability of a critical situation and warns of its appearance, so that there may be popular decisions, which will raise the hope that the council is not simply another additional state body, so that people will believe it, the so-called opposition will believe it, and in its necessity and useful plans. It should not be expected, of course, that the Presidential Council will immediately resolve all questions in the coming year, because the situation in the country is too complicated.

I am a poor prophet, but it seems to me that the Presidential Council was established at a very opportune time, which will make it possible to stabilize the situation, so that the situation may return to its peaceful ways; at least, I believe this.

[Rishina] Are you not shocked that the president was elected not by a popular referendum, but under conditions of the congress?

[Rasputin] It is necessary to cope with the situation. Well, I voted at the Second Congress of People's Deputies for Article 6—why? Indeed, because I feared disintegration. I thought that to reject it is to submit to anarchy, which could take place; that is, different parties would arise, and a competition for power would begin. This frightened me. Now that a new structure has been found for us in the form of a Presidential Council, there is a kind of defense mechanism against anarchy, and I voted with pleasure against this article at the third congress, believing from the very beginning that the article is farfetched and unnecessary.

[Rishina] President of Czechoslovakia V. Havel explained that he was a member of the "Club of Active Non-Party People." How do you, an active non-party person, react to multiple parties?

[Rasputin] Normally. I am simply afraid here of superfluous numbers of parties, like in Hungary, where there are now more than 40 parties, because we are a country not only of low everyday culture but also of low political culture. We need societal unity, but this does not mean that such unity must be under the aegis of one party. Let there be several parties, but these must be strong parties, significant parties, and not a tearing of society into parts.

[Rishina] Has the number of duties of the council been determined? What is your role?

[Rasputin] The duties are beginning to be defined. Aytmatov and I are still considering this. There will be some kind of work, of course, but as yet its role has not been designated.

[Rishina] I want to remind you of a trip to Bulgaria that LITERATURNAYA GAZETA organized four years ago, on which there was you, Astafyev, Okudzhava, Burlatskiy, Aleksiyevich, Drach, Sokolov.... Although everything was overshadowed by Chernobyl—it occurred on the eve of the trip, and we sympathized with Drach and were afraid for his son Maksim, who departed for the site of the catastrophe—it was our common concern and common grief that somehow brought us closer together. Could it have been supposed then that in a very short time such words would be in circulation as "groups," "non-Russians," "Russophobia," "Masons...."—we are now extremely bogged down in these horrors. You in the Presidential Council are also very different, but there, apparently, it never gets to a display of internecine relations. Such a thing is simply impossible to imagine. What in your opinion has to be done so that LITERATURNAYA GAZETA may once again be able to arrange such a trip, and that no one would feel like a representative of an opposing camp—one from "April" and another from the "74?" How can it be done so that writers may once again reach out their hands to each other?

[Rasputin] To do this, it is necessary to understand each other. This is exactly what I said at the first meeting of the Presidential Council, that nationalism, chauvinism, and all of these "isms" are a very abnormal condition of the nation. Of any nation. Very abnormal. The people are already tired of the nationality problem, and of everything that is brought forth by these problems. Now this is everywhere. For example, the Baltics intend to secede. No one, I suppose, should hold them by force, if that is what they want, but it is necessary to go through the legal mechanism of separation.

About the writers' strife. Willingly or unwillingly we are separated into various sides, and at present offenses are increasing. Of course, it is better to make all kinds of statements in one's own name. But, apparently, there are cases when it is necessary to sign a general letter. For myself, I decided that I will try to do this only in exceptional circumstances. I think that the letters of the writers of Russia are dictated by pain for Russia, although there are in them, of course, expressions that should not have been employed. In this matter I believe that before seeking the guilty parties in some other nation it is necessary to make demands on one's own.

[Rishina] And on oneself as a person.

[Rasputin] Of course, but in addition, the shortcomings and sins that exist in each person also exist in each nation. In order to eliminate these shortcomings and sins we must arrive at what was previously called repentance. Ask of oneself. Look into the state of one's own people, not only into what is disastrous but also into when the people lost their memory and found themselves in a kind of insensitive and complacent state. That is, try to raise the people's self-awareness. For the people are strong, and they will not pay attention to petty offenses. To raise the people to a united moral and spiritual force—this is now the artist's main task. Not to move them to offenses, but to strength. And not only one's own people but, in general, all people.

[Rishina] Do you think that this new role—work in the Presidential Council—will give you something as a writer: subjects, images, and conflicts; or will it pass you by and not touch you?

[Rasputin] No, I hope that it will not pass me by. How is one to know, perhaps in about seven years an Aytmatov novel will appear, as with Markes, something in this vein, and something of my own....

[Rishina] What are you writing now?

[Rasputin] Nothing artistic yet. I turned over a book about Siberia to MOLODAYA GVARDIYA, and I am continuing to write Siberian essays and articles, which I have been writing a great deal of recently.

[Rishina] Apparently, you will be compelled to leave Irkutsk?

[Rasputin] It will be necessary for me, of course, to live in Moscow for months, but I do not intend to leave Irkutsk.

Stanislav Shatalin

PM1004155290 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 14, 8 Apr 90 p 6

[Interview with USSR Presidential Council member Academician Stanislav Shatalin by Dmitriy Kazutin: "What It Means To Be a Presidential Aide"—date, place not given]

[Text] Kazutin: In his TV interview Mikhail Gorbachev said that his Presidential Council brings together persons of like minds. Do you agree? Do you regard the President as a like-minded person?

Shatalin: Let's see what we mean by "like-minded person". Often persons of like minds are described as those who think along the same lines. This is uniformity of death. Life isn't uniform, it's varied. It means a variety of ideas. As I see it, like-minded persons share the same approach to strategic ideas and objectives. We may disagree on some things but we should know precisely where we are going. What do we want our economy to be like? What's our attitude to the different types of ownership? What's the idea of the political reform? Do we need, for example, the CPSU's monopoly on power, or do we need a multi-party system? Should there be a strong opposition? What kind of cultural life is visualized for society, and what ought to be done in the sphere of education and culture to bring it about? What's our attitude to the press and its criticisms? What's our reaction to the ideas of people who don't hold our views? I hate the phoney word combinations "dialogue with the people" and "counsel with the people". Are we prepared to understand and accept the whole variety of human interests, and meet these interests halfway? That's what I think is important. People who see things as I do are capable of attending to what other people say and accept whatever true things they say. In this sense Gorbachev and Shatalin are like-minded persons.

Kazutin: When did you realize that?

Shatalin: Hard to say precisely when. It would be perhaps better to ask Gorbachev.... I long liked his honesty, benevolence, quickness of mind free from dogmatism. Perhaps he too discerned in me some qualities that we have in common. At any rate, after the conference of the country's major economists, we started to see each other more often. He asked me to join him on his visit to Italy, then there was the February Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee, then there was the March Plenary Meeting.... That's it.

Kazutin: I hear you're being called an apologist for Gorbachev.

Shatalin: You know me long enough to draw your own conclusions. As for accusing me of apology, let it remain on the conscience of the accusers.

Kazutin: Do you regard all the other members of the Presidential Council as being of the same mind as you are?

Shatalin: No, I can't say that today. The future will show.

Kazutin: In this case, whom would you call your main opponents?

Shatalin: I wouldn't like to answer this question now.

Kazutin: After you began closer cooperation with Mikhail Gorbachev, did you have any major arguments? Who was the more frequent "winner"? Can the President generally admit any defeat?

Shatalin: What you're referred to as "closer cooperation" has been going on for as little as six months. Frankly, I'm very interested in continued cooperation with him. I'm interested because in him I see someone who does want real changes. The same, incidentially, applies to most of the members of the Presidential Council. This should be stressed in connection with your previous question about "opponents". But our cooperation would become meaningless - primarily for the President - had it been bought at the price of "a priori agreement" with Gorbachev's opinions. As for major arguments, there have been hardly any during these past six months. True, we had an

argument right at the start, in October, about social democracy and forms of ownership. We debated this topic also during the February Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee. You will remember, speaking before the conference of leading economists, he had a few sharp words about the social-democratic road some people "are trying to push on us". Later in his speeches he spoke about social democracy in a different way. I don't entertain the thought that this happened precisely due to the argument we had, but it is obviously for me that there was an organic change of position, or, better, a deeper understanding of it took place. Yet another step in the same direction was made, as you know, in the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Congress. I don't mean to imply that Mikhail Gorbachev was the loser in that argument. I just want to demonstrate that while remaining a Communist, this person is open to new ideas. I don't know which of us has read more Marxist literature, but I admit that some of his arguments have made me reconsider some of my former ideas.

Kazutin: Agreeing to become a member of the Presidential Council, did you have an axe to grind?

Shatalin: Yes, I did. Don't think it demagoguery but the notion "people" is meaningful. For me it isn't small change that some make use of in electoral campaigns. I would never dare to swear by the name of the people or to speak in behalf of the people, although, after my address at the February Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee I received some anonymous letters charging that I had no right to call myself a Russian intellectual.

Kazutin: This must be because you spoke against the foundation of a Russian Academy of Sciences or a Russian Communist Party?

Shatalin: Yes. Still I regard myself as a Russian intellectual. I want to believe I'm one. Russian intellectuals used to take to heart and do take to heart the misfortunes and hopes of the Russian people and all Soviet citizens. I have knowledge and experience: I've been in economic science for more than 30 years. Being a member of the Presidential Council also gives me some powers. Thus I have greater chances of helping my people. I've been trying to make good use of the opportunity to the best of my abilities, knowledge and experience.

Kazutin: Do you have any programme of your own for your first 100 days as a member of the Presidential Council?

Shatalin: First, I'm going to foster a very resolute campaign against crime, which in our country has taken on the proportions of a national disaster. I will work for the passing of a law on entrepreneurship in the USSR which would integrate the laws on ownership, land and other related laws and make them work. This is second. And third, I would work to radicalize market relations and relations of ownership. All that can only be delayed after a good deal of thinking. That does not mean it should be a slow process. All that requires a national consensus. Excuse my being a bit vain, but I think I aptly described the Presidential Council as a council of national consensus and of national security at the same time. The term "consensus" has become hackneyed nowadays, but until there is a real consensus, the word will remain in wide use. Very much depends on you journalists. In the absence of trust and consensus we'll end up bankrupt. The people who have promoted us to power will not forget our failure. This applies equally to the President and all of us.

Kazutin: Can one regard the Presidential Council as an alternative to the Politburo in the sense of influencing the decisions taken by the President?

Shatalin: At this stage this question is meaningless even if because half the Council members are members and alternate members of the Politburo. In the future much would depend on the quality of the Central Committee to be elected at the 28th Party Congress.

Kazutin: Is there any chance you may resign?

Shatalin: Yes, if perestroika starts going in the reverse. This was one of the conditions on which I agreed to become a Council member.

Kazutin: You said recently that many of the social democrats' ideals are close to yours but that you were not going to leave the CPSU now that it is going through hard times. Does this mean you are suppressing what comes more natural for you?

Shatalin: It's a tough question. Let's take social democracy first. I've already said on one occasion that unless we are absolutely clear on what "socialism" is, we have no right to make references to the socialist choice that, as is maintained, our people made in 1917. Even if we admit that a choice was made, it was several generations ago. If children are not responsible for what their fathers did, grandchildren even more so. For this reason I think, and I enlarged on this idea in my article for the journal Kommunist, the "socialist choice" should be either confirmed or turned down through a national referendum. As for me, socialism first means real pluralism in the economy, including private ownership in its modern form, primarily in the form of shareholders' property. It is free enterprise where one can hire labour. Second, it is progressive profit taxes. Third, it's social protection, including unemployment benefits, retraining benefits, etc. These mechanisms work well in many civilized countries.

Fourth, it is social justice. Not the demagoguery about social justice that was practised in this country for decades, but social justice based on an efficient economy. I think it absurd to contrast social justice with an efficient economy. Social justice can only be real in an economically powerful society. It is such a society where conditions combine to instil in people the ability to take pleasure in their work. Thereby they protect themselves socially. Unless we understand this, we will continue to practice demagoguery and to ideologize the economy,

etc. I also share the political and moral symbols of social democracy. I think that the healthy forces within our Party which have origins in the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party are capable of assimilating many of these ideas, including, of course, the idea of a multiparty politics, of opposition, etc.

Kazutin: In this connection, which results of the 28th CPSU Congress do you expect will be the best?

Shatalin: First and foremost, it will be the real schism in the Party. A schism concerning the view of social democracy, on the model of the political system that incorporates multiparty politics, on the problems of ownership and entrepreneurship, pluralism in the sphere of culture and spiritual freedom and free thinking for the individual. Hoping for such a schism, I'm staying in the CPSU. A "Party purge" is terrible, but the Party needs a purge. On the condition, of course, that people who resign or get expelled don't experience any infringements of their civil and political rights.

Kazutin: Do you see any chances for avoiding such a purge? The experience of the Baltic Republics shows that in today's conditions Communist Parties can divide not only ideologically but also organizationally. One part accepts the social democratic orientation while the other remains on the "CPSU Platform". Aren't there still many people within the Party who continue to stand on the "CPSU Platform"—not today's platform, but on the one that existed before April 1985?

Shatalin: Well, there are perhaps such chances. As for me, if the conservative forces prevail at the coming Congress, even after I've exhausted all my chances to prevent this, I'm not going to discontinue my membership. But all the same, I'm absolutely sure that "we" shall win.

Kazutin: Going back to the Presidential Council, what do you think its first session has accomplished?

Shatalin: I think we've witnessed a historic event. I can hardly be suspected of naive optimism, but going back home after the session, I dare say I felt as if I had wings. There appeared a real chance to move things vigorously forward. This isn't of course a matter of two or three years. It will take much more time, but many things should be done right away. Not to use the new opportunities would be a crime.

State Committee for Nationalities Viewed

90UN1260A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 9, Feb 90 pp 2-3

[Report on interview with A.I. Smirnov by L. Chernenko: "Creating a State Committee for Nationalities"]

[Text] We asked A.I. Smirnov, head of the USSR Council of Ministers Department of Territorial Development of the Economy and Capital Construction, to speak about the most important tasks and functions of this committee.

[Chernenko] Aleksandr Ivanovich! Less than a year ago the USSR Supreme Soviet approved the composition of the USSR Council of Ministers. What has brought about the need for the formation of a new state body?

[Smirnov] I would want least of all for the intention concerning the creation of a committee for nationalities to be associated with the recently exacerbated situation in the sphere of interethnic and interrepublic relations. Although it would be wrong, of course, to deny such a connection. It is sufficient to cite the problem, which has essentially suddenly arisen as a result of the interethnic conflicts, of forced migration, simply put, of refugees. After all, their total numbers are currently over half a million.

The main reason, however, that insistently demands the formation of a special government body for nationalities is seen as lying elsewhere. If we wish to combat not the effects but to know the causes and control this process or the other, we must proceed from the objective growth, elevation, I would say, of the role of the national factor in the life of our multinational state. Ensuring the free and equal development of all nations and nationalities is a key task of the renewal of Soviet society directly associated with the political, economic and legal reforms being implemented in the country.

Yet it is in this exceptionally sensitive sphere of the life of each people and individual that numerous problems, which have for decades been ignored and driven inward and which have not been properly resolved, have accumulated. Democratization and glasnost have laid bare these phenomena and, what is particularly important, have created the conditions for them to be overcome on a just basis. However, given the present organizational structure of management at the center and locally, many problems affecting the vital interests of the nations and nationalities are severed, as it were, among various ministries, departments, and territorial authorities, and at times vanish from the field of vision altogether and are consequently studied in isolated, fragmented, and slapdash fashion. Thus there is an urgent need for a fundamental improvement in administration at the state level in the sphere of national development and interethnic relations.

This topic was raised for the first time practically at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. The resolution it adopted, "Interethnic Relations," set the task of stimulating the current and creating new institutions of the political system by means of which national interests should be revealed and harmonized. It is a question primarily of an enhancement of the role of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities and of the newly formed commissions for national policy and interethnic relations; the social and economic development of the union, autonomous republics, and autonomous oblasts; the development of culture, language, and national and international traditions; and protection of the historical heritage. Similar commissions have been formed in the supreme soviets of many union and

autonomous republics. In a word, the legislative authorities are turning toward problems of national development and interethnic relations.

A fundamental decision at the level of the executive authorities is now essential. The current administrative authorities must undoubtedly increase the attention they pay to these problems. However, the situation may be changed radically, as a thorough study of this question has shown, by the creation of a special central executive organ of state administration. Such a goal is pursued by the proposal concerning the formation of a USSR State Committee for Nationalities. In other words, these matters are now essentially "strays" and are scattered around many official homes and offices, and must in the shape of a USSR State Committee for Nationalities acquire a responsible and solicitous master. The committee is called on to provide for the elaboration and implementation of an all-around system of measures pertaining to the control of processes in the national sphere.

[Chernenko] What are the most important issues that will constitute the USSR State Committee for Nationalities' field of activity?

[Smirnov] At least two major blocks emerge here, I believe.

First, improvement of the national-state arrangement, enhancement of the legal status of national autonomy, and restoration of the rights of the peoples subjected to repression at the time of the Stalin tyranny. Questions of the protection and development of the national distinctiveness and culture of small peoples and also of nationalities lacking or residing outside of their national territorial formations could be put in this category.

As is known, over 100 nations and nationalities live in the USSR. The interests of the biggest of them are represented by 15 union and 20 autonomous republics. In addition, eight autonomous oblasts and 10 autonomous okrugs have been formed.

This system has remained practically unchanged for more than half a century. There have been profound sociocultural, economic, and demographic changes in the decades that have elapsed. Therefore, as the CPSU Platform "The Party's Nationality Policy Under Current Conditions" emphasizes, an organic part of a restructuring of the Soviet federation is the restoration in full of the legitimate rights and interests of the peoples residing in the autonomous republics, oblasts, and okrugs, and an enhancement of their role and legal status. This applies primarily to the autonomous republics, many of which are in terms of their territory, population, and economic potential superior to a number of union republics.

At the same time, however, one-fifth of the population (approximately 60 million persons!) lives outside of its national formations or lacks such altogether. Thus 2 million Germans, 1.1 million Poles, 440,000 Koreans, 380,000 Bulgarians, 360,000 Greeks, 270,000 Crimean Tatars, 210,000 Meskhetian Turks, 153,000 Kurds and so forth lack national formations.

The lack of national schools, cultural centers, and printed publications in the native language, together with such objective factors as industrialization and urbanization, are intensifying the danger of the assimilation of relatively small peoples, particularly those that are deprived of opportunities for compact habitation. Questions of the protection and development of national distinctiveness, language, and culture today require the closest attention, and a USSR state committee for nationalities should play its part in this matter of exceptional importance. Specifically, the formation of all-union state and public authorities for representation of the peoples who lack their own territorial autonomy would seem highly promising.

Also on the agenda is the solution of complex questions connected with a restoration of the rights of the Soviet Germans, Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks, and other peoples who were subjected to forcible resettlement from the areas of their traditional habitation. It is absolutely necessary here, understandably, to take account of existing realities and the interests of all peoples.

The second block consists of questions of the creation of socioeconomic conditions conducive to the development of each nation and nationality. I emphasize nation and nationality once again for it is they which, in my opinion, should constitute the principal object of the entire activity of the USSR State Committee for Nationalities. This is its distinctive feature and divide, and at the same time the basis for interaction with the State Planning Committee, State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, Ministry of Finance, State Committee for Environmental Protection, and other central authorities.

Today, unfortunately, there is no integral statistical information characterizing the socioeconomic living conditions of this nation or nationality or the other. However, even the data pertaining to the union republics and autonomous formations that is available testify to the still considerable differences in level of socioeconomic development and material prosperity by region of the country.

Thus in terms of the generation of national income per capita, the gap between the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] and the Tajik SSR amounts to a factor of almost three. There are great differences between the union republics in terms of provision with living space, per capita consumption of goods and services, level of mortality of the population, particularly infant mortality, and life expectancy. Whereas previously these differences were diminishing, what is more, in the 1980's a trend toward an increase in them may be discerned in a number of categories.

We cannot fail to be disturbed also by the results of a similar analysis conducted two years ago in our department at the microlevel—autonomous republics, oblasts,

and okrugs. It was ascertained that the vast majority of them had been lagging noticeably and for a long time in the development of the economy and social sphere compared with their neighbors—territories on which the indigenous population of the corresponding union republic lived, in the main. This is reflected in the lesser per capita amount of national income generated and utilized, the lower level of urbanization and industrialization and so forth. Thus mean per capita production of industrial products in the Karakalpak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR] is half that of the Uzbek SSR as a whole, less by a factor of 1.5 in the Abkhaz ASSR than in the Georgian SSR, and almost five times less in the Kalmyk ASSR and the Tuva ASSR than in the Volga and East Siberian areas respectively.

Of course, these questions of national development, like many others, have deep historical roots and are of a long-term nature. Nonetheless, it is essential to rethink the current practice of location of the productive forces, which inadequately takes into consideration the vital requirements of the nations and nationalities. We can no longer put up with the fact that economic development, the exploitation of natural resources, and the building of new enterprises are frequently not accompanied by a tangible improvement in the social and everyday living conditions of the local population or by the comprehensive development of the corresponding region. I believe that the USSR State Committee for Nationalities could and should have its say on these questions, seeking their solution in the harmonious combination of statewide requirements and the interests of the corresponding nation.

[Chernenko] What is the role of the union republics in these matters? Is there not a danger that the USSR State Committee for Nationalities might begin to substitute for them?

[Smirnov] Under the conditions of the broadening of the rights of the union republics, of all autonomous formations, and of the local soviets of people's deputies, this is absolutely impermissible. A fundamental proposition of the organization and activity of the USSR State Committee for Nationalities is that questions of national development unconditionally pertain to the direct jurisdiction of the sovereign union republics and other autonomous formations. It is in the republics and locally that practical work on their solution should be concentrated. With regard for this the republics will determine independently whether they need to form similar state committees or other bodies for the control of national relations. There can be no commanding from above here. Incidentally, decisions on the creation of such republic committees have already been adopted in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, Lithuania, and Azerbaijan.

As far as the union committee is concerned, it should rely on the republic authorities and closely cooperate and interact with them. Specifically, it would be expedient to incorporate into the committee as members permanent representatives of the union republic councils of ministers under the auspices of the USSR Council of Ministers. The activity of the USSR State Committee for Nationalities here would obviously be concentrated primarily on problems of interethnic relations and of an interrepublic nature requiring solution at the union level, and on the coordination of the efforts of union ministries and departments and of union and autonomous republic councils of ministers. For example, state protection of the small peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East should, of course, be a subject of the special concern of the Russian Committee for Nationalities. But at the same time this is largely connected with the activity of enterprises of union ministries. The USSR State Committee for Nationalities could not remain aloof, it would have to have its say here also.

[Chernenko] It is well known that the country did at one time have a People's Commissariat for Nationalities. Can it be said that we are talking about its revival?

[Smirnov] A People's Commissariat for Nationalities was indeed formed in November 1917 in the first Soviet Government. Its principal task was the formation of national republics and oblasts and subsequently preparations for their unification in the USSR. Together with work on the national-state arrangement, the People's Commissariat for Nationalities paid great attention to questions of international education, the training of national personnel, and the development of national cultures and languages. It had its own educational institutions and publishing houses. It was wound up by a decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee Second Session of 7 July 1923 with the reasoning that with the formation of the USSR the need for the existence of the People's Commissariat for Nationalities had disappeared. It was from this, in fact, that the departure from Lenin's principles of nationality policy began.

Today, evidently, so many decades on, it would hardly be legitimate to speak about a direct revival of the People's Commissariat for Nationalities. Different times, different tasks. But it is essential to draw from its work that which was valuable (and there was such), as also from the practice of regulation of interethnic relations in foreign countries, specifically the activity of government authorities. For example, the Nationalities Committee in China, and the Ministry for Indian Affairs and Northern Development in Canada.

I would add to this that the formation of the USSR State Committee for Nationalities should give a much-needed boost to the development of research into problems of national issues and interethnic relations. There is an immense amount of work to be done here.

[Chernenko] In conclusion, a question that is today troubling everyone—about refugees. Will their problems also be the province of the USSR State Committee for Nationalities?

[Smirnov] In my opinion, whatever the reasons for the forced migration of the population, under no circumstances should responsibility for the creation of the conditions for the refugees' return to the place of their permanent residence, their provision with employment, and compensation for loss be lifted from the pertinent republics.

I would like for this reason to conclude our conversation on an optimistic note. The USSR State Committee for Nationalities should deal primarily with questions of the prevention and removal of conflicts on interethnic grounds. There would then be no refugees. "Soviet citizens should feel at home in any part of the country—such, it may be said, is the highest and ultimate goal of all work on the harmonization of interethnic relations." These words from the CPSU Platform on Nationality Policy are also a fine motto for the activity of the USSR State Committee for Nationalities.

Lubenchenko Cited on Republic Secession Law

LD0804015290 Moscow World Service in English 0510 GMT 7 Apr 90

[Text] [First announcer] The Soviet parliament has passed a law on the mechanism for the secession of a republic from the USSR. Commenting on this law the Soviet parliament member, Konstantin Lubenchenko, who is the vice chairman of the parliament's Legislative Commission, has specifically underlined the democratic nature of this law.

[Second announcer] He said the law does not ignore the interests of the autonomous republic's regions. Nor does it disregard the interests of ethnic groups living in this or that republic. This legislation is quite democratic and fair in regard to any nationality or any group of people. It is important that it takes into account all the basic points of international law on the issue. But what is most essential is that the new legislation offers solutions that would be least damaging to both the republic and the union as a whole.

[First announcer] Speaking more concretely, according to this law, a republic is to hold a referendum among its population. Only after the referendum results in favour of secession further steps can be taken. However, lots of problems arise in this connection: economic ties and territorial relations with the neighbouring republics as well as certain moral commitments to the secession opponents. But all this, I repeat, can be only after the referendum. Why is the current Lithuanian leadership against a referendum?

[Second announcer] Konstantin Lubenchenko says: It seems they want to get one-sided advantages for their republic in this process and gain as much as possible. This certainly exposes their egoism, but by the laws of politics the Lithuanian leadership is entitled to this. It has a reason to delay the referendum issue. It is seeking a way out of the situation and wants to create the best possible situation for itself but if this takes place within the framework of international conventions they can do all that. However, I would advise the Lithuanian leadership to reflect on the fact that their decisions adversely affect the lives of thousands upon thousands of people whose destiny cannot be changed over night. It is like demanding a child back from parents who adopted this child and brought him up. This complex issue should be settled with understanding and responsibility rather than through crude force.

Air Traffic Controllers Plan 'Warning Strike'

LD1104101190 Moscow World Service in Russian 0940 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] The country's civilian air traffic controllers have decided to declare a two-hour warning strike on 15 April. In this way they wish to draw attention to their problems. The air traffic controllers are demanding pension benefits at 50, 56 days of holiday, a 36-hour working week, and a pay rise. As research has shown, by the age of 50, the overwhelming majority of controllers, 94 out of 100, become invalids. Up to now their requests have been brushed aside. In March, the all-union association of controllers appealed to USSR Supreme Soviet deputies in an open letter in the newspaper VOZDUSHNYY TRANSPORT [Air Transport], but they got no reply either.

Pamyat Member Prosecuted for Anti-Semitic 'Insult'

PM1104171090 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 14, 8 Apr 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Leningrad: The First Case Under Article 74"]

[Text] What can you do if in your letter-box you find a note saying: "Kikes! Get out of Leningrad. Your time is up. Death to Kikes." Signed—the Pamyat society. Citizen K., the woman who received this message, appealed to the procurator's office to protect her against those neighbours insulting her national dignity. And for the first time in the city's history, proceedings were instituted under Article 74 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.

A saleswoman from the "Elektronika" shop, one V. Dmitriyeva, who doesn't like the people living upstairs from her, admitted to penning the poison message. She was irritated by the noise, the cry of the baby, the heavy steps of the elderly woman in the K. family. According to senior investigator of the Moskovskiy district procurator's office, G. Rozov, Dmitriyeva decided to clamp down on K. in this original manner. The court will determine the guilt of Dmitriyeva. Article 74 is punishable by imprisonment of six months to three years or exile from two to five years.

Government Examines Bill on Freedom of Conscience

LD1104203990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 11 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Today the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium examined the draft law of the USSR on freedom of conscience and of religious organizations. The draft proceeds from the Leninist decree of 1918 on the separation of the church from the state and of the school from the church, reflects the changes which have taken place in the country over the years of Soviet power, and also the features of the present stage of development of socialist society. The draft takes account of the new approaches to state and church relations corresponding to the essence and spirit of perestroyka. The draft, with further elaboration taking account of the remarks and proposals expressed, will be presented by the government to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Laptev Discusses IZVESTIYA, Deputy Roles

PM0604122790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 5 Apr 90 p 1

[Interview with I.D. Laptev, IZVESTIYA chief editor and chairman of the Soviet of the Union, by S. Kiselev at a 4 April news conference 4 April, under the rubric "From Our Correspondent in Parliament: "At the Third Attempt"]

[Text] [Kiselev] Ivan Dmitriyevich, the chamber of the Soviet of the Union had to vote three times to elect its chairman. Journalists have started talking about a parliamentary crisis. What do you see as the reason for such a complex movement toward consensus, that is, to your election? And now that you have been elected chairman, how would you comment on this situation?

[Laptev] You remember the elections for chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet at the extraordinary third congress. The number of candidacies. Well, all right, it so happened that Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov's prestige was great enough for him to get through the first time. But if it had not been the first time, no one knows how many times we would have voted. Therefore, there is nothing surprising in this. It seems to me that it was simply that attempts were made to have a look at other people as well; and maybe there were certain manifestations of a group approach, we must also bear this in mind. Attempts were also made to rejuvenate the Supreme Soviet leadership and involve young people in it. I have already spoken about this, and I repeat: I would, quite simply, be glad if these attempts continued. So this was nothing special. It was, in my opinion, a normal process that did of course cause a somewhat nervous situation—but this can again be explained by the fact that we always try to draw one another toward our own belief.

[Kiselev] Second question. The Supreme Soviet database says that you are a doctor of sciences. But which sciences? And on what subject was your doctorate?

[Laptev] I am a doctor of philosophical sciences. I devoted many years to studying a subject which sounds unusual, but is exceptionally topical today. I started working on it in 1970 and am continuing with it at the present. I was involved in studying all political, ideological, and social aspects connected with the interaction of society and nature.

[Kiselev] Turning to the computer again, it records that you only came onto the rostrum twice in three Supreme Soviet sessions. Why is this? Do you think that you are not a speaker, or that your work is not here, on the rostrum—that what happens in the Supreme Soviet is not the most important thing?

[Laptev] It is neither of these things. I don't think that I am a worse speaker than anyone else, since we are all learning the rhetoric literally as we go along.

Why have I spoken so rarely? Not at all because I didn't have anything to say or that I didn't feel like it. But I was fulfilling my duties as IZVESTIYA editor. Strange as it may seem. You see, a deputy comes up and says that, comrades, I have received 10 telegrams in which people are asking me such and such a question, whereas I know that IZVESTIYA receives half-a-million letters every year and I can at any moment get 10,000 telegrams out of any pocket both "for" and against" on this question. That means that I must have a different approach. That is the first thing. But it is not the main thing. The main thing is as follows. IZVESTIYA consistently, from issue to issue, fought for laws that went through with difficulty. This includes the Law on Leasing, the Law on Land, and the Law on Ownership. So that is why I thought: Since I have the possibility of expressing my position and reflecting it somehow through the newspaper, then it will be quite correct for me to allow other comrades to speak.

[Kiselev] So, another question, and again it is based on computer data. The "Deputies' Association" column says: "information not available." Was your nonparticipation in the Deputies' Association also a principled position?

[Laptev] The point is that it was actually my post as chief editor of IZVESTIYA that prevented me from participating. I believed that, as IZVESTIYA editor who was also a deputy, I could not join any particular group, any bloc, or any wing, because to the newspaper they must all be identical and equal. Even if I myself did not do anything in these associations, my colleagues, knowing that that I am in this group, might wittingly or unwittingly favor it.

Laverov Stresses Laws for Science

LD0404224290 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1900 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Text] Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Doctor Nikolay Laverov sees a major way to invigorate the national economy in adopting a series of laws to govern scientific and technical activities. Dr Laverov is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and head of a state science and technology committee. He singles out a bill on intellectual property which is to determine relations

between scientists on the one hand and the state and society on the other. Dr Laverov speaks out for creating a scientific council under the Soviet President.

Apparatus Role in Drafting CPSU Statutes

PM0904094090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[A. Glukhovtsev article followed by editorial commentary: "Let Us Get to the Bottom of This"]

[Text] "There is a view that Gorbachev is opposed, in his progressive efforts, by a gigantic conservative party apparatus, first and foremost the CPSU Central Committee apparatus." This topic, according to a correspondent for the magazine OGONEK (No. 13, March 1990), is discussed by G.F. Khatsenkov, adviser at the CPSU Central Committee Party Building and Cadre Work Department, in an interview he gave him.

You could say that the reflections of G.F. Khatsenkov, who states that he played an active part in the formulation of the draft CPSU Statutes, are centered on the assertion that the party apparatus prepared a draft of the party Statutes which will serve only the interests of the party apparatus itself, hamper the renewal of the party in the spirit of the times, and constitute an obstacle to progressive changes.

I am addressing myself to the PRAVDA editorial office because it is a question of a party document and the CPSU Central Committee apparatus. The author of these lines worked side by side with G.F. Khatsenkov in one of the groups that prepared materials for the draft party Statutes. I will say frankly that to claim that the draft is the fruit of behind-the-scenes games by the apparatus is to go against the truth, to sow the seeds of distrust in the party's ranks, and to cast the shadow of unmerited accusations over your comrades. I cannot but refute this categorically.

First of all, a political scientist and expert in the sphere of party building must know that any apparatus is created specifically in order to draw up the necessary drafts for consideration by the appropriate organizations and institutions and their leadership organs. That is how the work on the draft party Statutes was done. And there is no need to intimidate people with fabrications about the apparatus' machinations over drafting the document. Furthermore the draft was not prepared from a blank sheet of paper by one or two scholars formulating their own ideas and discoveries for examination "upstairs," as G.F. Khatsenkov asserts when describing his work methods: "I am a representative of the lower strata, if we can put it that way, who start work with a blank sheet of paper. When we have filled it, it goes to the leadership...." Nonetheless one can only be surprised that Georgiy Fedorovich failed to notice how the party organizations' proposals were collected and studied, how workers from the CPSU Central Committee apparatus went out to the localities for this purpose, and how a very large number of versions of the draft Statutes were prepared. How in the course of work on the draft many formulations and entire sections were changed, because the desire to take into account as many proposals as possible sometimes led to the resolution of incredibly complex tasks.

True, Georgiy Fedorovich might not have noticed all this, because he was distracted from the work of the group. During the period when its activity was at its height, he was involved in an election campaign for the post of director of one of the country's biggest publishing houses. The elections proved unsuccessful. The contender was not elected. He then transferred his energy to other matters, seeking to win popularity as a political scientist, an expert in the sphere of party building, and an active participant in the formulation of the draft Statutes. He spoke in this capacity on the radio, and later in OGONEK. But that is by the way.

As for the draft, it traveled a difficult road from the many primary organizations that put forward their proposals, scientific institutions, and other collectives to the Politburo and the party Central Committee plenum. But this is only a draft, a document for further work, work which is to be completed in the party in the course of its discussion and the preparations for the congress and at the congress itself. One may agree or disagree with a draft and its proposals, one may accept some points in it and not others. And a discussion to this end has now begun in the party organizations and the press. I myself have a number of proposals to make on this document, including some on problems on which I had quite heated debates with the colleagues who took part in formulating it. But I am sure that this does not give me the right publicly to castigate them for their failure to agree with my view in the course of what you could call laboratory work, during the drafting of the document.

I am also perplexed by this question: How could Georgiy Fedorovich consider it possible to criticize the draft Statutes in the press three days before its publication, and basically to open a debate by generating a priori a negative attitude to the document? He really sounds the alarm to warn of imminent danger on the eve of the draft's publication. Although in his situation as he describes it, it would be more sensible for Georgiy Fedorovich to be more scrupulous.

G.F. Khatsenkov is today calling for a parliamentary type of party. "Where should we go? How should we restructure ourselves?"—the adviser asks rhetorically, and answers: "I think there is only one path today—the transition to a parliamentary type of party." Well, Georgiy Fedorovich is absolutely clear about that, and sees the only correct path. That is today. What about yesterday? When did Georgiy Fedorovich see the light? After all, in the course of work on the concept for the draft Statutes and later in the process of work on the draft itself he did not express such diametrically opposed

opinions, and was working in an entirely different direction. I am convinced that in any party, whether parliamentary or of any other type, more stable, principled positions than this are required of the members.

Until the last days of the group's work, Georgiy Fedorovich did not express such radical views. But even that is not the point. There was every opportunity to explain his views—starting from a blank sheet of paper, as only he knows how—and to refuse to participate in what, as it now transpires, he does not agree with. That, in my view, would have been noble and worthy of respect, and would have opened the way, as we now say but unfortunately do not always do, to a civilized debate.

You might think that would be the end of it. But the question arises, why was it necessary to talk about an apparatus version of the draft party Statutes, which is not in accordance with reality? If the idea was to give more weight to arguments in favor of his own new views on the CPSU as a parliamentary type of party, this is improper, to put it mildly. Today it is indeed necessary to move forward, study new problems of intraparty life, and formulate ways of renewing the party. But what is G.F. Khatsenkov telling us that is new when he presents as his own discoveries things that have already been spoken of repeatedly in the party and duly assessed? In partiuclar, the party's monopoly of power in the past, the fusion of its apparatus with the state apparatus, and many other problems. In his reflections Georgiy Fedorovich acknowledges in passing that there are many good workers in the party apparatus. One must agree with that. It is also true that the apparatus merits critical assessments. Its negative image is created not least by the wrong kind of people, who entered party work in order to satisfy their own selfish, ambitious interests. Now that the process of ridding the party of the negative accretions of the administrative edict system has begun, those who fitted in with it for their own personal ends are quick to miss no opportunity in the confusion and under cover of the changes taking place. They don the garb of fearless and spotless knights, fighters for a just cause. The party has not fulfilled their hoeps for personal long-term prosperity, it has renounced what helped them to flourish, and they has now decided to collect points by publicly trampling on the banners before which not so long ago they were taking an oath of loyalty.

The path of renewal of the party is not simple. At times it is very difficult. I and the other Central Committee apparatus workers could say much that is critical on this question. But criticism is always directed somewhere and at something. I am afraid that the nature of G.F. Khatsenkov's remarks on the eve of the 28th congress, in an atmsophere of heightened political tension in the party and society, does not contribute much to business-like polemics, and pushes the dispute onto far from healthy ground.

I cannot say that none of his reflections merit attention or could be the subject of a useful discussion. But many of them are designed to be superficially attractive, and are insufficiently well argued. Of course, within the framework of a brief talk in the pages of a journal, it is not easy to produce detailed arguments on the whole spectrum of problems he raises. But even Georgiy Fedorovich's wholesale rejection of V.I. Lenin's views on the party does, after all, demand a more profound approach in a dispute with such a weighty opponent. And it is not very conscientious to throw out in passing whatever comes to hand, counting on the reader to be insufficiently attentive or not entirely competent, to be one of those who will fall for sensational evidence about the apparatus version of the draft Statutes from an "active" participant in the work of drafting. Or take the following question, I quote verbatim: "It is not a question of people as such. It is a question of the system, the structures," G.F. Khatsenkov claims, seeking to demonstrate the need to eliminate the existing structures of the party apparatus. There is no question that it is necessary to change these structures, and this is, incidentally, incorporated in the draft new Statutes. But I would venture to assert that whatever the structures, it will always be a question of the people. Any form, even the best, can be filled with different kinds of content. These are banalities. But they should be remembered. At the very dawn of our party's formation, its founder said that no Statutes will guarantee its normal, healthy activity without real party comradeship. Today more than ever before we must concern ourselves with this, without in the least minimizing, of course, the significance of what is laid down in the precise norms governing intraparty relations. [Glukhovtsev ends]

From the editorial office: Such radical "transformations" are nothing unusual today—a complete change of views, the merciless destruction of everything that was formerly revered, and, conversely, the elevation to the highest degree of what was formerly denied. The "religious conversion" of political scientist G. Khatsenkov comes into this category.

Of course, it is very easy to attribute such political metamorphoses to the fact that perestroyka has opened the floodgates of glasnost and pluralism of opinions. But obviously neither pluralism nor any other perestroyka process is at all relevant here. They give everyone the opportunity openly and boldly to express his position, defend his views and principles, and act according to his conscience. But they do not in any way explain, still less do they justify, the unprincipled and immoral actions of those who are cunning and hypocritical, who are prepared, for opportunist reasons, to disavow everything that, as they understand it, prevents them from winning popularity in the changed conditions of the political struggle.

The critical mood is growing in society, and some speakers are apparently ready to bend over backward to be more savage than anyone else in their criticism. Membership of the CPSU no longer offers any advantages—so the populist with a party card in his pocket dissociates himself from the party in every way in order to gain "winning points" by making accusations against

it. The word "apparatchik" has become a scathing label, and only the idlest people fail to detect the "machinations of the apparatus" in any negative phenomena and to lash out at random without looking to see who is who.

We constantly hear the names of people who, having worked and made their career in that very same apparatus of party committees, up to and including the Central Committee, are now trying hard to align themselves with the "liberals" and "democrats," basically betraying the party's ideals. It is hard to decide when they were more hypocritical—then or now. There is probably no point in trying to give their hypocrisy a rating, as the fashionable expression now goes. One thing is beyond dispute: A deceiver, whoever he may be, cannot escape from the habit of deception; he carries it within himself.

It is equally futile to try to revive old views and old systems and disguise with perestroyka terminology a dogmatism that life has rejected, a dogmatism that some people pass off as loyalty to the principles of Marxism. The aim here is obvious: to catch in your sails the wind of social tension in society and rise to the top on the wave of criticism, blaming perestroyka, democratization, and glasnost for all our ills. And to try to win over gullible people who feel nostalgic for the past.

Everyone is free to change his views, that is a personal matter. But building a policy on opportunist calculations is unseemly.

Economic

Price Increases, Job Losses Foreseen in 1991

AU1204105290 Paris AFP in English 1035 GMT 12 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 12 (AFP)—Soviet citizens could see prices double and more than 10 million of them could lose their jobs under an economic reform programme outlined here Thursday and due to take effect from January 1.

President Mikhail Gorbachev was due to chair a meeting of the new Presidential Council and of the Council of the Union on Saturday to study the proposals which exclude monetary reform but include measures to cushion social hardship.

A senior Soviet official told a press conference Thursday that the reforms were supported by more than half of the population.

The official, the vice president of the Economic Reform Commission of the Supreme Soviet, Pavel Bunich, said: "According to projects still being discussed, 70 per cent of wholesale prices will be freed on January 1, and retail prices will have to be freed from that date, according to methods yet to be decided."

"If 70 per cent of prices are freed, on average prices will double."

The 30 per cent of prices set by the state would be for "the price of basic, essential products and the prices of strategic production" for the country.

Under the reforms being prepared, foreign companies would be able from July 1 to control "100 per cent of the capital of a company" in the Soviet Union. Mr. Bunich said: "A foreign company will even be able to buy a Soviet company offered by the government."

"If 70 per cent of state companies are de-nationalised, then the same amount of ministries will have to disappear". Pricing freedom would mean that "the state committee for prices will be responsible for only 30 per cent of prices, the state committee for supplies will be responsible for only 30 per cent of the economy".

He said that "by virtue of the law on property leases, de-nationalisation has already begun because the right to ownership concerns all goods" and that "it concerns private property, even if the term is not yet used".

The measures should result in a "critical mass" from 1991 making it possible to "cross the first stage, the most important stage" of economic reform.

There must be no separation between "the work of destruction and that of reconstruction". He also said that "we need about 10 years of broad structuring of the market to complete the reform".

He said that the Soviet authorities were "totally aware of the social problems posed by the reform" and that "we have the support of more than half the population".

Stating that "about 10 million people will be affected by unemployment", he said that "a draft law on inactivity envisages the right to be without work, the right to unemployment benefits and the right to training courses."

The necessary funds provided by the state "will be financed partially by inflation, and partially by new taxes on incomes and on capital".

Regarding the danger of hyper-inflation, he said that Soviet economists thought that a wages freeze might eventually be necessary so as to "reduce demand".

He ruled out monetary reform because the argument that reform would act against the "Mafia" did not stand up since black-market operators reinvested in antiques and in other items of stable value.

"It would be the poor people who would pay the price of such a reform," he said.

Replying to a Soviet journalist who was concerned about "the future of socialism", Mr. Bunich said that in the Soviet Union "there is still the stereotype which portrays an employer as an exploiter".

Bunich Views Transition to Market Economy

LD1204114390 Moscow TASS in English 1119 GMT 12 Apr 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow April 12 TASS—Up to 70 per cent of Soviet state-owned industries will soon be leased to work collectives or individual owners, a senior Soviet lawmaker in charge of economic reforms told reporters today.

In addition, nearly 70 per cent of all prices will soon be regulated by the market, Pavel Bunich, deputy chairman of the Soviet parliamentary Committee on Economic Reform, said.

The government will set prices only of key necessities and strategic prices, he said, urging quicker economic reforms.

The Soviet Union will soon have a market of securities, means of production and labour, he said. The parliament will pass bills to demonopolise the economy and promote competition.

The government will have to change its functions, too, since there will be no need for industrial ministries.

"I don't see the need for five-year plans either, at least in their present, binding form," Bunich said.

The Soviet State Planning Committee and Committee on Statistics should switch to coordination, he said.

A law on employment, determining the status of the unemployed in the Soviet Union, their rights for benefits and training, will be a central plank of the reforms, he said.

"During the transiton to market economics, unemployment in the Soviet Union will reach 10 million people, but the adoption of the law will enable the 'dilution' of about 75 per cent of this number," he said.

Bunich warned against the proposed monetary reform, saying "it will hit common people, and not the newly-rich and the mafia, as its proponents promise. [no closing quotation mark as received]

Psychological unpreparedness and social tensions in society were major obstacles towards a market-oriented economy, he said, rejecting the type of "shock treatment" taken by the Polish Government.

All government measures to help the country move to market economics will be discussed by the Soviet parliament and monetary reforms will be submitted for a nationwide discussion, he said.

The prime minister will deliver a speech on the reform package later this month, he announced.

Abalkin Economic Reform Proposal Examined

PM1104105190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 1

[V. Romanyuk report on 9 April news conference given by USSR Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman L. Abalkin: "Reorientation Toward the Market. Why Radical Reform of the Economy Was Needed"]

[Text] On Monday 9 April Academician L. Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, held a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists. He spelled out the government's position on the problems of switching the country's economy to a system of the regulated market type.

Why is public opinion so agitated? After all, even before there was plenty of discussion about radical reforms. Today, however, there is no doubt about the seriousness of the government's intentions. But is this the only reason for the keenness of the interest and even the degree of sensationalism in the government's new proposals? The extremely sharp debates about the government program approved by the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies are still fresh in the memory. Although calculated for a six-year term, it in fact survived...four months. It is to be assumed that a complex discussion lies ahead in the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Academician L. Abalkin will have no illusions about it. So, has the course chosen at that time—what you might call unruffled reforms spread over a period of time—proved untenable?

These words were not actually spoken. The USSR Council of Ministers deputy chairman stressed that the sharp turnaround stems not from short-term considerations or arrogance on someone's part but from the strategic choice. Indeed the government program did not deny the market but, on the contrary, set the objective of creating a highly efficient economy receptive to scientific and technical innovations and oriented toward the market.

It was again said at considerable length that a highly efficient economy cannot be created without the widespread utilization of market mechanisms. Here the system of state regulation must incorporate a powerful instrument for the social protection of the population. Talking about the reasons for the radicalism in the new approaches, L. Abalkin referred to the increased complexity of the economic situation in the country as a result of regional and interethnic conflicts. The fact that industrial output in the first quarter of the year was 1.2 percent down on the first quarter of 1989 was nothing but a crisis. He went on to talk about the increased impatience and excitement of passions in a society unwilling to wait until 1993 for radical reforms. In L. Abalkin's view, society was less agitated five months ago. And the main point is that balancing on two incompatible structures—administrative edict and market structures—is no longer sustainable.

IZVESTIYA has already described the package of documents aimed at building a regulated market economy. The details of the alternative options are currently being worked out and the possible consequences predicted—that is, the price which society will have to pay is being determined. Our government cannot count on the kind of powerful public support which the Polish Government, for example, received when implementing its "shock therapy" program. L. Abalkin expressed the hope that the press will be supportive and participate in preparing public opinion to react correctly to the "change of course."

But what specifically does this "new course" comprise? Answering numerous questions, Academician L. Abalkin attempted to spell out his view of what a regulated market economy consists of. One complex question is pricing. Should prices be "freed?" If so, should it be done immediately or group by group, using regulators? Essentially this process is already underway. Free prices for vegetables and fruit have been in existence in the country for four months. Prices set by administrative methods are manifestly unsuitable for a market economy—it is oriented toward free prices. But freedom is a relative concept; restrictions are even imposed on the biblical "thou shalt not kill." Restrictions are especially necessary in conditions of inflation and unrestrained growth of the population's incomes.

Or take the fact that there are around 300 different banking structures in the country. Commercial-type banks (regional, cooperative, commission-charging banks) must be the dominant type. But for commercial principles to take over in banks' activity, financial support from the state (subsidies) must be abolished. In general financial resources must come only through the credit system, while credit itself must become a weapon against inflationary processes in the economy. L. Abalkin was dubious about a proposal made by a number of deputies that the USSR State Bank be made directly subordinate to the USSR Supreme Soviet. The argument went: Since the bank is emerging from government jurisdiction it is ceasing to be answerable for the money supply situation in the country. Personally I haven't spotted anything dangerous in this. Let the USSR State Bank be answerable in the same way that central banks throughout the world are answerable.

A question was asked about joint-stock companies: Are shares going to remain an economic curiosity for a long time to come? It transpires that a draft law on the subject is in the pipeline and has already been subjected to expert appraisal by Western specialists. Provisional regulations governing joint-stock companies are being prepared. The only concern is to ensure that shares are not used as a means for "laundering" some people's excessive incomes.

Again the question of monetary reform was raised, and again the idea behind it—siphoning excessive incomes out of the shadow economy: taking from the rich and giving to the poor, so to speak—was rejected. L. Abalkin warned against a passion for leveling. Taking from a few and sharing the proceeds among everyone? That will not make society richer or fairer.

The deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers was criticized for paying inadequate attention to pensioners—the introduction of the new pension law is several years behind schedule. A reasoned answer was given: You can only share out the national income that you have actually obtained rather than created artificially by printing money. But the following ungratifying trend emerged. Departments at first fought for their own interests, which in total exceeded the available resources several times over. So now USSR Supreme Soviet committees and commissions have found themselves in the role of defenders of the local interests of individual groups of the population and spheres of activity.

In a year of working in the Supreme Soviet, L. Abalkin noted, I have not once heard proposals about how to increase production efficiency or save resources. Programs must have material backup, otherwise they are worth no more than the paper these decisions are written on.

In conclusion let me single out one of the numerous questions: At what level was the decision to switch to a regulated market economy made? At the level of the government, the Central Committee Politburo, or the USSR president? The answer given was: The government is an executive organ; it can make a proposal but in the final analysis it only implements Supreme Soviet decisions. The Central Committee Politburo no longer participates in making decisions of this kind and never will again. The only possible decisionmaking combination is: The president-the parliament-the Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

Details of Foreign Currency Banking Explained

PM1204083090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[S. Cheremin article in reply to reader's letter, under the rubric "From Expert Sources": "A Magic Wand? About Interest on Currency Deposits"—first paragraph is reader's letter]

[Text] In PRAVDA for 18 February 1990, under the rubric "Dialogue," you reported that the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity pays two percent annual interest on currency accounts. However, in January I received a statement from the bank showing that no interest had been paid on my deposit.

[Signed] V. Borodin, Moscow.

Unfortunately, many writers of similar letters overlooked that the "Rich Man—Poor Man" item spoke only about "V" type accounts, since it is these that are used by the overwhelming majority of Soviet citizens. In all, four different kinds of account exist in the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity, as N. Chernyshev, deputy

chief of the contract and legal administration, explained. In all probability our reader V. Borodin has a "B" type account, in which clients keep freely convertible and nonconvertible currency.

The mechanics of interest payment in the case in question are rather complex. If you have freely convertible currency, the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity fixes an interest rate 1.5 percent lower than the rate applicable to foreign banks with capital in the Soviet Union, but not less than two percent. In the case of nonconvertible currency (for instance, the Iranian rial, the Algerian dinar, the Indian rupee, and so forth) no interest is paid on a deposit, regardless of its size. In order to receive an income, holders of "B" type accounts must convert them into "V" type accounts. However, this rule applies only to those who have earned currency on foreign business trips, or who have received royalties for various types of creative activity or from sports competitions. In a number of cases, for example the receiving of an inheritance or the sale of property abroad, interest is not payable and accounts cannot be converted.

Many people also still express bewilderment about the existing system of payment in Berezka [foreign currency] stores. In order to facilitate even a little a procedure demanding an enormous expenditure of time and effort, to say nothing of nerves, experimentally the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity is introducing plastic cards on which all the information about the deposit holder and the sum of his savings is encoded. When paying for goods, there is no need to go to a branch of the bank and register a currency transfer; all you have to do is to insert the card into the computer in the store, and it will automatically deduct the money from your account. However, this fine initiative has run into purely technical difficulties.

In a test run of the new system in four Moscow Berezka stores, many faults, defects, and hitches were found in the operation of the equipment. The trouble is that the existing channels of communication are not adapted for electronic finance operations.

But even the plastic card, in my view, will not be a kind of "magic wand" by a wave of which all problems will be resolved, since goods shortages will remain for the foreseeable future. And as long as they exist, speculation will also thrive. It is quite possible that we may soon come across card speculators.

New Economic, Financial Weekly Paper Launched

LD1204071790 Moscow TASS in English 0701 GMT 12 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 12 TASS—The Soviet Union's first economic and financial weekly newspaper, "BUSINESS AND BANKS" has been founded. It will be issued from next June by the information-commercial consortium. Its founders include the news agency INFORMBANK as well as the leading Soviet banks—Promstrojbank, Agroprombank, Zhilsotsbank and Sberbank.

The weekly will provide regular coverage of current world and domestic market prices of the main industrial commodities and food products, raw materials as well as foreign currency rates. It will carry operational banking information, economic reviews and forecasts by leading foreign and Soviet experts.

Legal documents, which have not been widely published so far, will be of special interest to all organisations and enterprises which use bank services.

The new weekly's supplement, "ZARUBEZHNOYE DELOVOYE OBOZRENIE" (FOREIGN BUSINESS REVIEW), will feature activities of major foreign banks, international financial organisations and leading foreign firms, world trade development and changes in the world market, as well as other issues.

Scientific

'Foton' Satellite To Study Space Materials

LD1204075190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0722 GMT 12 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 12 April. (TASS)—On Wednesday another "Foton" earth satellite was launched in the Soviet Union by means of a "Soyuz" carrier rocket. The satellite is designed for the continuation of research into space materials.

The program of the flight, estimated for 16 days, envisages the carrying out of experiments in obtaining, under conditions of micro-gravitation, crystals of proteins and semiconductor materials with improved properties, and also development of the technology of their experimental-industrial manufacture.

By commercial agreement the "Foton" satellite also carries research equipment of France's National Center for Space Research.

After the planned flight program has been completed the materials obtained will be delivered to earth and conveyed to scientific organizations for research.

The equipment installed on the satellite is working normally.

The coordinating and computing center is processing the incoming information.

'Mir' Cosmonauts Continue Mission

LD1004105690 Moscow TASS in English 1039 GMT 10 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 10 TASS—By TASS correspondent:

The second month of the orbital flight of Soviet cosmonauts Anatoliy Solovyov and Aleksandr Balandin on the orbital complex Mir is drawing to an end.

Today's agenda includes scientific, engineering and medical research and routine maintenance of some on-board systems of the basic module.

Using a portable spectrometer, the cosmonauts will take several series of measurements of spatial and energy characteristics of X-ray and Gamma-ray radiation in the compartments of the orbital complex.

The experiment "Monitoring" will be performed to judge the strength of the structural elements of the Kvant-2 module with the use of accoustic sensors installed inside it.

The cosmonauts continue to perform experiments to measure the fluxes of micrometeorites in near-earth space and to study the influence of open space conditions on various materials.

Scientific information is being conveyed to earth, where it is processed.

The two cosmonauts are in good health.

Military

Yazov, Others Discuss Draft Defense Law

PM1204104990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Draft Law Discussed"]

[Text] The principles of Soviet defense organizational development, the basic principles of its economic guarantees, and the powers of organs of state authority must be legislatively enshrined in the USSR Law on Defense. This was said on 10 April at a session of the USSR Defense Ministry collegium devoted to discussing the draft of this law.

The following took part in the collegium's work: USSR people's deputies, members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Defense and State Security, and leading personnel from the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR State Planning Committee, the USSR Foreign Ministry, the USSR KGB, the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry, the USSR Justice Ministry, and the USSR Academy of Sciences.

In their speeches, Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister; I.S. Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces; and others noted that the USSR Law on Defense must serve as a long-term legal basis for military organizational development and be the core of the entire system of legislation governing USSR defense. They stressed that the legal status of the Armed Forces and the principles of their staffing and organizational development must be enshrined in the law.

The collegium instructed the USSR Defense Ministry Military Legislation Commission to finalize the draft law on the basis of the proposals and observations made at the collegium session and to submit it to the USSR Supreme Soviet in line with established procedure.

Arbatov Claims on Defense Sufficiency Rebutted

90UM0448A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA in Russian No 12, 23 March 90 p 17

[Open letter to Academician G.A. Arbatov from Major General German Kirilenko, doctor of military science: "What To Consider Reasonable, What, Sufficient?"]

[Text] I was present at the Second Congress of People's Deputies on the very day that General of the Army M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, and Academician G.A. Arbatov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute, spoke.

This combination promised an interesting exchange of opinions between the military and politicians on the current processes occurring in the country and the world.

High professionalism is always valued, and for this reason I waited, following General of the Army M.A. Moiseyev's speech, with perfectly understandable interest to hear what Academician G.A. Arbatov would say about current foreign policy problems.

But, unfortunately, Georgiy Arkadyevich chose the currently fashionable topic which military science attributes to the sphere of the theory of military economics and the organizational development of the armed forces.

Naturally, I began to listen to his speech with roughly the same interest and attention with which he would have listened to mine, had I been speaking on foreign policy problems of the United States and Canada.

The contentiousness and inadequate reasoning of his opinions seemed to me even at that time dangerous to the extent that the deputies and readers might take them to be truth available to a well-known academician.

When, however, in issue No. 5 of the journal OGONEK Georgiy Arkadyevich continued the subject he had begun at the congress and which, probably, had pleased him, I considered it my duty to object, and this is my printed speech—an open letter to Academician Arbatov.

First, concerning the main statements made from the congress rostrum.

1. "No developed state in the world currently spends on military outlays, as we do, more than 9 percent of its GNP."

First, this is not the case. There are countries—Israel, for example—that spend a greater proportion. Second, the USSR does not fit into the category of the countries you name. Third, I would specify that in 1989 the proportion of the USSR's military spending in GNP constituted not 9 but 8.4 percent, and in 1990 will constitute no more than 7.7 percent. Fourth and finally, since our GNP is half America's (and you know this), the proportion of military spending to maintain parity should have been twice as high, but was higher by a factor of less than 1.5. In the United States, 5.9 percent, with us, 8.4 percent. As a result we maintain parity mainly thanks to servicemen's low pay.

2. The most burdensome manifestation and legacy of stagnation is the complete freedom of the military and military industry."

First, not all that proper. Second, your viewpoint is very similar to America's. This was precisely what the United States and Canada thought: the military governs policy here, not the other way about. But if you believe that Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Chernenko were military, who, in that case, was a politician?

3. Even given a cut of 500,000 in our Armed Forces, they "remain 1.5 million more than America's."

There were some 3.289 million men in the U.S. Armed Forces in 1989. This number included 2.13 million regular forces and 1.159 million men in the organized reserve (the National Guard and reserves of branches of the service).

The military equipment strength level of the formations of the organized reserve constitutes 80-85 percent, and the readiness to conduct combat operations, from 3 to 10 days.

The overall numbers of the USSR Armed Forces as of 1 January 1990 constituted 3.993 million.

Without giving away any secrets, I can assure you (and the Americans know this) that our Armed Forces (I stress, armed, that is, constantly engaged in combat training, and not in economic activity) are no greater than America's by a single soldier.

4. "We share the doubtful fame of being the biggest dealers in arms and military equipment. Military extravagance has literally bled our economy white."

According to foreign estimates, in which you place full confidence, arms exports are a most profitable item in Soviet foreign trade. They provide the country with up to 15 percent of all proceeds in hard currency (oil sales, 60 percent). Such "extravagance" could hardly bleed our economy white. Of course, we could forgo both the "doubtful fame" and the "proceeds in hard currency," only let it not be thought that other countries would follow our example.

And now about your notes in the journal OGONEK "in continuation, as it were, of the speech" at the congress.

You write that "military force should be 'reasonably sufficient'—no more, no less."

But how much is this? Why do you not venture to bestow a numerical indicator on this "reasonable sufficiency," which is very reminiscent of the proposition that "the economy must be economical."

As a participant in the Great Patriotic War and proceeding from experience in it, try to define in what defensive operation such "sufficiency" was created. At Kiev, Odessa, Sevastopol? No? At Kursk, then? I think so too. But let us recall that such "sufficiency" was achieved given the considerable superiority of our forces. And this under conditions where we were not inferior to the enemy in quality of arms and military equipment. F. Engels observed that "the advantage in a military respect is gained by the country with a higher level of civilization over its less developed neighbors."

Can we today state that we have such an advantage over the United States or other NATO countries? You, obviously, know this full well. Nonetheless, I will adduce in this connection the following fact. Whereas in the 1950's our country was in third place in the world in terms of the youth intellectualization factor, in 1985 we were 42d, and by 1987, 57th.

You are worried by the fact that we have more tanks than the United States. Excuse me, but I am forced to remind you that we also have more tractors and combines, as workers also, in agriculture (in the United States, 3 million persons, but with us, 23 million), but for some reason or other we obtain less grain and meat. Think about reasonable "sufficiency."

I hope you will not maintain that our tanks are in terms of quality, as distinct from the tractors, better than America's, and that soldiers of the construction battalions are not inferior in level of combat training to the U.S. National Guard?

In that case, I would make so bold as to assure you that you are mistaken and are deluding the readers.

As far as the numbers of the Armed Forces of the United States and the USSR are concerned, I would like to call your attention to the following circumstances also.

First, the geographical distance of the territory of the United States from possible theaters of war and the existence there of land borders with Canada and Mexico do not condition the numbers of the Armed Forces which it has.

Second, it should be considered that in the U.S. Army soldiers are not enlisted even in such chores as kitchen duty but that our Armed Forces not only cater 20-40 percent for their own food requirements but also participate actively in the accomplishment of such large-scale national economic tasks as "Housing 2000" and "Roads of the Non-Chernozem," reclamation, the annual harvesting and much more.

If, following your counsel, we continue to reduce the army, to whom will we entrust these concerns? "General" arguments are not worth a cent if there is no answer to difficult questions here.

Third, having "served" in the U.S. Army, the journalist Artem Borovik told us in the journal OGONEK that the Americans believe one soldier of the U.S. professional army is worth three nonprofessionals. I have no reason to distrust the American estimates. But in this case with what numbers, in your opinion, might we ensure our "reasonable defensive sufficiency"?

I do not understand why, in taking issue with your opponents (S.F. Akhromeyev and A.I. Ovchinnikov) concerning the numbers of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, you resort as a principal argument to official American data and completely ignore our official information, although it has been published in the open press for several years now.

Together with this I am amazed at your euphoria in connection with the 10-percent reduction in U.S. military appropriations over five years (with regard for inflation) and your readiness "to answer fully for official U.S. statistics." I would in this case like to remind you that just last year alone the USSR reduced its defense spending 8.2 percent without taking inflation into account, but were we to count, as you propose, "scientifically, in real prices, with an adjustment for inflation," this indicator would be considerably higher than America's. It should also be considered that not only do I have sufficient reason to treat American statistics with a certain caution. Such caution is shared by PRAVDA correspondent V. Gan, who has reported that although certain cuts in the Pentagon are planned, "these are all merely 'fat-cutting.'" All the Pentagon's main programs have been left untouched. The White House is seeking an increase to $4.8 billion in appropriations for SDI, supporting the acquisition of Stealth bombers and new submarines and fighters and so forth.

This is the situation in reality.

Much-esteemed Georgiy Arkadyevich, I could continue the polemic in respect of other of your arguments also, but I would like also to agree with you that the other side's intentions need to be judged not so much by its words as its possibilities. After all, it is sufficiently obvious that the danger of war persists in the world, that the by no means defensive doctrines and concepts of the United States and NATO remain in effect and that they have multimillion-strong armies and multibillion-dollar military budgets. It was no accident that this was dealt with at the CPSU Central Committee February (1990) Plenum, and it was stressed that we need well-trained and equipped armed forces. And it is necessary to pay for quality no less than for quantity.

The country's defense currently costs R70.9 billion. You write that this amount passes beyond the framework of reasonable sufficiency. I would be interested to know your opinion as to by how much. If it is borne in mind that at the present time over 173,000 families of servicemen are in need of apartments and that the official salary of even a regiment commander is not more than that of a municipal bus driver. As far, however, as the quality of the arms and military equipment is concerned, I hope you will understand that there is no basis with us for economizing here. Reports on accidents on submarines and in aircraft are graphic testimony to the amoral nature of such proposals.

Of course, considering the present socioeconomic conditions, R70 billion is a substantial sum. However, let us take a closer look: Is it that ruinous for our country?

According to information presented in the Supreme Soviet on 3 June 1989 by P. Mostov, chairman of the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, half of the industrial product is lost in the country annually—this loss amounting to R450 billion.

According to figures adduced in their official speeches by M.S. Gorbachev and N.I. Ryzhkov, there is an annual loss of agricultural products to the extent of 20-40 percent, which constitutes a loss within the R47-95 billion range.

Losses of work time (USSR Academy of Sciences figures) are put at 30 percent or R83 billion.

A summary estimate, however, made on the basis of testimony of F. Fedorov, leader of a working group of the USSR Supreme Soviet studying the problem of unproductive losses, shows from far-from-complete data that total unproductive expenditure and losses in the national economy are put within the R580-629 billion range.

Together with this the USSR Procuracy reports that criminal capital in the country is the equivalent of R210-240 billion (and according to other sources, considerably more!). One-third of this sum (as much as the country allocates annually for its defense) participates in the "shadow economy."

Should not this potential be employed primarily for the solution of our socioeconomic problems? You will agree that against the background only of the said unproductive losses even the money allocated to the country's defense appears more than modest. Is it only expenditure on the army that is "rocking" the country's economy?

I would like in conclusion to express the hope that the vogue for the indiscriminate blackening of the Army and attendant subjects will pass. The more so when it is obvious to everyone that there is an urgent need for the enhanced prestige of Army service, the professionalism of servicemen, and military reform. M.S. Gorbachev's report at the CPSU Central Committee February (1990) Plenum observed that coverage in the mass media of Army and Navy life "should be truthful and respectful in respect of the Soviet Army and soldiers' and officers' military affairs." Anti-Army propaganda has never been

popular among our people. But it was heard, unfortunately, distinctly enough in your speech at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies and in OGONEK.

It was this that prompted me to address an open letter to you through LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA.

Respectfully,
[Signed] Major General German Kirilenko, doctor of military sciences.

Air Defense Forces Political Chief Interviewed

PM1104155590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General N.M. Boyko, member of the Military Council and chief of the Air Defense Forces Political Directorate, by correspondent Colonel A. Yurkin under the rubric "Today Is Air Defense Forces Day": "As Commanded by Duty"; place, date not specified]

[Text] On the eve of Air Defense Forces Day our correspondent met with Lieutenant General Nikolay Makarovich Boyko, member of the Military Council and chief of the Air Defense Forces Political Directorate, and asked him to answer a number of questions.

[Yurkin] Even in peacetime the Air Defense Forces fulfill combat tasks of guarding our country's air borders. What is the situation at this hour, this minute?

[Boyko] Just a few minutes ago I heard a report from the Central Command Post's duty general. The situation is this: Several reconnaissance aircraft are in the air, and fighters of the NATO forces are over the Baltic. In addition, almost 1,000 of our aircraft are being monitored. During the night fighters had to be sent up, and antiaircraft missile subunits had to be made ready. In short, there is sufficient work for radar operators, missilemen, and airmen in all parts of the country. The actual situation does not yet attest to a lessening of tension—there is no reduction in the number of reconnaissance flights, and first-line units have been obliged to perform duty in readiness for very decisive actions. Every day that has been lived through confirms that the role of the Air Defense Forces increases and assumes special significance with the adoption of the defensive doctrine.

[Yurkin] Nevertheless, some officers are stating their wish to be transferred to the reserve. Does the Political Directorate have a work program aimed at restoring the prestige of service in the Air Defense Forces?

[Boyko] Our service really is special, and not everyone is able to perform it at remote points in the mountains, in the sands, or in the tundra. This is a fact, and it cannot be disregarded. I will also say that combat readiness in companies and battalions is not sustained by people who fill out forms. On the southern border, under high mountain conditions, the radar operators of the battalion commanded by Lt. Colonel Sergey Mikhaylovich Strok carry out their duty irreproachably, on the Baltic coast specialists of the subunit in which Major Sergey Vladimirovich Fedorov serves greet NATO reconnaissance aircraft, and in high latitudes the search and rescue detachment headed by Captain Gennadiy Stepanovich Shikhranov, who has 530 parachute jumps to his credit, operates courageously. In one of our units Sergeant Vasiliy Yudzin's combat crew, which comprises Ilgar Medzhidov, Aleksey Kurnikov, Rashid Zamaletdinov, and Zaza Paniashvili, has been acknowledged the best. The guards' missilemen of the Putilovsko-Kirovskiy Regiment and other units of the Air Defense Forces are also greeting the festival with good indicators.

If we regard the fall in the prestige of military service as a social phenomenon, the most negative role here is played by unsubstantiated and frequently malicious attacks on the Army and by its vilification in a number of mass media. The Army and Army Communists are a thorn in the flesh of antiperestroyka forces! Hence the imposition of depoliticization and the erosion of a traditional principle: Military service is not only the USSR citizen's duty but also his honor!

Everyone boldly judges the Army now, just as he once judged agriculture equally "competently." We all know how that turned out. But I would like to turn to the experience of other countries, to which all sorts of reformers frequently refer us. Recently, for example, I familiarized myself with the "Code of Honor of the U.S. Army Officer." This document, which is interesting in its own way, contains the following line: "Service in the ranks of the U.S. Armed Forces is a matter of honor." It goes on to point out that "if the day comes when the majority of our citizens consider Army service something beneath their dignity, then our proud power will fall to the level of the peoples which have been unable or unwilling to fight for their principles, to preserve their freedom."

[Yurkin] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's readers are concerned that people in a number of union republics are beginning to consider military service not only unnecessary but also unlawful.

[Boyko] Yes, in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic we recently succeeded in preventing several servicemen of Lithuanian nationality from going absent without leave from their unit, with their weapons. Persons endowed with power in the republic are recommending them to scatter among the villages and hide in churches. Conflict situations can also be observed in the Transcaucasian republics. What question can there be of prestige, if people suggest to youths that service is immoral?

It is against such a social background that Army Communists must seek promising ways forward. Only the first steps have been taken in this search. The Political Directorate has carried out research work on the distribution of forces of political organs, party organizations, and Communists in units and in our troops' VUZ's [higher educational institutions]. It turned out that

essentially only commanders and political workers engage in educational work, while officers of the services and categories of troops are excluded from this activity. This inertia and formalism in party work largely account for the shortcomings in the life of subunits and the errors in education, including that of the young officers who have submitted applications for transfer to the reserve.

[Yurkin] The institution of checkers has long been subject to criticism, but no progress has been made, as the saying goes...

[Boyko] We have learned to criticize splendidly, but constructive suggestions are needed too. We have a right to expect them from our scientists, but they stay silent, although five years of perestroyka are quite sufficient to check and approve even the boldest decisions. The scientific potential is quite great. For example, almost 50 scientists work in the Leningrad group alone—in military VUZ's under our jurisdiction. This force has now been set in motion and been geared to resolving urgent problems of enhancing the quality of performance of service and regulating interethnic relations in military collectives. The recommendations will be geared to commanders and other officials of the regiment, battalion, and company link.

Scientists are already voicing interesting ideas, but I am troubled by the fact that their recommendations too might be smashed to pieces against cliffs of indifference. Is it not sad to see entire subunits being formed in the fall to lay down vegetables in city depots and columns of military vehicles transporting salt and matches? It is necessary to help, but combat readiness must not suffer because of someone's bad work. USSR people's deputies are heard calling for the Army to be used for its proper purpose, but the matter goes no further than that. Now another misfortune has befallen our troops: In the Transcaucasian republics subunits are not only performing combat duty but also repulsing swoops by local extremists. And there are losses. We need assistance on a state scale, because guarding the USSR state border is a matter not only for border guards and the Air Defense Forces.

[Yurkin] Anxious notes are heard in letters to the editorial office with regard to servicemen's social protection...

[Boyko] Against whom are we to protect our servicemen? Against the bureaucratic commander, the officious political worker? It is not particularly hard to vanquish them, and complaints about officials' unlawful actions are, as a rule, resolved quickly. The difficulties here are of a different kind: There is no unified program of housing construction or consumer services development in the country. We thank our government for the compensation that has been introduced with regard to paying for housing and preserving the service record of servicemen's wives. This concern is gratifying, but it does not resolve the whole package of problems.

In the sphere of social justice people are indignant both at the inequality of opportunities and the inequality before the law. This is a layer of problems that requires both legal and administrative regulation. For example, the order of priority for receiving apartments and buying durables. These problems are particularly acute in our small and frequently remote garrisons. And all this stems from our indigence and bad supplies. We had been expecting a safety valve to appear soon as a result of conversion, but so far this has led only to increased strain with regard to supplying subunits with spare parts and equipment. In campaigning for reduction and disarmament, our legislators have not thought through the conversion processes to the end. In my opinion the practice of leaving one-fourth of draftees in their own republics has not justified itself either. The events in the Transcaucasian republics have shown this, while the Baltic region has confirmed the erroneousness of the adopted decisions. Much has been done in our units to smooth out interethnic relations, but it is also necessary to look the truth in the eyes: New recruits include more and more people who have participated in gatherings of all sorts of fronts and groupings. They frequently have a very vague understanding of duty and are incompatible with the demands of discipline.

[Yurkin] The draft CPSU Statutes are now being discussed actively in Air Defense Force units. What is your attitude toward the section on CPSU organizations in the USSR Armed Forces?

[Boyko] I consider it a significant step forward on the path of democratizing the party and enhancing its prestige. In the opinion of communists, the discussion of the draft not only gives rise to the debates that have already become customary but is also appreciably activating the work of party organizations.

Radar Station Threat to Environment Denied

PM0904142590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Apr 90 First Edition pp 1,5

[Interview with Colonel General of Aviation V. Kraskovskiy, USSR Defense Ministry representative, by own correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev, under the rubric "Topical Interview": "Facts and Conjecture About Radar Station in Transcarpathia"; date and place unspecified; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers State Commission set up with a view to assessing the socioecological situation which has arisen in the vicinity of the construction of a radar station near the Transcarpathian village of Pestryalovo has completed its work. Our correspondent met with Col. Gen. of Aviation V. Kraskovskiy, member of the commission and USSR Defense Ministry representative, and asked him to answer a number of questions.

[Dokuchayev] Volter Makarovich, could you fill readers in on the commissions' conclusions?

[Kraskovskiy] First and foremost, I would note that the new radar station in the Mukachevo region is being set up at the decision of the Soviet Government to replace the current radar station. It is designed to detect ballistic missiles and to track spacecraft. At all of the radar station's planning and development stages an unswerving condition, along with the fulfillment of its combat tasks, was to rule out any harmful impact from the installation on people's health and the environment.

The commission reaffirmed that this condition has been carried out. The actual planned capacity of the radar station's electromagnetic current will not exceed the normative set by the "Provisional Health Norms and Regulations To Protect the Population From the Impact of Electromagnetic Currents Generated by Electronic Installations." At the same time, and bearing in mind the sociopolitical situation in the region, the commission recommended that engineering and technical solutions which would make it possible to reduce the electromagnetic current by 100-1,000 times below the normative be employed at the concluding phase of the radar station's construction. How will this be achieved? The radar's average emitted capacity will be cut, emissions in the direction of Pestryalovo Village will be algorithmically reduced, and a protective biological screen will be set up 150 meters away from the transmission center. Those were the main conclusions.

[Dokuchayev] But the report issued by TASS stated that the commission had concluded that it was inexpedient to continue building a radar station in Transcarpathia...

[Kraskovskiy] Let me be brief. Our commission was simply not empowered to make such a decision. It was set up to assess the socioecological situation in the area and, if necessary, to elaborate solutions to improve that situation. Only the country's top leadership is entitled to make any decisions on the radar. The station is a highly important defense installation.

[Dokuchayev] We're both military men, and readers might get the impression that we're putting forward departmental views. Were there any independent scientists on the commission, for instance?

[Kraskovskiy] Of course, it was a state commission. Thus, the subcommission assessing the possible medical consequences of the radar's construction included representatives from the USSR Academy of Sciences' Biophysics Institute, the USSR Health Ministry's Biophysics Institute, Uzhgorod University, the USSR Academy of Medical Science's Labor Hygiene and Occupational Diseases Institute, and doctors from Mukachevo and Uzhgorod. I have already noted the academics' conclusion on the question of electromagnetic radiation: The installation has no harmful effect on people's health. I would add that our normatives for the population are substantially below the U.S. standard and the recommendations of the international committee for protection against nonionizing radiation.

[Dokuchayev] There are fears that the station will use a great amount of water, which is already in short supply...

[Kraskovskiy] There were inaccuracies in the TASS report. What is the essence of the problem? The radar is an installation which uses water—maximum consumption is 1,800 cubic meters a day. Now a rumor has started to circulate to the effect that the area will be left without any water and that the 300 sources of curative mineral waters located in the oblast would be harmed. Just what is the real picture? The hydrogeological research that has been carried out has shown that the impact of the planned water intake for the station will not be the same for subsoil water and natural springs. Yes, there have been cases of wells running dry in Pestryalovo. However, this is not linked with the sinking of exploratory wells. There is another reason—land reclamation measures.

And the water intake could not have any impact on mineral water sources. This is ruled out by the distance (20-30 kilometers) and by the fact that the intake is located at a lower level—100-150 meters lower. The Chop-Mukachevo Depression and the Latoritsa River, which prevent the reciprocal influence of fresh and mineral waters, are located between these water deposits. Those are the facts.

In order to resolve all the issues, the planning organization has elaborated a technological version of the station's operation using air-cooled units. What is the advantage of this? Water consumption will be cut from 1,800 to 350 cubic meters. And the extra underground water will be used for the population's needs. This will considerably improve water supplies to the population of Mukachevskiy Rayon, who are short of potable water.

[Dokuchayev] So where have the Transcarpathians' fears come from?

[Kraskovskiy] Generally speaking, interest in the station is a normal process, and ecology is at the center of people's attention worldwide. The problem lies elsewhere: Why have passions failed to subside for so long? For certain elements the illusory fear of the station has become the touchstone of a political campaign and a reflection of all the other shortcomings in the oblast. It had been agreed that a nuclear reactor would operate at the station. How could feelings fail to be get inflamed?

I think that this is the fault of us military specialists too. For some time we have delayed issuing to the population full information on the installation, and there has been conjecture which has been exploited by political speculators.

What has been done to brief the Transcarpathians on the radar station? A commission set up by the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Government to assess ecological safety has worked at the station. Its report was published in the newspaper ZAKARPATSKAYA PRAVDA. It did not differ in its main parameters from

what was determined by the materials of the study carried out by Defense Ministry scientific institutes at the planning stage.

Military specialists spoke at a session of the oblast soviet and met with labor collectives and residents of the surrounding areas. We intend to continue our explanatory work. We have no secrets from the Transcarpathians, since we need good contacts and harmony.

[Dokuchayev] Volter Makarovich, I'd like to know your opinion of the radar as a most important defense installation. After all, such radars, along with other systems, are a factor for restraining aggression and preventing the outbreak of nuclear war. Each of us should remember that.

[Dokuchayev] I have already noted that the station is a means of providing early warning of a missile attack. The existence of such installations in the USSR and the United States is envisaged by the relevant treaties. And the balance in this area should in no way be upset.

The station also carries out the task of tracking foreign and Soviet spacecraft. There may be cases when some spacecraft fragments fail to burn up on reentering the earth's atmosphere and could fall to earth. These fragments could be misconstrued as ballistic missiles attacking our country. We need radars to ensure that such situations do not entail unpredictable consequences.

Former Military Ammunition Depot Looted

PM1104124590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Report by own correspondent N. Lisovenko: "Stray Weapons Yet Again"]

[Text] Voroshilovgrad Oblast—For many years an ammunition depot belonging to a military unit disbanded last year within the framework of the unilateral reduction of the USSR Armed Forces was situated not far from Mikhaylovka settlement, Perevalskiy Rayon. Upon leaving the territory they had settled, the servicemen took most of their property with them but a certain quantity of ammunition they simply buried in the ground.

The local inhabitants were not slow in taking advantage of this. Thus the militia recently confiscated about 2,000 cartridges for a submachinegun and a machinegun, 45 hand grenade fuse assemblies, and even a grenade thrower barrel from the 17-year-old V. Garin, with no specific employment.

During a raid among V. Garin's fellow countrymen militiamen confiscated two machineguns, several kilograms of powder, and two howitzer shell cases with blasting caps thanks to which these cases, if filled with powder, could be used as powerful mines.

The military prosecutor's office was informed of all these facts but unfortunately the Defense Ministry has still done nothing to put the territory which belonged to it in proper order with the aid of skilled sappers. So now the Perevalskiy Rayon militiamen are having to guard the former depot.

Baltic Republics

Baltic Republics To Sign Economic Agreement

LD1204112690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 12 Apr 90

[Statement by Lithuanian Government spokesman Ceslovas Jursenas]

[Excerpt] Today I would like to inform you about a very important event that is to take place this afternoon. It is an event of great importance first of all to Lithuania and to all the Baltic states. I also would like to inform you about some other decisions recently adopted by the Council of Ministers.

So, about the event that is to take place. Prime ministers of the neighboring Baltic republics are coming to the republic of Lithuania, that is Estonian Prime Minister E. Savisaar and Latvian Prime Minister Vilnis Edvins Bresis, with corresponding delegations, of course. The aim of the meeting with our Prime Minister K. Prunskiene is to sign an agreement of economic cooperation between Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, or perhaps our listeners have already heard. We could put it another way; to sign a treaty on founding the Baltic market. [passage omitted]

Baltic News Agencies Start Joint Bureau

LD0504190690 Moscow TASS in English 1844 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Riga April 5 TASS—The telegraph agencies of the three Soviet Baltic republics—Latvia (LETA), Lithuania (ELTA) and Estonia (ETA) today signed a treaty to establish a joint information bureau BALTIJA.

The bureau will prepare, exchange and spread printed information and photos inside and outside the Baltic region.

The bureau's establishment has been prompted by the desire to ensure a prompt coverage of all the major events in the region and transmit them to all the organisations concerned.

Although BALTIJA plans to specialise in short reports, it is also ready to dispatch to the mass media expanded materials, commentaries and photo information.

BALTIJA says that one of its main principles is to spread materials that are not influenced by any party, organisation or public movement.

A resolution to rename the information agency under the Latvian Council of Ministers (LATINFORM) into the Latvian Telegraph Agency (LETA) was spread in Riga today.

Paper on Rebirth of Baltic Military Structures

LD1204064590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0455 GMT 12 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 12 Apr (TASS)—"The recreation of militarized structures that existed in the bourgeois republics of the Baltic region is far from being rumor. An example of this is the rebirth of the unfortunately well-known organization of Kaytseliiyt [Defense Union] in Estonia," writes the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA newspaper today.

The newspaper recalls this nationalist militarized formation got its name in November 1918, although in fact it was founded a year earlier, when, frightened by the extent of the revolutionary movement in Russia, the Estonian bourgeoise created in Tallinn the voluntary nationalist organization of "Omakaytse" [Self-Defense].

In 1921 the organization was liquidated as it was not wanted. Already three years later, in December 1924, in connection with the popular insurrection that flared up in Tallinn, "Kaytseliiyt" was restored and its members took an active part in putting down the revolutionary movement in Estonia. Surviving until June 1940, it showed itself to be a most well-organized and active formation. The officer corps of "Kaytseliiyt" was made up of officers of the Estonian Army hostile to the Soviet Union, many of whom took part directly in fighting with the Red Army at the dawning of Soviet power.

Many former members of "Kaytseliiyt" joined the military-fascist organization of "Omakaytse" that was created during the German occupation of Estonia and which was of significant service to the Hitlerite Army.

Today "Kaytseliiyt" is being reborn from the ashes and an active process is underway to form its renewed structure. Moreover, at a number of meetings of supporters of the organization, it was stressed that the main task of "Kaytseliiyt" will be "to ensure the security of citizens of Estonia, first and foremost in rural localities, and to train officer cadres for future national forces of self-defense of an independent Estonia. "There too one heard the idea that "Kaytseliiyt" must "train Estonians for active self-defense, including with weapons in their hands."

Understandably, writes the newspaper, the recreation of "Kaytseliiyt" cannot be viewed outside the context of events not straightforward in nature, that are taking place in the Estonian SSR. It organically blends with the plans of separatist-minded forces and is supported and encouraged by them in every way. Evidently some people here are impatient to switch from parliamentary discussion to more resolute actions, concludes the article.

Vilnius Radio Carries 11 Apr Council Session

Status of Deputies Debated

LD1104145190

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1200 GMT on 11 April begins carrying a live relay of the

Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius. A. Abisalas, presiding over the work of the session, says that the independence of Lithuania is today one month old. It is decided to continue the debates that were not finished yesterday. The issue under discussion is the draft Law on the Status of Deputies and the supplement to the Law on Government. Debates are held on each article separately, following which the article is adopted by means of a vote.

At 1318 GMT a vote is taken on the entire draft Law on the Status of Deputies. The law is adopted by a majority of votes. Following this the draft supplement to the Law on Government is read, discussed, and adopted.

At 1330 GMT the session is adjourned until 1400 GMT.

Council Takes Oath

LD1104171990

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1400 GMT on 11 April continues its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

The first issue on the agenda when the session resumes its work is confirmation of the appointment of the deputy arbitrator and the College of Arbitrators. Following the confirmation of the college of arbitrators members, at the request of the the Supreme Council Presidium the session is adjourned for 15 minutes.

At 1437 the session resumes work.

At 1440 the Supreme Council Presidium swears an oath of allegiance to the Republic of Lithuania. Following this, members of the Supreme Council sign the allegiance.

At 1447 V. Landsbergis says that the main task has been carried out, that is, the government has been formed. The day has come, he says, to swear in the government.

At 1449 Prunskiene comes to the rostrum with other memebers of the government. She reads the oath of allegiance with all the members repeating it. The radio commentator who is present in the building says that Algirdas Brazauskas also took this oath, together with other deputy ministers.

At 1458 Prunskiene outlines the main trends in the government's policies. She says that the formation of the government was completed only a week ago; therefore, she admits that a concrete detailed outline of the program of the governemnt has not yet been completed.

At 1516 Prunskiene concludes her report. Following this, questions are addressed by the deputies to the prime miniaster.

At 1540 the session is adjourned until Tuesday, 17 April.

Lithuanian Council Members Take Allegiance Oath

LD1104181790 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1440 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] Kazimiera Prunskiene leads the members of the Council of Ministers in swearing the Oath of Allegiance: I, Kazimiera Prunskiene [each Council of Ministers member gives his name] in witness before your presence, swear to be loyal to the Republic of Lithuania; I swear to honor and carry out its laws; to protect the integrity of its land; I swear to strengthen Lithuania's independence with all my might; to honestly serve the Motherland, democracy and welfare of the Lithuanian people. So help me God!

Vytautas Landsbergis led the members of the Presidium in swearing the Oath of Allegiance.

Paper Reports on Lithuanian Developments

PM1204092190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent Captain Third Rank V. Urban report: "Whoever Is Not With Us..."]

[Text] Vilnius, 10 Apr—The latest issue of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LITVA has come out. As before, it was printed outside the republic—in Minsk. This once again forces me to return to events around Press House, which I discussed in a previous reportage. As is known, the internal forces did not use force. And in order not to provoke a conflict, those same 250 soldiers retraced their steps. So, as before, two parallel guards—militia subdivisions and "Sajudis" activists—are on duty at Press House.

This is what A. Yelbakh, editor of SOVETSKAYA LITVA, said at the latest news conference of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU platform):

"Press House is the property of the CPSU. But this is what is significant—our editorial staff are working there, but the printing house is refusing to print the newspaper at the printer's. 'Sajudis' has talked a lot about pluralism, but the first thing it did when it came to power was to insist on the virtual closure of our newspaper. It turns out that if I don't agree with the official viewpoint, then I cannot express my own."

The continuing division of party property has a direct bearing on this problem. In the opinion of V. Shved, second secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party's interim Central Committee (CPSU platform), "Everything could have been solved long ago and by quite peaceful means. But we have been cheated for virtually three months now, they have not met us halfway."

Why is this happening? Ninety-eight percent of the apparatus has switched to the independent Lithuanian Communist Party. Naturally, it is trying to dictate its terms. A typical example. In Klaipeda, Shved said, most communists share our positions. But the city party organization

apparatus is against them. It is also occupying the gorkom [city party committee] building. So actions are not particularly surprising.

The communists standing on the CPSU platform are being subjected to the sharpest criticism in the mass media. Any opportunity is used to mock them. For instance, the press has featured the "fact" that a significant proportion of the 35,000 members of the pro-CPSU Lithuanian Communist Party are servicemen. So it is no accident that this question was also raised at the news conference. In fact, Army communists take part in the work of most elected organs, but, according to the CPSU Statutes, they are actually registered only in their own party organizations.

On Monday [9 April] the republic's Supreme Soviet sessions resumed work. The deputies were acquainted with the Supreme Soviet's explanation "On the Conscription of Citizens of the Lithuanian Republic into the USSR Armed Forces." An appropriate resolution was adopted. The document as it were unites the provisions of all the laws adopted on this question in the republic. In particular, the right of young men to decide for themselves whether or not they should serve in the army of a "foreign state" was reconfirmed, but in any case they do not have to take the military oath. The courts are ordered not to consider refusenik cases; military commissariats must stop their activity, and their property is being handed over to organs of local power. So the war of "nerves" with Moscow initiated by the Lithuanian parliament continues.

One more piece of news. It is planned to introduce new cap badges for the republic's militia. It is also intended to swear in all officials of the internal affairs organs. Of course, all this is part of the system of measures which presupposes full control of the law-enforcement organs. In short, everything follows the principle: Whoever is not with us is against us...

Sajudis' Cekuolis Urges Talks With Moscow

PM1104154490 London BBC Television Network in English 2130 GMT 10 Apr 90

[Interview with Sajudis Executive Council member Algimantas Cekuolis and SOVIET WEEKLY London correspondent Viktor Orlik by news presenter Peter Snow live on BBC 2 "Newsnight" following a report on the threat to Lithuania of presidential rule from Moscow]

[Text] [Snow] Well, now I'm joined here in the studio by Algimantas Cekuolis, a leading member of the executive council of Sajudis, the Lithuanian independence movement and, indeed, is a close associate, too, of the Lithuanian President Landsbergis. Mr. Cekuolis, what do you think about today's statement from Mr. Gorbachev? What do you think he means when he says he is ready to impose presidential rule in Lithuania?

[Cekuolis] Well, it's not a big deal: We are under presidential rule even not having president in Kremlin in the last 50 years, so only formally would be exposed. [sentence as heard]

[Snow] So there's no way you're independent?

[Cekuolis] No. Of course we have declared, they are struggling for it, but what's happening now in Lithuania is pure Prague '68, August of '68, but just without visible signs, more cleverly done. Mr. Gorbachev has learned that tanks on the corners of streets does not help so now he is trying to apply, well, trade and economical blockade.

[Snow] Well, we're also joined by Viktor Orlik, who is London correspondent of SOVIET WEEKLY. Mr. Orlik, what do you think the Soviet president means today when he talks about being ready to impose presidential rule—the rule by his own presidency and his own presidential council—on Lithuania, if necessary? What does that mean, do you think?

[Orlik] Well, it's a difficult question because so far we have not experienced yet what the presidential rule means, but I would like to stress here that in the same statement, Mr. Gorbachev maintained that he is in favor of political means of resolving the Lithuanian crisis. By saying that, I am not implying that presidential rule is not that of political means, but I can well speculate....

[Snow interrupts] Well, indeed, then, I mean, Mr. Cekuolis just compared it to the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

[Orlik] Unfortunately, I haven't heard that point.

[Cekuolis interrupts] I can repeat it for you—it's already all over the place.

[Orlik] No, you don't have to—I can know that in advance, but I must tell you that there is no occupation, and there is no possibility of any occupation of Lithuania: Lithuania is part of the Soviet Union, and the only problem now that we face together—I hope, still together—is to restore the constitutional paths, the constitutional ways—I mean the Soviet Constitution—of resolving the crisis. And the sooner we do it, the better. And once again, the language of ultimatums—unilateral hasty decisions and declarations—will lead to nowhere: It would not help to resolve the crisis.

[Cekuolis] But Mr. Orlik, is 50 years of waiting a hasty decision?

[Orlik] Speaking of 50 years, probably there is some logic in what you're saying, but some people today doubt the legitimacy of the Great October Socialist Revolution—it proves nothing. It doesn't convince me, neither it convinces tens of millions of people all over the world. For the last 50 years, Lithuania has been part of the Soviet Union. Probably, you were not an occupied part, you were not a member of the "occupied community" when you were representing interests of the Soviet Union on various assignments, and you didn't feel... abroad, and you didn't feel yourself an oppressed, or I didn't sense any sense of inferiority about you, on the contrary.

[Cekuolis] Thank you very much, all right.

[Snow] Well, let him speak for himself. Did you feel inferior or oppressed?

[Cekuolis] No, I feel superior, because being occupier is to feel inferior, and I have, at least I feel, the sympathy of all the world, or at least, here in the United Kingdom.

[Snow] Now, gentlemen, what is going to happen now? Mr. Orlik, what do you think the pressures are building up to? We talked at the President's Council yesterday of economic pressures or political pressures, and now we, of course, today have this presidential rule. Now is there going to be a straight economic boycott imposed on Lithuania?

[Orlik] Personally, I doubt that very much. Nobody's going to impose an economic boycott on Lithuania. The question is simple: Nobody is against Lithuanian independence, Lithuanian sovereignty, and its... her secession from the Soviet Union. The question is to do it properly, orderly, on the basis of the Soviet Constitution. And above all, we are not very sure that the, shall we say—I won't use the word "handful"—but a certain number of politicians in Vilnius represents the will of the Lithuanian people and the population of the republic. So let's hold a referendum, and there is nothing wrong about referendum as far as international law is concerned.

[Snow] How about a referendum?

[Cekuolis] We could go for referendum, but the wording should be ours and that wording should be: "Shall we join the Soviet Union?" because we are not in, and never were in. It was sheer power occupation, nothing else, and when you are telling they're imposing—that bunch of extremists wants separate. There are four elections held during those, that one year—three official elections and Baltic link. Can you tell any... another group in Lithuania—Russians including—who don't want to separate, because even half of the Russian population and all of the Polish population want the same. So tell me who is in Lithuania against it, if four elections....

[Orlik interrupts] To begin with, I didn't use the word "extremist": I didn't use the word. The only thing....

[Cekuolis interrupts] You don't speak the words, but essence.

[Orlik] No, the only thing I am trying to maintain is that probably the most natural and logical way for secession for Lithuanian independence on a constitutional basis would be a referendum as the first step in this major process. Secondly, for the last 50 years when Lithuania was part of the Soviet Union, you preferred to use the word, "occupied part." Okay, it's irrelevant in my considerations, in my deliberations. It was part of the Soviet Union, so there is plenty of issues involved, problems which have accumulated over the years which ought to be resolved: economic, political, social, and national, and so on.

[Cekuolis] So let's negotiate.

[Snow] Last point, Mr. Cekuolis.

[Orlik interrupts] Let's negotiate.

[Snow] But one final answer from you, please, on how you think... how much longer you think the Lithuanians can sustain this kind of pressure without giving in?

[Cekuolis] It's hard to tell. It depends on what pressure it is, but what I know is: If democracy is smashed in Lithuania, how could it survive in the Soviet Union?

[Orlik] Nobody is against democracy in Lithuania and for the legitimate democracy: We're looking for the best of this democracy.

[Snow] Mr. Orlik, Mr. Cekuolis, I'm afraid... Thank you very much, I'm afraid we must end there.

Landsbergis Sees Moscow Preparing 'Brutal Moves'

LD1104174590 Warsaw PAP in English 1649 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] Warsaw, April 11—Asked to make a forecast as concerns future developments in Lithuania, chairman of the Lithuanian parliament Vytautas Landsbergis told the RZECZPOSPOLITA government daily that the Soviet Union might be ever more determined to continue its "policy of anaconda". That is to slowly strangle Lithuania lest it should seem to brutal.

"But it (the USSR) may decide on brutal moves when it takes into account what can happen in other republics. It will want everybody to face the accomplished fact counting on the West to give its consent to that in order to maintain good relations with 'Gorby'. Because the West cares for this more than for freedom and justice and for all these values which are far more important in practice than in theory.

"Brutal moves may not be made today or tomorrow. But the preparations for them are evident. We can see how the Soviet propaganda works both at home and abroad. It lies about the situation in Lithuania and about her position. This reminds us of 1940 when accusations and demands towards Lithuania grew to end in the annexation of our country.

"Only more determined attitude on the part of the West could lead to a dialogue. And the West fails to assume such an attitude. What surprises us is the fact that the West is yielding to this falling empire of the Soviet Union.

Moscow's firm answer to the letter by the Lithuanian parliament "proves that perestroyka is but a superficial, cosmetic change. The myth of Gorbachev cannot last much longer," the paper quoted Landsbergis as saying.

Landsbergis Expects Stalemate To Continue

LD1104231190 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 11 Apr 90

["Highlights" of an interview by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, with unidentified correspondent in Vilnius on 11 April;

Landsbergis speaks in Lithuanian with superimposed English translation—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] It has been exactly one month since the independent republic of Lithuania was restored following the parliamentary act of 11 March. What future prospects and perhaps latent possibilities does Vytautas Landsbergis envisage for the republic of Lithuania?

[Landsbergis] We did not map out very precisely what must happen or may happen and at what definite time. We just proceed through general alternatives. Either we are done away with or a dialogue starts with Moscow. But neither this nor that has come yet. And for our actions in the immediate future everything is pretty clear. We continue establishing independent structures of the (?type) tranforming the activity of the Council of Ministers while the Supreme Council is energetically advancing with adopting laws that are indispensible for our new life. The whole (?complex) of state and public institutions is functioning despite the impending danger heightened from time to time by new statements of the Moscow leadership that they will not tolerate the road we have chosen and that they will make us repeal it. Such a situation is likely to continue for some time in the future. [end Landsbergis]

Returning to home policies he pointed out that social problems were going to be the (?nearest target). A number of laws and decrees have to be adopted to improve the day-to-day life of the most miserable sections of society. In this respect the Lithuanian Council of Ministers has begun implementing a number of very concrete steps like the newly-adopted law on enterprise which enables the setting up of smaller or larger, private joint stocks or other (?companies).

Zorin on Lithuania's 'Hasty' Secession

LD0104165490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 1 Apr 90

[Text] You have, of course, most probably already read in today's papers the USSR president's address to the people of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], and his address to the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania. Universal attention is currently fixed upon the situation in this republic. Our correspondent Igor Zorin presents a dispatch on how things stand today.

[Zorin] Everywhere in Lithuania I was greeted in a friendly way, both on the kolkhoz near Kaunas and at the Jonava furniture combine, though in conversation, everyone frankly expressed his own view on the situation in Lithuania. One cannot avoid this today, of course, neither in the countryside nor in town. For instance, the chairman of a Lithuanian kolkhoz, who has been in the CPSU for 30 years, considers that his membership of the party was enforced, and that he never shared communist ideals at all. I was quite astonished at ideas like that; and how, then, is one to understand the fact that he is today a member of the Independent Communist Party of Lithuania. His opinion is simple: Lithuania should be independent, and what is more, he already regards it as independent.

People who are not burdened with public office are dubious about the situation in Lithuania. Personally, I respond with greater sympathy to someone with doubts, because the unbridled gallop of the horseman on a white charger, if I can put it like that, seceding from the Soviet Union is unlikely to enrapture all the inhabitants of Lithuania, and is unlikely to evoke a tumult of applause at the finishing line.

As I was going to the Lithuanian radio studio, I accidentally bumped into a woman at a crossing, apologized in Lithuanian. She replied in Russian "good morning," evidently judging by the accent; she was a Lithuanian. I asked her, an ordinary woman who, incidentally, works at the telephone exchange here and was on her way to work, whether she had read or heard the address by Comrade Gorbachev, USSR president, to the deputies of the republic and to the inhabitants of Lithuania. She answered that she had listened to the Lithuanian television panorama yesterday: I'm not particularly interested in politics, she said, but I want one thing, I want there to be peace, I want my children to be able to study in peace at their institutes. She has two children, and they are studying at institutes.

Late that evening, I heard on the Lithuanian television program "Panorama" a conversation between the leaders of the republic in connection with the USSR president's address. And my feeling was—I did not see in the words of Comrade Landsbergis, the leader of the present Lithuania, any desire to understand the anxiety of the country's president. In the president's address he saw, alas, for some reason, only a threat. But, as the saying goes, everyone looks at the world through his own eyes, and that's the way things are. But when the whole republic is following your glance, and today perhaps the whole world as well, then tolerance and well-considered actions are the most appropriate. But many people in Lithuania are lacking the ability to listen to a different point of view on Lithuania's secession—in my view, Lithuania's hasty secession—from the USSR.

Landsbergis Outlines Recognition Moves

90UN1421B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 30 Mar 90 pp 1, 2

[Report on Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Soviet, reports at evening meetings of Supreme Soviet on 27 and 28 March: "The Political Situation"]

[Text] At the 27 March meeting V. Landsbergis briefed the Supreme Soviet as follows:

At the present time many U.S. Lithuanians are going to Washington, where it is planned staging a big rally to demand that the White House support the independent republic of Lithuania and recognize its government. Algis Potsyavichyus, chairman of the community, has telephoned from Canada. Together with representatives of all national communities he is heading for Ottawa, for the Canadian Parliament, to support independent Lithuania

and demand recognition of its government. He said: The words I spoke yesterday for American radio, "will America sell us out a second time or not?" have had big repercussions. This may also help our efforts.

And, according to a TASS report, I would remind you that the White House is continually repeating the call for the start of a peaceful dialogue on our question. It is maintained that the Soviet side has publicly assured us that it does not intend using military force. But we know how things have tended to be in reality, and yesterday evening a new speech by M. Gorbachev caused great concern. Whatever, it should have been known in advance that efforts to intimidate the Lithuanian people would not produce the desired results.

The main thing, perhaps, is a statement of U.S. President G. Bush, which I read, it is true, in the British TIMES. It had been conveyed by an unnamed high official of America. G. Bush is prepared to sacrifice even future disarmament monitoring treaties and trade agreements with the Soviet Union if Moscow uses force. This is, perhaps, one of the most serious statements that have been made so far.

TASS, meanwhile, is disseminating imaginary comments from Latin American countries on the events in Lithuania. A variety of secondary figures are allegedly condemning Lithuania, saying that President M. Gorbachev is acting correctly and so forth. It is clear that this is intended for domestic consumption, to persuade citizens of the Soviet Union that the world supports the USSR in the solution of this problem. Hardly anyone will be convinced by this.

V. Landsbergis read out a telegram addressed to him and signed by deputies of the newly elected Moscow City Soviet, which expresses approval of the decisions adopted by the republic of Lithuania Supreme Soviet. He also read out a telegram from deputies of this same soviet to M. Gorbachev demanding noninterference in Lithuania's affairs and the start of negotiations with it.

This is good news not only for us, V. Landsbergis said, but also for Russia and all peoples aspiring to freedom and democracy.

At the evening meeting on 28 March Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the republic of Lithuania Supreme Soviet, said:

Lithuania itself has also begun to participate in the political debate on Lithuania, of which there has truly been a great deal. What the media are reporting, what people themselves are noticing, and also the obscurities and various positions that are emerging are also being discussed.

Thanks to the mass communications media, we have obtained certain clarifications from the U.S. State Department. Thus concerning the correspondence or exchange of opinions between Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister E. Shevardnadze: the State Department yesterday categorically refuted any secret agreement between the Soviets and the United States on Lithuania. It is pointed out that its wording contains absolutely no hint of a deal or an understanding. We have learned that Baker sent the telegram, but Shevardnadze's reply is awaited. After this, the correspondence will cease to be secret, possibly. Let us hope that this is not an agreement at our expense. Concerning the odd or wrongly transmitted words of U.S. Vice President D. Quayle to the effect that the Soviet Union is justified in trying deserters or something of the sort, his press spokesman delivered a statement: "The Soviet authorities are, to judge by everything, disseminating false information. The vice president in no way approves of the actions of the Armed Forces in the Lithuanian capital in the past 24 hours." There are other comments and statements of interest and meriting comment also.

And I would like to call attention to one fundamental principle of the debate to which we should, I believe, adhere. I refer to the terminology which is employed in the talk about Lithuania. Earlier we ourselves employed and subsequently gradually dispensed with such concepts or formations as "center and the republics," "detachment," "secession," "separation." We realized that none of this had anything in common with us and that our legal, political, and historical situation was different. And now the concept "deserter," which people are attempting to convey very extensively, has arisen. It emanates from the Soviet Union, and attempts are being made once again to filter it into international politics. Understandably, in any system, in any state the word "deserter" has a negative connotation. Accordingly an evaluation of these people is made, and political content is consequently imputed to actions against them. Unfortunately, prominent persons of certain foreign states employ this concept in discussing the problem of our runaways, young men who are leaving or those who are caught. And then Chetvertikov, Soviet emissary in Washington, may also with sham persuasiveness speak about the fact that the army must observe discipline. This could sound perfectly convincing for a person who has not gone deeply into or does not understand the specifics, in just the same way that the assertion that the state must maintain public order may be received in various ways. In our case we must correct the explanations that this is an army in which its legitimately drafted citizens serve. The more so if refusal to serve in a foreign army is being categorized as desertion. We are constantly receiving statements of protest from every conceivable high-level military authority that we are calling for a violation of the oath and such like. At one of my first meetings with the military I responded peremptorily to such an attack: "And what right did you have forcing them to take the oath?"

And for this reason, I believe, we should be giving thought to a decree to the effect that an oath of loyalty to the Soviet Union given earlier has not been binding on anyone since 11 March.

It has to be observed, unfortunately, that although we have tried to maintain relations with the military leadership, which is here, in Lithuania, performing particular assignments, their word does not always correspond to the truth,

is not always kept, and is not always reliable. We have heard explanations about the buildings that are being guarded: the guards are merely watching to see that nothing happens to these buildings, and they will not impede the operation of the establishments located there. It cannot be said that they have not impeded the operation of the Vilnius Pedagogical Institute or the hospitals.

Many of us, evidently, saw on television how General D. Yazov explained with a pleasant smile in France that it was only maneuvers being conducted in Lithuania and that there were no more troops there than usual. And that they were doing nothing that they do not normally do. But after this the world was able to see for itself—this was shown by French television—what certain premises in Lithuania looked like after the military's "visit." Did this resemble maneuvers?

And the movement of army units continues, and they are being concentrated in Lithuania. The activity of an army which is alien to us and not under our jurisdiction, and the unreliable contacts (I have said that the words of the military cannot be believed), do not permit us to maintain that threats do not exist. Although the situation is calm and stable, the threat to stability remains.

The roundup of young men who have left their units continues and will continue, it seems. This extraordinary action is large-scale and brutal. Individual young men who are in hiding are being sought out. The draft for the Soviet Army will begin shortly. It is illegal. No state may announce such a draft in Lithuania. But there will be a draft—and from the party which has force here. This is its sole argument.

The confiscation of weapons has not yet begun, not counting the DOSAAF [All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the USSR Army, Air Force, and Navy] storehouses and school premises that were broken into. But the confiscation of weapons from private individuals could begin. Especially given records of the sportsmen. And what should they do? What should they do particularly in cases where, let us assume, unbidden guests arrive and, citing the directives of the president of another state, demand the surrender of an individual's private property. And if he refuses, they attempt to break into his house even and carry out a search or something similar. Of course, this would be another and newly dangerous provocation against the citizens of our state and against the tranquillity, and we should try even under such conditions not to disturb the calm. If some people really do have these weapons, it is their business to decide whether to surrender them for storage or not. And the unwanted guests should be received affably: We should invite them in and pleasantly explain why their behavior is wrong. In addition, we should record each such visit and its results: who came, on what day, at what hour, and what the upshot was.

Regarding the continuing occupation of the buildings, we should continue to make our evaluations and protests. Not necessarily at Supreme Soviet level, this could possibly be done by the Council of Ministers. We must also decide what to do in cases where its guests are expelled from the republic of Lithuania. Foreign journalists are starting to be kicked out. It is difficult for new ones to get here. Such a removal of journalists from Lithuania would be a manifest action against the principle of glasnost, which the leadership of the Soviet Union proclaims. And for us glasnost is the principal weapon of defense against all kinds of threats. So it would be necessary, with great regret, to announce the abandonment of the principle of glasnost. We, for our part, will obviously have to offer journalists the protection of the republic and begin, possibly, to issue or extend Lithuanian visas.

The whole world is awaiting our negotiations with the USSR, but only a single state—the Soviet Union—is saying nothing about them as yet. However, there is talk of dialogue, and I believe that it will begin. I would like to mention here the form of interstate dialogue which could facilitate the negotiations—contacts with members of parliament of Russia. Deputies from Leningrad and Kaliningrad Oblast have arrived, and at a meeting with them today we discussed quite a wide range of issues.

For instance, thoughts were exchanged on Lithuania's relations with the Russian Federation's Kaliningrad Oblast—this is, after all, to a large extent a close neighbor, and our relations should be the best. We also discussed the following question, which we are very often confronting both elsewhere and even here, in Lithuania—that of a referendum. It seems to our guests that the decrees of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Soviet could be confirmed by a referendum of the inhabitants of all Lithuania also. It had to be explained once again that this would be illogical and politically strange since in electing their representatives to parliament, people supported a clear program and its future implementation. And we would thereby be acknowledging that something that had already been well-foundedly decided was still to be confirmed. On the other hand, we had to ask them: If, as we are being told, Lithuania's inhabitants did not have sufficient opportunity to choose whether they wished to be in the Soviet Union or not, this choice could be far broader. Let us offer a referendum on the question, for example, of whether Lithuania wishes to join the Soviet Union. We could in exactly the same way pose the question, perhaps, of whether Lithuania wishes to resume the union with Poland. In addition, Lithuania had a short-term union with Sweden, and Lithuania could also ponder a Baltic federation. After all, after Latvia and Estonia have proclaimed the restoration of their independence, the choice will be even broader. People of Lithuania would most likely support primarily that same independent Republic of Lithuania. But we are being dealt this question very often, and therefore, I believe, we ourselves need to have a clear-cut position on how we would treat such proposals. The point of departure should be the same as at the time of our self-determination: how and when we should restore the independent Republic of Lithuania. It existed legally, and we are now once again

beginning to embody this. And any other possibilities may be discussed only in accordance with people's wishes.

Lithuanian Communist Party Bureau Meets

90UN1233B Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 3 Mar 90 p 1

[Unattributed article: "In the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau"]

[Text] At a 2 March session of the Communist Party of Lithuania Central Committee Bureau, which was attended by a group of Central Committee members, it was decided to put a halt to the activities of Lithuanian Communist Party members in the organizations of the republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KGB, the customs service, the organs of the Lithuanian Communist Party Ministry of Justice, the procuracy, state arbitrage, state control, and the courts. In the resolution adopted on this issue it is indicated that organizations of the Lithuanian Communist Party are to be eliminated in the enumerated organs of law and order. By 1 April 1990 they will hand over documentation and the documents of party members to the territorial party committees.

The bureau discussed a draft of the structure of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat. It will be presented for the examination of the Fourth Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum. It is intended that the Secretariat will consist of the following groups: analysis and prediction of political processes; sociological research; consultations on organizational and party work; coordination of the activities of territorial party organizations; ties between the Lithuanian Communist Party and state organs and social organizations; national policy and relations with other parties and organizations; consultations on informational and propaganda work; ties with the scientific and creative intelligentsia; social and economic policy; agricultural policy; and services for party work and economic, financial, and legal work. The new Central Committee Secretariat will be half as large as the current Central Committee apparatus.

A critical evaluation was made of an editorial piece published 24 February in the newspaper TIESA—the day of elections to the republic's Supreme Soviet—which could be considered contrary to the Law on Elections. The conclusion was drawn that this was not a premeditated position by the paper but rather a disappointing mistake, which the collective regrets.

The bureau approved the proposal by the chief editor of the journal POLITIKA concerning the structure of the editorial board. An editorial council was approved.

After an exchange of opinions concerning an interrepublic branch in Vilnius of the Academy of Social Sciences Institute of Scientific Atheism under the CPSU Central Committee, it was acknowledged that further activities of this institution are inadvisable.

The issue of the administration of property under the authority of the Lithuanian Communist Party was discussed.

A statement by Romualdas Ozolas, member of the bureau, was announced at the conclusion of the session: "I propose that a member of the party who is elected deputy should be first and foremost a parliamentarian during the period of his work in parliament. I ask that you support my wish to leave the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau." This issue will be presented for examination ant the next Central Committee Plenum.

Lithuanian Communist Party Holds Plenum 4 Mar

90UN1233F Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 6 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by S. Bykhun: "The Confrontation Intensifies?"]

[Text] **The third plenum and 26th conference of the communists loyal to the CPSU platform takes place on weekends.**

The Third Plenum of the provisional Communist Party of Lithuania Central Committee (on the CPSU platform) took place on Sunday, at which the results of the February CPSU Central Committee Plenum were discussed.

M. Burokyavichyus, secretary of the provisional Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee (on the CPSU platform), gave a report. In particular, he noted that the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU platform) does not desire confrontation with the reorganized Lithuanian Communist Party. We appeal to our comrades from that party to struggle together for a socialist state of Lithuania in the USSR and for a Lithuania built on socialist and democratic principles and on principles of complete social justice, which take into account the historical features of the development of the Lithuanian and other peoples residing on the republic's territory.

As they discussed the report, many of the speakers noted that it is very difficult for the party organizations to work: There are no accommodations, printing organs, methodological literature, or statistical materials that many of the communists loyal to the CPSU platform need in their social and legal defense. This is especially true in the rural rayons.

The plenum decided to convene the 21st Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU platform) on 21 April in the city of Vilnius.

The plenum also examined an organizational question. M. Burokyavichyus was elected first secretary of the provisional Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, and V. Shved was elected second secretary.

On 4 March the communists of Vilnius loyal to the CPSU platform met for the 26th party conference. The

questions they discussed concerned the political situation in the republic, tasks of the city party organization resulting from the decisions of the February USSR Central Committee Plenum, elections to the local soviets, and elections to the city party committee.

Professor V. Lazutka, department head of the Vilnius Higher Party School, and A. Chistyakov, secretary of the party gorkom [city committee], gave reports.

As was clear from A. Chistyakov's report, there are now more than 15,000 members of the CPSU in the city's 267 local party organizations, and four party raykoms [rayon committees] have been created. At the same time the conference's participants were troubled by the fact that the political situation in the republic has not improved but has instead taken on a more critical aspect. A similar situation is also arising in the city of Vilnius. Thus, Professor Yu. Yermalavichyus noted in his speech that an economic slump has hit the republic, crime has increased, many social problems are not being resolved, and lack of confidence in the future is increasing.

Z. Markovskaya, a delegate to the conference, said with alarm that communists at a calculator factory are being intimidated and clearly made to understand what will happen to them in the event that Lithuania secedes from the Soviet Union. With respect to this, delegate D. Shikher proposed that a legal service be created at the level of the party gorkom which would concern itself with questions of the social and legal defense of the city's population.

A detailed resolution was adopted concerning all the issues discussed. This stated in particular that by the end of March the party gorkom must develop a program of concrete actions, design a common system for registering members of the CPSU, issue its newspaper, increase its work with young people, create a social and political center, etc.

Delegates from Minsk, Tallinn, and Kaliningrad attended the party conference.

Participants at the party conference elected a city committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, made up of 82 people, and secretaries. V. Lazutka was elected first secretary of the Vilnius Lithuanian Communist Party gorkom (on the CPSU platform); A. Chistyakov was elected second secretary; and V. Khadunkin was elected secretary.

Radio Begins Broadcasts in Republic Languages

LD0804085290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 8 Apr 90

[Text] Restructuring of the CPSU, initiated five years ago, has greatly changed customary concepts of the political, economic, and public institutions of our country. It has also affected the mass media. Thus, a year ago, the Moscow Radio World Service in Russian was set up at the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, whose broadcasts are heard all over the world.

And from today, in response to numerous appeals by our country's citizens, radio broadcasting is beginning in the languages of the peoples of the USSR. Today the first broadcast in Lithuanian will go out on the air. Radio listeners of this program, radio listeners of this republic may tune in to the Mayak wavelength at 1400 Moscow time.

First Program in Lithuanian

LD0804113190 Moscow TASS in English 1114 GMT 8 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 8 TASS—The Soviet Mayak radio program, which was established in 1964, today for the first time ever began broadcasts in national languages of Soviet peoples.

The first thirty-minute program was in Lithuanian.

Lithuanian People's Deputies To Remain in Moscow

LD1204083290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 12 Apr 90

[Text] The Sajudis Information Agency reports:

A press conference was held yesterday at the Lithuanian Supreme Council. Supreme Council Deputy Chairmen Bronius Kuzmickas and Ceslovas Stankevicius, and Lithuanian Minister of Forestry Vaidotas Antanaitis, took part in the conference.

Bronius Kuzmickas noted that the West's attitude toward us has stabilized within the limits expressed by the U.S. leaders and politicians in other countries. The opinion of democratic forces does not always rise to government level.

Vaidotas Antanaitis spoke about a meeting of former people's deputies from Lithuania. It was decided at the meeting that they should continue to work in Moscow as mediators. He said we should pay principal attention to the East and not to the West. We will only gain what we can achieve in Moscow. It was stressed that this does not mean they will take part in the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It is also intended to help democratic movements in the Soviet Union. A commission was set up which will decide the status of the people's deputies from Lithuania.

It was noted at the press conference that presidential rule can be avoided only with wise behavior. Each step should be scrutinized in order to avoid harming not only ourselves but also all democratic movements.

Lithuanian, Moscow Relations Discussed

PM0604150090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 13, 27 Mar-2 Apr 90 pp 6-7

[Leonid Mlechin article: "No One Wants To Make More Enemies"]

[Text] Restrained comments in the West on Lithuania's declaration of independence can hardly please Moscow and grieve Vilnius. In former times some capitals would not miss the opportunity to recognize "a new state," just for the sake of annoying the Kremlin. Today Western politicians and diplomats are out to display their loyalty and support for Gorbachev and a stable and predictable Soviet Union. It should be remembered, however, that many countries, first of all the United States, have never recognized the inclusion of three Baltic republics in the Soviet Union. This circumstance provides a legal basis for recognizing the Lithuanian Republic at an opportune moment.

It is not pleasant to realize that for the last 50 years a large part of the world community has regarded the summer 1940 events as an occupation. Isn't it an occasion again to recall the events which took place 50 years ago and to study them carefully? This should be done in view of the fact that the conclusion on "the occupation of Lithuania" was drawn by the republic's Supreme Soviet, not the present but the previous one, elected at the time when no Sajudis had been formed.

A brief discussion of the situation in Lithuania at a special congress of People's Deputies, pending the results of the election of the president, reveals that the deputies tried to understand what had happened in that repubic with a deplorable lack of current and historical information. Even a university course of lectures on history, not to mention a pre-university course, is not enough to understand why the Lithuanian parliament declared that the republic was opting out of the USSR.

Research into our own past has offered us surprises every day. For several years since the reforms were initiated we heard from officials that there were no secret protocols to the Molotov- Ribbentrop pact. One of the deputies became almost hysterical when the protocols had eventualiy been found. Another deputy, who referred to history, questioned the legitimacy of the very emergence of an independent Lithuanian state by declaring that the secession of Lithuania from Russia had been decided by the German command and Emperor Wilhelm.

It should be noted that several independent states came into being as a result of the first world war. Some appeared as a result of the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Others seceded from the former Russian empire. Lithuania was recognized by the Lenin-led government and the world community. The events of 1940 need a serious study indeed. This work has been done in Vilnius. Research into history will help us to understand why Lithuania has made its recent decisions. The main question now is what is to be done. Anyway, Lithuania will not become independent overnight. it is impossible to put the clock back half a century, to the initial position. During the past decades Lithuania has become closely integrated in the Soviet Union and the dissection of even a small vessel may hurt. The interests of security, the capital investment and enterprises of central ministries, and the claims of other republics must be carefully evaluated and every step must be considered. There is, however, a problem which is difficult to solve. How about the citizens of Lithuania who want to remain citizens of the Soviet Union?

Let us make things clear. The absolute majority of Lithuanians want to secede from the Soviet Union, and the new parliament has received such a mandate. The Russians, Poles and Ukrainians resist such a measure. Life in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic and life in the Lithuanian Republic are different things. In the first case, they live simply in one of the corners of the vast country and accommodate themselves to local conditions to the extent that it is necessary. In the second case, they find themselves in another state, where people live according to their own laws. It is also not known what status you enjoy: whether you are a desirable or undesirable foreigner.

The inability to settle the "Russian question" is perhaps the biggest mistake of the Sajudis. The situation in Lithuania differs from that in Latvia and Estonia. Antanas Snieckus, who led the republic for many years, was able to defend its interests and, in comparison with its neighbors, Lithuania had less projects which required the import of labor force. Most of the Russians, Poles and Ukrainians living in Lithuania feel like indigenous citizens and have linked their destinies with that republic. However, the national movement, once it was born, cut ethnicalily alien elements off. Instead of trying to gain the support of all people living in Lithuania for the idea of its rebirth, the national movement made the Russian-speaking citizens its enemies. These citizens fear now that they may become second- rate people and they will desperately fight for the maintenance of the former state of affairs.

Some argue that a referendum should have been held before making a decision on seccession from the Soviet Union. But there is no intention to organize such a referendum, and not only because it was not held in 1940. The result of a referendum can be predicted accurately enough: 80 percent of the Lithuanians will be unanimous in their decision. There are several parties in Lithuania, and people are not unanimous in their politiacl sympathies. However, the slogan of independence units all of them. Those who live outside the republic do not seem to understand this fact well.

It was useful for TV viewers to listen to an interview with Vladislav Shved, secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party on the platform of the CPSU. He is a politician of a new formation, a young and dynamic man. It should not be forgotten, however, that his party has won only four seats in the Lithuanian parliament, naturally in the

districts inhabited by Russians. Those who gave prefence to the Greens, Christian Democrats and the independent Communist Party voted for seccession.

Vladislav Shved evidently make an impression on the TV viewers by calculating that the Sajudis deputies represent the interests of roughly 30 percent of the republic's population. In general, this happens always and everywhere (with rare exceptions) in democratic elections. It was only Boris Yeltsin who polled 85 percent of the votes. Other candiates were elected by taking, say, 59 percent. If 60 percent of the electorate went to the polls it could be easily calculated what percentage of the total a given deputy represents.

Nevertheless, such a deputy gains a legal status and he is entrusted with settling issues that affect a given republic as a whole. He can be recalled if he exceeds the limits of his mandate. But I have not heard about ny considerable movement for the recalling of Lithuanian deputies who voted to opt out of the Soviet Union.

Deputy Yevgeniy Kogan was applauded at the Congress of People's Deputies when he proposed to introduce direct presidential rule in Lithuania. Let us hope it was merely an emotional reaction to the hasty steps taken by Vilnius. Sober-minded people will not disregard the will of the Lithuanian voters and will begin to work out a mechanism of interaction with Vilnius. Any attempt to solve the problem by force will undermine first of all the positions of democrats, those who support the President of our country, and strengthen the positions of those elements in the republics who think it is useless to negotiate with Moscow.

Of course, the very idea of holding talks on secession from the Union seems to frighten some people. The Soviet Government has decided to avert the economic, financial and customs separation of Lithuania from the economic complex of the USSR. The enterprises subordinate to all-Union ministries will remain under Moscow's control. Special asssignments have been given to the KGB and the Interior Ministry. A great deal now depends on contacts between Moscow and Vilnius. The position and fate of Russian-speaking Lithuanians has to be discussed too. After all, one must always see things in their right perspective. The current changes in Europe are opening up a way to a new, unprecedented European integration. The main thing now is not to make more enemies.

'Soyuz' Supports President Rule for Lithuania

PM1104153590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 11 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[N. Garifullina commentary: "Leaps Into Nowhere: Commentary on USSR Supreme Soviet Session Report"]

[Text] The news from Lithuania these days is no longer just alarming, it is simply shocking, because the actions undertaken by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet led by V. Landsbergis are illogical and far removed from common sense. It seems that many Lithuanians are beginning to reach this conclusion too, although quite recently they were in a state of euphoria and intoxicated by their sense of total license. USSR People's Deputy G.I. Tikhonov gave a witty commentary on the attitude of Lithuanians themselves to the present situation in the republic at a recent press conference given by representatives of the "Soyuz" deputies' group after their return from a visit to Lithuania.

"I spent a whole day in Vilnius with Lithuanians of the older generation," Georgiy Ivanovich said. "We talked frankly about the development of the situation and the stance taken by the Lithuanian leadership. As far as they are concerned, Landsbergis puts them in mind of a horse that has taken the bit between its teeth and galloped away. He cannot turn back. He has announced to the whole world that Lithuania is seceding from the USSR, having taken a unilateral decision without consulting the people, and now, spurred on, he is galloping headlong toward this objective, undertaking one adventurist act after another on the way. But you cannot take things at a gallop in politics. You must take a considered, sober, circumspect approach. Lithuanians themselves are saying that, if 'Sajudis' replaced its leader, it could possibly come up with a constructive platform for the businesslike discussion of ways to implement the Law on the Secession of a Union Republic from the USSR recently adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet."

At this point, N.A. Kostishin, a member of the "Soyuz" group and one of those who went on the visit to Lithuania, remarked:

"People's deputies from Lithuania were perfectly well aware that this mechanism was being developed. All they had to do was wait a while—and the process would have been calmly set in train, with the people's will definitely taken into account. But, to all appearances, Vilnius officials have no intention of considering the people's opinion. They prefer to spur the horses on, not realizing that, while moving at a frantic pace, the Lithuanian parliament is rushing nowhere."

Having spent five days in Lithuania, the group of parliamentarians were able to see for themselves the results of these reckless leaps ahead. The information they collected is so alarming that the deputies decided to convey it urgently to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

"The main conclusion we have reached is that the situation in Lithuania has a clearly expressed trend toward further deterioration," People's Deputy Ye.U. Kim said at the joint session of the two chambers last Tuesday. "The republic is in the process of dismantling the Soviet socialist system, and the leadership is trying to destroy the entire system of existing ties with the USSR by speeding up the adoption of a series of legislative acts. The USSR Constitution has in fact ceased to operate on Lithuanian territory. The process of polarizing the republic's population and law enforcement bodies,

including the Internal Affairs Ministry and KGB apparatus, on the basis of political beliefs and nationality is intensifying."

The statement by representatives of the "Soyuz" deputies' group, read by Ye.U. Kim, stresses that every hour's delay in taking decisive measures inspires confidence in "Sajudis" supporters and causes confusion among those who sincerely want to see a renewed Lithuania within the USSR. The republic's population feels a moral weariness because of the ambiguous position in which it now finds itself as a result of the unconstitutional policy conducted by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. Abandoning the promises it made before the elections, once in power the "Sajudis" leadership assumed a monopoly on the mass media and is now bringing strong pressure to bear on the population, not stopping at threats, blackmail, and intimidation....

At their press conference, the people's deputies talked about what lies behind the dry officialese of their statement. The group attended eight rallies, held 45 meetings in labor and military collectives, gave six receptions to answer citizens' individual questions, received more than 500 letters, took part in a joint plenum of the Vilnius city party committee and rayon party committees loyal to the CPSU platform, met Cardinal Sladkyavichus, head of the Catholic church, and so forth.

"The atmosphere among the population is explosive," USSR People's Deputy Ye.V. Kogan believes. "The violation of ethnic minorities' civil rights on a massive scale has long been the norm here. Crude tyranny and persecution of the Russian-speaking population are flourishing. At a reception in Kaunas, I was approached by someone who said bitterly that parents are afraid to let their children out into the street. His own 11-year-old son had come home from a walk beaten up and with all his teeth knocked out. Someone else told me that a sales assistant he knows had flatly told him: 'I am not going to sell you anything. Clear off home to Russia!' We were told in Klaipeda, at a meeting with the collective of the 'Baltiya' Experimental Shipyard, that last year SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA had published a collective letter, 'We Beg Our Country to Protect Us,' in which they told how their rights were being infringed, how nationalism was rearing its head in Lithuania, and how the graves of soldiers from the Great Patriotic War who died liberating the land of Lithuania were being desecrated. All 320 signatories to the letter have had criminal charges brought against them and are being dragged into court. The collective nominated one of the women as candidate for deputy in the recent elections, but a campaign of terror was immediately begun against her, abetted by the investigative bodies, and she was forced to stand down."

"I spent a whole day receiving citizens to answer individual questions," V.V. Khmura, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, said at the press conference. "Hundreds of people came. They demanded the restoration of the mass media working on behalf of the Lithuanian Communist Party loyal to the CPSU platform, because glasnost and pluralism in Lithuania have become a one-way street."

The deputies noted in their statement that the situation in the Lithuanian republic has been fueled by the mass media, which are totally in "Sajudis" hands. The Russian-speaking population and many Lithuanians are essentially deprived of the possibility and the right to publicly express their opinion. Since mid-1989, the broadcasting of all-Union radio's channel one has stopped, Leningrad television broadcasts were also stopped recently, and military servicemen are banned access to television and radio broadcasts by a Lithuanian Supreme Soviet decision.

"People are traumatized by the passport exchange process under way in the republic," V.V. Khmura continued. "They are being intimidated: Those who do not take Lithuanian citizenship and change their passport will be immediately expelled from the republic. There is also another form of psychological pressure: Some parents said that they had been advised to make a better job of hiding their sons, not to send them into the Army at the end of the recess, and that they had been politely warned of the consequences should they fail to comply. What should they do? parents ask. And dozens of people asked: Why are USSR laws and presidential decrees not effective any more? People expressed total bewilderment at the indecisiveness of the USSR president and government in putting their own decisions into effect. They frankly asked us: 'Why is our president afraid to show determination on the territory of a state whose integrity he must guarantee?' I was given letters bearing anything up to 10,000 signatures: People are demanding that direct presidential rule be introduced on Lithuanian territory."

The same proposal was also made at the Supreme Soviet session when the statement by representatives of the "Soyuz" deputies' group was read out. They now see this as perhaps the most effective way to restore the rule of law, respect for and observance of the USSR Constitution, and human rights guarantees in Lithuania. And to sober those Lithuanian politicians who certainly have "taken the bit between their teeth," as well as those who, not really understanding the situation—such as the groups of deputies from the Moscow Soviet and Leningrad Soviet—have made ill-considered, provocative statements prompting deep outrage among the working people of Lithuania. Their letters were read out at the press conference and their opinions brought to the attention of USSR Supreme Soviet members.

Everyone must be extremely circumspect at this difficult time, because some political wheeler-dealers in Vilnius are seizing any opportunity to undermine the authority of the USSR Presidential Appeal to the Lithuanian People and the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and to frustrate the implementation of the decisions taken by the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

"If presidential decrees are systematically disregarded and instructions from the general prosecutor and internal affairs minister ignored, it seems to me that officials must be answerable before the law. Yes, we recognize the right of the Lithuanian people to self-determination and the formation of a sovereign state, but we believe that this question must be decided solely on the basis of current legislation. In this connection, the 'Soyuz' group has proposed that the USSR Supreme Soviet hear reports in closed session from the USSR general prosecutor, the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry, the USSR KGB, the USSR Defense Ministry, and the USSR Foreign Ministry on the situation in Lithuania and the effectiveness of measures being taken to normalize that situation," Ye.U. Kim said to me after he had addressed the joint session. "I would also like to point this out: We are concerned that a growing number of Lithuanian servicemen are deserting from the Soviet Army under the influence of irresponsible appeals by the Lithuanian leadership. In this connection we have proposed that the Soviet president issue a decree exempting from prosecution those military servicemen conscripted from Lithuania who have illegally left their military units but voluntarily return to their subunits, on the condition that they present themselves within seven days of the decree being published. We also feel it simply essential that the Committee on Glasnost devote one of its sessions to discussing how the mass media are covering events in Lithuania and give a fundamental assessment of those who contribute to the buildup of destructive processes either through ignorance or for other reasons."

Today we are all responsible for the course of events. Responsible before our compatriots, before history, and, ultimately, before our own consciences.

Maslyukov Assesses 'Initiative'

LD1204084490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 12 Apr 90

[Text] The Sajudis [Lithuanian Movement for Restructuring] Information Agency reports:

On 10 April, at a press conference in Moscow, Yuriy Maslyukov, member of the Presidential Council, and chairman of the USSR Planning Committee, had to answer the following question: How does the Presidential Council assess the demand by the Soyuz group of people's deputies for the introduction of presidential rule in Lithuania? In Maslyukov's opinion it is merely a Soyuz group of deputies initiative, and is treated as a pluralism of opinions.

Reasons for Lithuanian Crisis Examined

PM1104170090 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 14, 8 Apr 90 p 4

[Yuriy Bandura dispatch: "Lithuania: In Search of a Miracle"]

[Text] The uniqueness of the present situation, which has turned Lithuania into the centre of world attention, can be felt in Vilnius only in conversations, talks, and interviews. And it doesn't leave you until your return to Moscow, making you ponder the question again and again: "What has happened? What is happening, and what can still happen?"

And Again—the Army

"What has happened?"—my question is repeated by Vytautas Landsbergis, Chairman of Lithuania's Supreme Soviet, whom I managed to battle my way to on March 30 only at 11 p.m. "During these two weeks we have experienced different forms of pressure and intimidation on the part of Moscow. Our attempts to establish direct contact with the Soviet Union's leadership, to say nothing of repeated proposals to commence dialogue and talks, have not been crowned with success."

During the days of my stay in Lithuania I had repeated occasions to hear about intimidation attempts: this is how the operations of the USSR Armed Forces on the republic's territory have been appraised here. It is not difficult to notice that for several days the Army became an appreciable phenomenon in the republic's political affairs—a force whose presence and actions could be construed by Lithuanians only as intimidation and pressure.

Article 31 of the USSR Constitution says: the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union are maintained in order to "defend the gains of socialism, the peaceful labour of the Soviet people, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state". None of these purposes was put forward by the military leadership to justify their actions in Lithuania. On the other hand, it was openly and loudly said that in some cases the Armed Forces were used at the request of the Communist Party of Lithuania (on the platform of the CPSU).

It is not hard to imagine what the country will turn into if the troops start fulfilling the requests of opposition political forces. I believe therefore that some of the Army's actions in Lithuania should be investigated by the Military Procurator's Office. All the more so that, to justify their conduct, the representatives of the Army occasionally make reference to the USSR President's Decree of March 21 "On Additional Measures to Ensure the Rights of Soviet Citizens and Protect the Sovereignty of the USSR on the Territory of the Lithuanian SSR". The Decree prescribes some or other actions to many govermnent departments. The Ministry of Defence, however, has been charged with merely one function, "to accept from the bodies of internal affairs the weapons confiscated from citizens and ensure their storage". From this point of view the seizure of a number of party buildings—in Vilnius and Klaipeda—and the use of Army helicopters to scatter leaflets calling for meetings "on the platform of the CPSU" can be seen as unconstitutional actions discrediting presidential power in the eyes of the USSR and the world.

In a Unique Language

Official Moscow reports on the Lithuanian situation generally have a dry, tough and exacting tone (except for "The appeal of the President of the USSR to the People of the Lithuanian SSR"). An unprecedented phenomenon in relations between the USSR and the Union republics. Also unprecedented are the decisions of Lithaunia's Supreme Soviet "on the reestablishment of the Lithuanian state's independence" and on the repeal of the USSR Constitution's validity on the republic's territory which were adopted in a form even ruder than an ultimatum: it was decided that Moscow would not be consulted or even warned about these decisions.

Talking with me in his office on the second floor of Lithuania's Supreme Soviet, Vytautas Landsbergis said:

"We need to start a discussion. At least, a discussion on a discussion. At least talks about talks. And I'm sorry that this is being delayed. Moscow has made some categorical statements which now compound the problems on the diplomatic plane. I hope, however, that some way out will be found and that discussions wil begin."

Why is the chairman of Lithuania's Supreme Soviet concerned about dialogue with Moscow right now? Why didn't this occur to him on March 10, when the first session of the new convocation of the republic'sSupreme Soviet elected him its chairman?

Says V. Radzvilas, prominent Lithuanian political scientist, member of the Council of the Seimas of Sajudis:

"Neither Moscow nor Vilnius was prepared for what happened on March 11. I hold that the decisions taken that day could have been forestalled if Moscow had made an explicit statement about the draft law on the procedure of secession from the USSR. But Moscow did not understand the concern with which Lithuania viewed the very possibility of such a law emerging. On the other hand, no one in the republic could, in that atmosphere of fright, take specific steps to ascertain the true state of affairs. Thus the declaration of independence outstripped the natural course of the political process."

Moscow was indeed unprepared for such a turn of events: Landsbergis and his allies had not notified Moscow of their intentions.

Escaping From the Reality

Indeed, by proclaiming in Article 72 each repubic's right to freely secede from the USSR, our amazing federal Constitution formally enabled Lithuania to take advantage of this right and announce its independence from the federation. It never occurred to those who wrote the Constitution that someone would or could exercise their right to secede. Therefore they didn't say a word about the procedure of seceding from the USSR (Lituania is also to blame: it took part in the unanimous approval of the USSR's Fundamental Law). The lack of guarantees and procedures has turned the right of free secesion into a travesty. Landsbergis would like to conduct negotiations with the president of the USSR as the head of an absolutely independent state. Should Mikhail Gorbachev start such negotiations, it would be possible to speak about the legality of Vilnius' March decisions.

But it is only now—with the discussion of the draft law on the procedure for secession of Union republics from the USSR, with the drafting of a new Treaty of Alliance on the agenda—that the right to secede from the USSR is beginning to acquire the outlines of a real right. Isn't this the reality that the Lithuanian parliament tried to escape?

Yet it looks as if there is nowhere to escape. "Today we may be recognized by Israel or Namibia, for example," says D. Krivelis, a leader of the Social-Democratic Party of Lithuania. "But this is not yet independence. Independence will only come when Moscow ambassador arrives in Vilnius."

At a meeting of the Club of Liberals held in one of the halls on Vilnius University, Brazauskas' Party faced much criticism, the main complaint being that the CPL [Communist Party of Lithuania], after its leader was not elected chairman of Lithuania's Supreme Soviet, was incapable of playing the role of an opposition as the biggest parliamentary party of Lithuania (Sajudis is still not a party).

Criticisms were also addressed to Sajudis at this meeting of Vilnius intellectuals, who said that that organization, well adapted for taking power, turned out to be incapable of developing the state; "Politically Sajudis is coming to resemble the CPSU. With a majority in parliament, it is beginning to pursue its policy, refusing to reckon with the minority and dismissing it with a claim: 'We act on behalf of the people'".

Isn't it this criticism that Lithuania's deputy corps has been trying to evade by hiding behind the populism of the "anti-Moscow Fronde"? I can't give an absolute affirmative answer inasmuch as this corps' prestige among Lithuanians is indisputable and truly the people's mandate. But the substance of this mandate is something else again. Did it call for a spontaneous secession from the USSR? Rather doubtful. Especially since the republic's leadership is reluctant to put this issue to the test of a referendum. But without a referendum, the decisions of Lithuania's Supreme Soviet will seem a sham and not a product of the people's self-determination. Consequently, the USSR will have the right to insist that Lithuania observe the provisions of the USSR Constitution, including paragraph 12 of Article 73 which says that "other matters of all-Union importance" should be settled according to the jurisdiction of the USSR, as represented by its highest bodies of state authority and administration.

This paragraph is both sly and ruthless, for it leaves little to the Union republics as sovereign states.

Tragedy of Lithuania's Russians

Having attended the meetings of Lithuanian Russians with USSR people's deputies I heard many reproaches: "Russia has given us up, Gorbachev has left us, and the Centre doesn't give a damn about us," which is why allegedly "all our hopes must be placed in the Army: it alone will help carry out the Soviet laws". To Deputy Obolenskiy's remark that the Lithuanians had a right to choose their own destiny came the angry reply: "Such deputies deserve a bullet through their head".

Such are the sentiments. They stem not from innate conservatism, but form life. Indeed, most of those who recently moved to Lithuania from Russia work at what were recently "classified enterprises" or "P.O. boxes", of which there are many in the republic. Perestroyka has declassified them one by one and scrapped the privileges that came with the secrecy. Next will come conversion, and all the problems of retraining. And next will come Lithuania's secession from the USSR, and all the unanswered questions: How to live? Where to Live? For those who are middle-aged this is a tragedy, and all the bitterer since there is no contact or mutual understanding with the local authorities. The guarantees of social justice in relation to Russians don't look convincing to me. Moscow has merely demanded that Lithuania observe the rights of all citizens of the USSR; but it has not invited Russians back to Russia—where could it put them?

This flashpoint strikes me as the greatest danger for the next few months: the slightest spark will be enough for everything to blow up.

360 out of 38,000

One of the most burning issues in relations between the Union and the Lithuania concerns the destiny of Lithuanians serving in the Soviet Army: the declaration of Lithuania's independence invited them to desert. Believing in independence, 360 young boys escaped to Lithuania from their units. The central press gave their defections a lot of play. You'd think that everyone was deserting. But 38,000 Lithuanians are still serving in the Soviet Army in various parts of the country.

The central media have shot many a critical arrow at all possible appeals from the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania. Yet I haven't read anything about the one issued on March 17 which says: "We call upon all citizens of the Lithuanian Republic serving in the Armed Forces of the USSR to remain at their places of service in the expectation of a negotiated solution with the government of the USSR to the question of your return to Lithuania. We call upon you not to give an occasion by your behaviour for the outbreak of conflicts." Had this appeal received wide publicity, soldiers might not have needed to break into the Novo-Vilniask mental hospital the night of March 27 where several dozen deserters had been given refuge.

Not everyone in Lithuania sees the exodus from the Federation as a cure for all past and present evils. Journalist Ruta Vanagaite writes in Sogiasiye (Accord) published by Lithuanian Movement for Perestroyka: "It is not worth it to harbour illusions that we are still Europeans or that we can turn into them overnight. All our brothers are on this side of the wall: Estonians, Georgians, and those Russians who share our pain. We have passed through a concentration camp all together."

"What do you think," I asked V. Radzvilas, "is rupture really inevitable?"

"A year ago I would have thought twice before giving a definite answer, but today, I'm afraid, there is no escaping from Lithuania's secession," he replied and added after a moment's hesitation: "Only if some miracle occurs..."

They say there are no miracles. But didn't we see a multiparty system in our country and the possibility of quitting the USSR as miracles only quite recently? If we try and find the real way, maybe we shall discover it—that miracle.

Pro-Soviet Lithuanian Communist Leader Cited

PM0204103490 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 30 Mar 90 p 11

[Interview with Vladislav Shved, leadership member of the pro-Soviet Lithuanian communists, by Ezio Mauro in Vilnius; date not given]

[Excerpt] Vilnius—[passage omitted] [Mauro] After the fear caused by the entry of soldiers into party headquarters and the action against deserters two days ago, the new Lithuanian government says that the worst is over and that dialogue with Moscow can now start. Do you share that view?

[Shved] I do not think we can act as if nothing had happened, as if the situation in Lithuania were normal. In fact, we are in the middle of a constitutional and state crisis, with part of the USSR not recognizing the Union's laws and Constitution, appointing unconstitutional bodies, stating that it does not intend to respect the Soviet president's decrees, and, in short, behaving illegally.

I would like to ask everybody: What would happen in Italy, France, or Britain if a province, a region, or a county rebelled against the state as Lithuania is doing?

[Mauro] But the parliament maintains that Lithuania has very specific historical reasons to back its independence, it condemns the Soviet annexation as the result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and maintains that it has the support of the people who elected it: What is your answer?

[Shved] My answer is that Lithuania has the right to leave the USSR if its people so desire, but a separation cannot be decided by just one of the two sides, because there are major specific interests to be settled. However, here in Lithuania, people are rushing ahead blindly, without thinking and without discussing, and this is only

taking us up a blind alley. Ultimately, there is only likely to be one way out—the declaration of a state of emergency, in other words an emergency measure which will put an end to normality. We do not want that, but everything now seems to be moving in that direction.

[Mauro] Do you maintain that parliament's declaration of independence is not valid or that it is not enough?

[Shved] I think that the Lithuanian Republic will have the right to exist. But I also think that a simple parliamentary gesture cannot cancel out the past 50 years of this country's existence within the USSR. It is necessary to define the unsolved questions—political, economic, social, and human. It is necessary to act within the specific framework of a law. However, it seems that people here are erecting a new iron curtain, between Lithuania and the USSR.

[Mauro] What are you referring to?

[Shved] To the decisions which the local government has already made. They have stopped the transmission of television programs from Leningrad, they are trying to bloc programs from the first and second Soviet channels throughout the republic's territory. Our party's daily newspaper has to be printed in Minsk in Belorussia because nobody in Lithuania is prepared to print it. Sajudis won votes and support by criticizing the old bureaucratic methods and it is now using the same systems. The radio announced that all the participants in our protest demonstration on Tuesday had been filmed and photographed. What state uses that kind of method. Perhaps the old USSR, and certainly totalitarian countries, dominated by a dictatorship.

[Mauro] On the one hand you are accusing the new government and the new parliament of authoritarianism, and on the other you are condemning their attempt to restore bourgeois power: Is that not going too far?

[Shved] No, not if you judge the government or parliament by its methods and laws. For instance, here they are starting to introduce private ownership, but without even thinking about social protection and the methods of protecting the weaker classes which the Scandinavian countries have. Unemployment in Lithuania is taken for granted, and an attempt is being made to restore capitalism in its most primitive form. I think that an attempt is being made to restore the bourgeois system under the disguise of nationalism. It is a disguise which also conceals worrying military operations.

[Mauro] What do you mean?

[Shved] I have personally seen leaflets calling on all "volunteers" ready to serve in the army, the militia, and in the Lithuanian border guard to register with Sajudis. That is a very dangerous thing, because it is not a state but a party which is organizing those military groups. There are only two countries in which something similar has happened in the past—Italy and Germany—and we know what that led to.

[Mauro] However, you occupied the Central Committee headquarters with the help of Soviet paratroopers. Why this show of strength?

[Shved] Because we have no other instrument apart from the Army. The militia, the court, and the attorney's office no longer obey us. Only the Soviet Army garrison is under the orders of the Soviet Constitution. Of course I am very well aware that the Army should not deal with such matters because troops have nothing to do with the possession of a party headquarters. But when we heard that the students were about to invade the Central Committee building, while Prime Minister Prunskiene wanted to transfer the CPSU school to a teaching institute, then we realized that a serious political problem was about to emerge: All the Lithuanians who still consider themselves citizens of the USSR would no longer have a point of reference in Vilnius on which to base themselves in opposing Sajudis and ensuring observance of th Soviet laws. So we decided to intervene.

[Mauro] How do you explain the fact that the Soviet militia decided to serve the new Lithuanian authorities loyally?

[Shved] It is a direct consequence of the separatist dictatorship that I mentioned. The interior minister swore to obey only the new Lithuanian laws and not to execute Moscow's decrees and Gorbachev's presidential instructions: As a direct consequence, even the militia no longer obey the Soviet Government.

Actually in Vilnius 70 percent of militiamen do obey the Soviet Government's orders, but in the rest of Lithuania 70 percent disobey them. So the situation is dangerously out of control.

[Mauro] As things stand, what do you believe the solution could be?

[Shved] There are only three. Either the Lithuanian parliament recognizes the USSR Constitution, or the USSR accepts Lithuania's separation from the Union, or a direct presidential administration of Lithuania by Gorbachev is established. In my opinion the first and second options are not realistic. That leaves only the third: a temporary presidential government to stabilize the crisis, block unconstitutional laws, and start a dialogue between Vilnius and Moscow. The presidential council meets in Moscow Friday, and it could reach a decision to this effect. Otherwise it will be done later, but it must be done in any case.

[Mauro] But would the Lithuanian government and parliament remain in office even under the president's administration?

[Shved] I believe that when the supreme authority intervenes the other authorities must stop. They do not cease to exist, they are not dissolved; but they are as though suspended and work to set negotiations in motion.

[Mauro] Is this not a blow to a parliament legally elected according to the laws of perestroyka?

[Shved] I say that an intervention to defend the rights of the USSR or its citizens is unavoidable. Like it or not, we ar still on the Soviet border, though Gorbachev does not use the methods that Bush did in Panama. But we too have little time.

[Mauro] One final question: If you look into the future, in two, three, five years' time, do you see a Soviet or an independent Lithuania?

[Shved] All the futurologists' prophecies that I read are terrible: They talk about the demolition of the USSR. I say that it would be better to shore up this Soviet edifice in order to rebuild it. If it collapses, thousands of people will perish beneath its ruins.

Moscow Rally of Lithuanian 'Solidarity' Mocked

PM0104192090 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 1 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[V. Ivanov report: "They Showed 'Solidarity': A Private Performance"]

[Text] Yesterday's rally of "solidarity with the people of Lithuania," organized by certain Moscow informal organizations in Gorkiy Culture and Leisure Park, was by every yardstick more like a small but well-rehearsed "private performance" than a mass event with serious political purposes. This impression was created by virtually every speech. The sense of theatricality was reinforced by remnants of decor at the back of the stage where those who wished to share their views on events in Lithuania gathered.

There is certainly nothing bad about an exchange of opinions, however much opinions may differ. If someone thinks differently from you or me, let him. But one thing was worrying: According to the speakers, the conflict that exists today between the leadership of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and the country is the fault of... the Army, socialism, and the president! And that being so, all these things, in the speakers' opinion, should be "consigned to the archives."

Isolated attempts by some speakers to refute by force of argument the crudest fabrications on this score did not succeed with the audience. Thus Lieutenant Colonel S. Terekhov, a student at the V.I. Lenin Military Political Academy, and USSR People's Deputy N. Petrushenko left the platform to whistles and jibes.

Only tankman Sergeant Kostas Petraytis, a Lithuanian, had more "luck." True, the young serviceman, while acknowledging the right of every people to self-determination, did not succeed in his attempt to find out from those present how they would feel if their sons ended up on trial for deserting from the Army (and this was loudly called for at the rally). The only answer he received was a stony silence...

But when one V. Ufimtsev, calling himself a physician and speleologist, publicly burned his army card, the public's rapture knew no bounds. Passions on this score were also inflamed by a comment by one of the rally's organizers, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputy V. Urazhtsev: "We recommend," Vitaliy Georgiyevich said, "that this noteworthy initiative be extended to party and Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] cards" (!—V.I.). Look what a "radical" deputy the voters in the capital's Gagarinskiy Rayon have...

To conclude the two-hour event, a few hundred supporters of "escape" ("We watch your escape with delight and hope, proud Lithuania!—that was one of the banners above the crowd), by now freezing cold because of the wind, were invited to listen attentively to the resolution, because "its text will certainly be transmitted by the mass media." "Not ours, of course, but the foreign media," the "presidium" promptly explained.

The document was approved and adopted. Then they broke up, evidently deeming "solidarity" to have been displayed.

Academician on Economic Ties With USSR

LD1104143390 Moscow TASS in English 1420 GMT 11 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent]

[Text] Vilnius April 11 TASS—Lithuanian economists believe that the republic's political independence should not sever the economic relations that have developed over the past fifty years between the Baltic republics and the Soviet Union.

According to eminent Lithuanian scientist Academician Eduardas Vilkas, for instance, the economic relations of politically independent Lithuania with Russia and other Soviet republics should be based on its participation in the "common market of the Soviet Union".

However, the implementation of this idea is now complicated by the fact that the Soviet economy is still hampered by administrative directives. Therefore, secession from the Soviet Union's administrative system, if it is finally effected by the new Lithuanian leadership, cannot but influence deliveries of raw materials and semi-finished goods to the republic, and the marketing of its production.

Academician Vilkas told TASS that the republic's present economic situation is by no means easy. But the national economy is running comparatively smoothly and contacts with enterprises of the Soviet Union have not been interrupted.

As distinct from the West, where such contacts are market regulated, this function is still performed by centralised planning in the Soviet Union. Neither the republics nor enterprises trade with each other today. They operate through a single distribution system. Prices play a purely auxiliary role and are fixed by the Soviet Government.

A unique situation has arisen now in relations between Lithuania and the USSR: a state, which has declared itself politically fully independent, rests on an economic basis which is mainly administered from Moscow. The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet bluntly said in one of its decisions that Lithuanian enterprises should observe their contractual and plan commitments to the USSR.

The present deadlock between Vilnius and Moscow is due to a political conflict. The Lithuanian leadership believes the mechanism of secession from the USSR should not be applied to Lithuania because it did not join the USSR voluntarily. The central authorities, on the contrary, believe the republic should withdraw from the USSR by means of a mechanism envisaged by Soviet law. But no matter how the past fifty years of Lithuania's history are assessed, they are a reality. And only proceeding from this reality will it be possible to cultivate new relations.

We already have sprouts of new economic relations. They were mentioned by Academician Vilkas, who said that the present political situation did not influence mixed firms, enterprises and cooperatives, linked by bilateral business ties, by personal contacts of businessmen. They are successfully working to the good of both sides.

Economic cooperation promotes normal human relations. "I have faith," Academician Vilkas stressed, "in the democratic process in the neighbouring republics, especially in the Russian Federation, and believe we shall finally arrive at normal good-neighbourly relations."

Academician Vilkas's views corroborate the idea of a transitional period, during which real requisites will be created for the political independence of a republic that wishes to secede from the union. This transitional period is envisaged in the recently adopted USSR law on secession.

USSR Ministry Tasks in Lithuania Explained

90UN1421C Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 30 Mar 90 pp 1, 3

[Report on interview with USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs official Yuriy Arshenevskiy: "From the Horse's Mouth"]

[Text] A group of employees of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] is working in the republic of Lithuania. An ELTA correspondent interviewed on its work and assignments, Militia Colonel Yuriy Arshenevskiy, deputy chief of the USSR MVD Media Relations Department.

[Correspondent] For what purpose have you come to Lithuania?

[Arshenevskiy] A group of employees of the USSR MVD central staff—about 23 persons altogether—is now working in Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipeda. Upon his arrival each introduced himself to Miriyenas Misyukonis, minister of internal affairs of the republic, and notified him of the purposes of his visit.

As Minister M. Misyukonis has already said in an interview with an ELTA correspondent, the group of representatives of the USSR MVD Political Directorate is studying the situation connected with the depoliticization of the internal affairs authorities, and examining questions of the political workers' adaptation to the new structure and also problems of their employment.

Our officers are interested primarily in how the edict of the USSR president on the surrender of weapons is being fulfilled. Incidentally, according to available information, all weapons of DOSAAF [All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the USSR Army, Air Force and Navy] organizations and educational institutions had by 27 March been handed over in the republic for temporary storage. Some 1,487 hunting rifles and other weapons belonging to the citizens have been handed in.

[Correspondent] Several officers of the USSR MVD Corrective- Labor Main Administration are working in the republic also?

[Arshenevskiy] They have come to coordinate the activity of the corrective-labor enterprises of republic of Lithuania establishments and enterprises and establishments of corrective-labor administrations of other Union republics, and to ensure the fulfillment of reciprocal cooperative supplies. In addition, they are studying the possibility of transferring Lithuanian inhabitants convicted of various crimes who are being held outside of the republic to corrective-labor establishments located on republic territory.

[Correspondent] What are your relations with officers of the Lithuanian Ministry of Internal Affairs like?

[Arshenevskiy] We have taken up residence in the building of this ministry. We have a common goal—ensuring law and order. After all, the criminal situation in Lithuania, as in the USSR, is complex. In recent years there has been a particular increase in the number of crimes. A method of alleviating this situation is the population's surrender of weapons (correspondent's note: on 28 March the republic of Lithuania government passed an ordinance on the safekeeping of hunting rifles and sporting weapons. Its purpose is to protect against the threatened illegal and forcible confiscation of the property of Lithuanian citizens, which the USSR Armed Forces is preparing to carry out. Internal affairs departments may take in hunting rifles and sporting weapons for temporary storage. The republic Ministry of Internal Affairs is obliged to ensure that the internal affairs departments guarantee the high-quality guarding of all weapons taken in without their removal from Lithuania and their return after the danger of confiscation has passed).

[Correspondent] How long do you intend working here?

[Arshenevskiy] My assignment will last 20 days, the other officers will spend approximately two weeks in Lithuania.

Britain Returns Gold to Lithuania

LD1104151290 Vilnius GIMTASIS KRASTAS in Lithuanian No 13, 1-5 Apr 90 pp 1, 4

[Article by Vitas Balandis, entitled "Lithuanian Gold on Ferry Enroute To Klaipeda." Filed as telephone report from the deck of "Koningin Beatrix."]

[Text] The "Koningin Beatrix," a huge ferry boat resembling a five-story, swan white building has just left Great Britain's Port of Harwich. Its regular route used to be Harwich—Hoek van Holand (Holland). Hundreds of British, Dutch and German passengers used to travel on it. This time the upper decks, normally reserved for passengers, are almost empty. Bartenders, who are normally very active, are passing their time at the huge bar, in boredom. The only passengers are—journalists. Practically all major world news agencies, newspapers and radio and television programs have sent them (only a TASS representative is missing). Mr. John Brown, the boat's captain, is on special assignment from the Great Britain monarchy's government. Huge boxes containing gold bars are stored on the boats lower deck, normally reserved for cars. This is gold being returnd to the Lithuanian Republic by England. The boat is set on a course for Klaipeda.

Journalists are engaged in lively discussions of the festive sendoff from the Port of Harwich. Editor of FORUM, Rolandas Barysas and I are giving interviews left and right. Neither one of us spares words of praise for England's Prime Minister, who in a speech at the Port of Harwich, stated: "Lithuanian gold had been kept in England's backs for 25 years." "In 1965, however, the then Labor Government committed an unforgivable error that darkens the face of England's solid democracy to this day," continued the prime minister, who addressed her remarks at great length to the guests assembled for the gold's sendoff, who included many individuals from Wall Street, Great Britain's ministerial Cabinet, representatives of the diplomatic corps, and understandably, members of Great Britain's Lithuanian Association.

M. Thatcher continued: "I have the distinct honor of rectifying the historical error, committed by H. Wilson, and am returning a part of Lithuania's gold. I am convinced that, Mr. President Gorbachev, highly esteemed by me, will soon do likewise."

I wish to call to GK readers' attention the fact that 13 tons of gold belonging to the annexed Baltic States had been stored in England's banks for safekeeping. Of that amount, 4.5 tons belonged to Lithuania. As was stated earlier, H. Wilson and N. Kosygin, signed an agreement which enabled these large countries to divide our wealth among themselves. The Soviet Union immediately "invested" the gold in English goods, thus it is possible to state that the "Soviet" portion of the Lithuanian gold has been eaten [consumed] long ago. Journalists of the solid daily newspaper, INDEPENDENT, were the first to speak out, at the beginning of last year, on the fate of the Lithuanian gold in England, stating that England should already start thinking about its return—in the event the Lithuanians should restore an independent Lithuanian Republic.

Preparations began on 11 March, immediately following the broadcasting by the world's press agencies, of our state's resoration declaration. The government reserved the "Koningin Beatrix ferry boat and bankers began to set in order the customary, for such transactions, formalities. Great Britain's Queen Elizabeth II assigned 20 riflemen from her Royal Palace Guard to escort the festive gold corteg: from London to Harwich.

English worries are—already behind. The ferry boat is already on the open sea, sailing on course for Klaipeda. "Now comes the time for our tribulations," states, in a puzzling manner, A. Povilaitis, the Lithuanian Bank administrator, aboard the "Koningin Beatrix." His concern is so deep that Lithuania's senior banker firmly refuses to give in depth comments on the gold subject. His thoughts are long since in Klaipeda, where we ourselves also know we will feel the drift of the reality of the situation.

In truth, if no great difficulties arise from the "Koningin Beatrix" docking, the dock of the ferry "Klaipeda—Mukranas" should be suitable, then our troubles will commence.

Soviet Union's Border Guard Units, as always, are controlling the Port of Klaipeda, just as they control all of Lithuania's borders; they continue, for the time being, to view the Lithuanian Republic's visas with suspicion and every evening, they await new and strict orders, carried by Central TV's "Vremya" broadcasts, and also those carried in secret dispatches, the contents of which we can only speculate about. It is difficult to predict what sort of situation will await us at the Port of Klaipeda, 48 hours from now, and that is why the bank administrator is in such a somber mood. Aside from that, even if we do succeed in getting through the border barrier, we will not be spared any problems. Such an amount of gold will require fool proof and well-prepared protection. It is true that the Supreme Council's Committee For State Protection, headed by Z. Vaisvila, has promised us comprehensive protection. There are no guarantees, however, that our construction workers will succeed in completing all the work necessary to adapt the Lithuanian Bank Building to safeguard the gold—for some time, Lithuania has received virtually no metal construction materials—resulting from the start of an economic blockade from the East.

In the words of O. Benderis, "the ice has moved and there is no way back." The gold is on its way to Lithuania. The "Koningin Beatrix" will enter Klaipeda Harbor at about twelve o'clock Vilnius time [am or pm

not specified]. The Lithuanian Joint Horn Orchestra is rehearsing in preparation for the reception ceremony. The official welcome is scheduled during the lunchtime break. Admission to the harbor area is free. More about this in the next issue.

Postscript: Because of the Soviet Army's actions, the captain has decided to stop in Bremen.

Landsbergis 14 Mar Supreme Soviet Address

90UN1342D Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 14 Mar 90 pp 1, 2

[Speech of Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic, at a session of the Supreme Soviet published under the rubric: "First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic of the First Convocation"]

[Text] On 12 March, opening the morning meeting, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic, V. Landsbergis, stated:

Esteemed deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic! I welcome you who have gathered this morning on the first new day of a new era in the history of Lithuania. Obviously, all of our hearts are laden with feelings and our heads with all kinds of information about what is happening at the present time in Lithuania and around it. This information is not always precise. We shall say something here about how people are reacting, what they expect, and what they are hoping for. But before beginning to discuss where we are, how we are living today, and what we must do, I ask you to remember all those people who hoped, waited, fought, and suffered and never lived to see this day. Let us honor their memory.

On my own behalf, on behalf of the Presidium and all of you I also wish to congratulate all the people in Lithuania and those who ended up in foreign lands, those who through their perseverance in work, their sacrifices, and their lives have contributed to the possibility of Lithuania's seeing these days—having suffered but not been destroyed or put down, and tired but not broken; to the fact that in Lithuania, in spite of all kinds of obstacles and the suppression of her forces, her love of work, and the disclosure of her talent have not quenched her thirst for work and creativity or the will of the people. Lithuania has retained her national culture although there has been the threat of its complete disappearance. Certain successes have been achieved and a certain economic and living standard were achieved for the people which in essence would not give anyone cause for joy but still it was frequently better and higher than in other lands controlled by the great eastern empire. The credit for this goes to all residents of Lithuania—for we have aimed at and have been able to arrive at this day. This is also to the credit and a result of the labor of those who have ended up in foreign lands, who have lived and continue to live somewhere other than Lithuania but in whose hearts burns the fire of love for Lithuania and who have done everything they could so that the name and rights of Lithuania would not be forgotten. In addition to all the workers of Lithuania I wish to thank all the people engaged in political work both in Lithuania and in other places, and above all those who are here, for whom it was frequently not easy to take the blows and ease them so that Lithuania would not feel all of their strength. Thus I also wish to thank the former republic leadership and again express the hope that we shall work together constructively. I especially wish to thank the esteemed Algirdas Brazauskas. Not everyone knows and I, undoubtedly, do not know everything. But from several personal conversations in the past I know what he had to experience when he came up against a much harsher force. Thank you!

Among the political representatives and the fighters for the freedom of Lithuania recently, as I already mentioned yesterday, a large amount of work has been done by the USSR people's deputies elected by the residents of Lithuania. It was not convenient for me to discuss this in greater detail yesterday. And the same is true today since I am one of the deputies. But I am one of them and I saw close up and participated in the political battles that this institution of our political life had to engage in. This group of people's deputies from the very beginning of their activity, although they were not an official delegation from the Lithuanian state, was prepared to defend the principles of Lithuanian sovereignty in each issue that arose there. And today when we are discussing and the USSR people's deputies are discussing what their future status should be in contacts between Lithuania and the Soviet Union, I wish to say that we should not have any doubts about their status in this hall. We shall prepare and present to you a decree concerning this issue.

I can describe its content at least as a statement the these are the first representatives of the people in postwar Lithuania to be elected in multiple-mandate, competitive elections. And therefore their authority should be valued and their participation in our work here in Vilnius at the session of the Supreme Soviet is desirable and expected. We are obviously thinking about whether they will have an advisory vote or the status of observers or advisers. But it is clear, and I hope you will not doubt this, that for our part we must make such a decision. What decision will be made in Moscow, of course, is not within our competence, just as it is the decision of each of these deputies whether or not to participate in the activity of the state organs of the Soviet Union.

We are just beginning to receive responses and other information about how the decrees we adopted yesterday are being received. And we have done what had to be done because this is what the people of Lithuania, our voters, wanted. There is a great deal of joy in Lithuania. It is understandable that the concerns we already know about still exist. Obviously moods of joy and hope prevail. We should like for this joy and hope along with concern to be transformed into moods of resolve and love of work, for it has been necessary in the past and will

be even more necessary in the future for everyone to work hard and patiently without counting on very good or rapid results in all areas and possible putting up with and knowing ahead of time that it will be necessary to experience both difficulties and adversities. But we have the main thing that inspires a person—we have hope and we have a future. It is understandable that in Lithuania there is and can continue to be a certain amount of dissatisfaction with what we have had to do and, possibly, disenchantment, fear, or doubt. All this is also a part of our life, our reality, which should not surprise any one of us.

We shall obviously receive official statements about how people are reacting to our steps in other places. So far from Moscow we have had only very laconic information from IZVESTIYA about the change of the state's name and seal, at least as far as I have seen. Perhaps this is all they had managed to obtain by the time they went to press. Possibly certain information has not reached me yet. This evening and this morning I received certain telephone information and congratulations—from abroad, of course, from the Lithuanians of the world and their organizations. One piece of information I received on the telephone was taken from a statement by White House press spokesman Marlin Fitzwater, which was conveyed by the REUTER agency. Here is an excerpt from the announcement: The United States calls on the Soviet state to respect the will of the citizens of Lithuania. We, that is, the United States of America, have consistently supported the inalienable right of the people of the Baltic states to peaceful self-determination. We call for the Soviet Government to express its concerns and interests through direct, constructive negotiations with the Lithuanian Government. Fitzwater also called on the Government of Lithuania to pay attention to the national minorities in Lithuania. This has been done before this appeal and will continue to be done. And in conclusion it says: Washington is convinced that a peaceful solution to this problem of Lithuania will serve the interests of Lithuania, the Soviet Union, and the countries of the Helsinki Accords.

I can also read a statement from the Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that was dictated on the telephone and immediately translated into Lithuanian. This information was conveyed by the Australian mass media: Australia calls for the Soviet Union to recognize the newly elected parliament of Lithuania and not to create any obstacles that will lead to a confrontation. Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Gareth Evans announced in Canberra that Australia recognizes the resolution of the freely elected parliament of Lithuania. Recognizing that this is a significant step in the reforms of Eastern Europe which have taken place as a result of the actions of the Soviet Union, the minister calls for arranging full-fledged negotiations between the two countries.

Senator Evans says that these negotiations should lead to complete and actual economic and political independence of Lithuania.

Other information received on the telephone from various countries shows that the television channels and the world press are filled with reports on yesterday's events in Lithuania and the decisions we made. Today the French minister of foreign affairs is receiving the recognized Lithuanian diplomat, Stasis Bachkis, and his son, the chairman of the Lithuanian community in France, to discuss the Lithuanian question. Possibly at this meeting a letter will also be turned over to the president of France, Francois Mitterand. This is a letter that was signed some time ago by the former—for he himself wanted to emphasize this—Lithuanian minister of foreign affairs, Yuozas Urbshis, and myself as the chairman of the sejm of Sajudis of Lithuania. As you can see, certain steps, including steps of Lithuanian diplomacy, were taken abroad ahead of time. Mr. Stasis Lizoraytis has recently spent entire days in the U.S. State Department and the White House and obviously contributed a great deal to the formation of a good opinion toward us as well as favorable comments. We very much respect such people about whose activity we know at the present time and we thank them, and also the people about whose work on behalf of recognition of Lithuanian rights we have not yet learned or cannot say anything concrete today.

Allow me to conclude the introduction to today's meeting with this while at the same time appealing to the citizens of Lithuania. I wish to thank them for their support, solidarity, and confidence and for everything that has enabled us all to be here and do what we have done. This is also the beginning of our work. A good beginning, as they say, is half the job. Although it would be extremely optimistic to think that we had already done half of our work. This is only a conventional use of the folk saying. But we do indeed have a good beginning, and Lithuania's position, as we can see from these responses, has already changed. Now it is important for us to justify what we have begun. Thank you for your attention.

Lithuanian Law on Press, Media Issued

90US0634B Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 18 Feb 90 pp 1-2

[Lithuanian SSR Law on the Press and Other Mass Media]

[Text] **I. General Provisions**

Article 1. Freedom of the Press

Citizens of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] have the right to free and unhindered expression of their views and opinions and to the dissemination of information through the press and other mass news media, and to obtain through them objective information on any matter of state and public life.

The mass media are free and not subject to censorship. Interference in their activity connected with the preparation and dissemination of information is not permitted.

Article 2. The Mass Media

In accordance with this law, mass media is understood to mean newspapers, journals, books, releases, and other periodicals, and also onetime publications issued in a print run of over 100 copies and intended for public dissemination, and also television and radio broadcasts, newsreels, press agency reports, audiovisual recordings and programs prepared and disseminated by official, political, and public organizations, public movements of the republic, and also by citizens of the Lithuanian SSR.

The mass media are represented by publishers, press, and television and radio broadcasting editorial offices and editors, and also by press agencies, publishing houses and other establishments engaged in the production and dissemination of mass information.

A mass medium may be a legal entity.

This law does not regulate social relations that come about upon the promulgation of legislative instruments, instruments of organs of state power, and administration and departmental law-making instruments.

Article 3. Basic Principles of the Activity of the Mass Media

The mass media freely prepare and disseminate information. They are guided in their activity by the principles of humanism, equality, tolerance, respect for man, and other values common to all mankind; they promote the development of democracy and glasnost, and also the progress of society and the state.

Article 4. Right To Obtain Information

Official, political and public organizations and public movements and their leaders make available to the mass media the requisite information, except for information not subject to publication in accordance with Article 6 of this law.

Information is made available in the official language of the Lithuanian SSR or in another language acceptable to both parties.

Article 5. Language of the Mass Media

Mass media on the territory of the republic prepare and disseminate information in Lithuanian and, if necessary, in other languages. The mass media are obliged to comply with legislative instruments regulating use of the official language of the Lithuanian SSR and to display concern for its culture.

The national minorities are guaranteed in the procedure determined by law the right to obtain, prepare, and disseminate information in their native language.

Article 6. Information Not Subject to Publication

The divulging by the mass media of official secrets, the list of which is determined by the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers, is not permitted. The government may also determine other curbs necessary to protect the interests of the republic and citizens' rights.

Information containing propaganda of war, violence, and national and religious enmity is not to be published, nor is the dissemination of pornographic publications allowed.

The disclosure of information on an individual's private life without his consent is not permitted, except for information determined by a court of law.

Data of a pretrial investigation is not to be published without the written authorization of the prosecutor, investigator or person conducting the investigation. The publication of material violating the presumption of innocence or anticipating the court's ruling is not permitted during coverage of trial proceedings.

II. Establishment of a Mass Medium and the Suspension and Termination of its Activity

Article 7. Right To Establish a Mass Medium

The right to establish a mass medium is enjoyed by official, political, and public organizations, public movements, artistic unions, scientific societies, religious, cooperative and other organizations, and also by adult citizens of the Lithuanian SSR resident on the territory of the republic.

The publisher may at any time terminate and reorganize the activity of a mass medium.

Article 8. Registration of a Mass Medium

A mass medium is registered within 1 month following the submittal of an application to the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers or an organization it designates.

The application to establish a mass medium specifies:
1) the publisher (organization, movement, citizen);
2) the name and location of the mass medium and also the language in which information will be disseminated;
3) the purposes of the mass medium;
4) the territory on which it is proposed disseminating the bulk of the product of the mass medium;
5) the periodicity and size of the publication.

An official impost is levied for the application to establish a mass medium in an amount determined by the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers.

Following registration of the mass medium, the publisher is issued a certificate on the establishment of the mass medium.

The right of the publisher of the mass medium to embark on his activity lasts for one year following receipt of the

certificate. The appearance of the publication is communicated within a period of three days to the organization that registered the mass medium.

Obligatory copies of publications are sent to libraries and other establishments in the procedure determined by the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers.

Article 9. Publishing Activity Not Subject to Registration

The mass media are not subject to registration if the publishing activity is undertaken by organs of state power and administration for the publication of rules of law and also other material essential for their work.

Activity pertaining to the preparation of a product not intended for public dissemination is not subject to registration.

Article 10. Denial of Registration

Refusal to register a mass medium is possible if:
1) the application has not been submitted in compliance with the requirements stipulated by articles 7 and 8 of this law;
2) false information is given in the application;
3) the person has a previous conviction in the form of imprisonment for a serious premeditated crime;
4) the person is incapable;
5) a mass medium of the same name is already registered and operates on the same territory;
6) the official impost for the application is not paid.

In the event of a refusal to register a mass medium, the applicant is notified of this in writing within five days with reasons for the refusal given.

Article 11. Suspension of Activity

Following the dissemination of the information specified in Article 6 of this law which is not to be published, the activity of a mass medium may be suspended, that is, one or several issues of the publication are banned, and also a directive concerning the temporary suspension of a television or radio program is issued.

The organization that registered the mass medium has the right to suspend its activity for a period of up to one month. Suspension of the activity should ensue in not more than three days following the dissemination of the information.

A break in the activity of a mass medium for a period of not more than one year is possible.

Article 12. Termination of Activity

Termination of the activity of a mass medium by the organization registered it is possible in the event of:

1) systematic violation of this law and the warning of the publisher in this connection three times within the space of a year. The organization that registered the mass medium has the right to issue a warning in connection with violation of the law. Suspension of its activity is considered a warning;

2) a flagrant violation of this law, which has entailed or could have entailed serious consequences;

3) inactivity on the part of the mass medium for a year.

A mass medium is deemed to have terminated its activity unless the publisher lodges within 10 days in a court of law an appeal against the decision to terminate its activity. Otherwise activity is considered terminated as of the day the court's ruling takes legal effect.

Resumption of the terminated activity of a mass medium is possible only in accordance with the procedure determined by articles 7 and 8 of this law.

Article 13. Appeal

A refusal to register a mass medium and also a ruling on the suspension or termination of its activity may be appealed by the publisher in a court of law within 10 days.

Recognition of these rulings as unlawful entails restitution by the organization that issued them of the material losses incurred by the mass medium.

III. Organization of the Activity of the Mass Media

Article 14. Production and Financial Activity

The production and financial activity of the mass media is regulated by laws of the Lithuanian SSR.

Article 15. Leadership of the Mass Media

Leadership of a mass medium is exercised by the publisher or a person he appoints.

Each periodical publication must have an editor. Only a citizen of the Lithuanian SSR may be such. The editor is appointed and dismissed by the publisher in accordance with labor legislation of the Lithuanian SSR.

Article 16. The Editor and the Mass Medium

The mass medium realizes the publisher's program on the basis of independence. Economic, financial, and other relations between the publisher and the mass medium are regulated by an agreement between them.

Article 17. The Editor and the Editorial Office (Editorial Board)

The procedure for the formation and the authority of the editorial office (editorial board) are determined by regulations governing the editorial office.

The editorial office is led by the editor, who is responsible for preventing a breach of this law.

Article 18. Preparation and Use of Publications

The mass media study and publish at their discretion letters and other works they receive. Journalistic material, works of fiction and poetry, and scientific works are used in observance of copyright laws.

Article 19. A Publication's Title-Page Information

Each printed publication must contain the following information:
1) the name of the publication;
2) the publisher (organization and citizen's first and last name);
3) the language of the publication;
4) the sequential number and date of the publication;
5) the price;
6) the address of the editorial office;
7) number of the certificate of establishment of the mass medium;
8) the editor.

The publication must also indicate other information of the official standard.

Television and radio stations give their name, and also the first and last name of the person presenting the broadcast.

Article 20. Dissemination of Mass Information

A product of a mass medium is disseminated by the publisher, official or public organizations, and citizens in accordance with an agreement concluded with the publisher.

An unregistered mass medium is prohibited from preparing and disseminating a product.

Reproducing or disseminating published printed or other information is authorized only in the event of this not violating the rights and legitimate interests of the author and publisher. Reproduced information must specify the source from which it was reproduced, the executor, and the date and place (address) of its reproduction.

Article 21. Official Communications

Official communications of the organs of state power and administration are published by the official mass media free of charge and within the timeframe they specify.

The mass media are also obliged to publish free of charge rulings of the courts and decisions of the state arbitration tribunal subject to publication.

Article 22. Suspension of Dissemination

Given the presence in a publication of information not to be published, in accordance with Article 6 of this law, the dissemination of this publication is suspended by the organization that registered the mass medium.

The mass medium has a right to appeal this decision in a court of law, which examines the case within five days.

In the event of the court finding the suspension of dissemination unjustified, the organization that made this decision is obliged to compensate the mass medium for material losses incurred by the suspension.

Article 23. Storage of Published Information

The editorial offices of television and radio broadcasting are obliged to store transcripts of information for no less than six months following the day of disclosure of this information.

A publisher is obliged to keep copies of publications that have been released for no less than one year following the day their dissemination was begun.

Article 24. Repudiation

Official, political, and public organizations, public movements, and persons have the right to repudiate information made public through the mass media which does not correspond to reality and which offends their honor and dignity.

The repudiation must clearly specify the information not conforming to reality and the date and place of its publication.

The mass medium is obliged to immediately publish in the press or to disseminate the repudiation by other methods, unless it has proof that the published information corresponds to reality.

In the event of the mass medium refusing to repudiate the disseminated information, a person or organization has the right to demand the repudiation of this information through the court, unless the mass medium has proof that it corresponds to reality.

The mass medium may decline to repudiate the disseminated information in the event that:
1) it is proposed repudiating facts determined by a finding or sentence of a court which has taken legal effect;
2) information for whose dissemination the mass medium is not responsible, on the basis of Article 34 of this law, is being repudiated;
3) the information has already been repudiated in the procedure determined by this law.

Article 25. Secrecy of the Information Source

A mass medium is not obliged to reveal the source of information and does not have the right to divulge the first and last name of the person who has made the information available without the consent of this person.

The source of information may be revealed only at the demand of the investigating authorities or a court of law if this is essential for the investigation and examination of cases.

IV. Rights and Duties of the Journalist

Article 26. The Journalist

By journalist this law understands a person engaged in the gathering, creation, editing, or other preparation of material for a mass medium that has concluded a contract of employment with him, or who is engaged in such activity on the authorization of a mass medium, or is a member of the Journalists Union.

Article 27. Rights of the Journalist

The journalist has the right:
1) to gather and publish information;
2) to refuse to prepare and publish material of his that is contrary to his beliefs;
3) to remove his signature from material he has submitted when its content has been distorted in the editorial preparation process;
4) to make recordings, with the use of audiovisual equipment and filming and photographing included, and also to record information by other methods.

Preventing a journalist from performing his professional duties is not allowed.

Article 28. Refusal To Make Information Available

A refusal to make information available on the part of official, political, and public organizations, and of public movements and their leaders is possible only in the event of it not being subject to publication in accordance with Article 6 of this law. The refusal is presented to a representative of the mass medium in writing within a three-day period, with specification of the reasons for the refusal.

Article 29. Appeal Against a Refusal To Make Information Available

An appeal may be lodged against a refusal to make information available with a higher official or a court of law.

Article 30. Duties of the Journalist

A journalist working in a mass medium is obliged:

1) to present reliable information;

2) to authorize a pronouncement made for the first time at the request of the person who made the information available;

3) to obtain the consent of a person or his legitimate representatives to the dissemination through a mass medium of information about his private life. Consent is not required in the event of it being necessary to protect the rights and legitimate interests of the state, society, and also persons;

4) to notify the editor of the limits beyond which disseminated information could represent the disclosure of an official or other secret protected by law;

5) to refuse to carry out an assignment given him by the editor if it is connected with violation of the law;

6) to respect the rights and legitimate interests of persons and official and public organizations, and to comply with the rules of professional ethics.

Article 31. Accreditation

Following coordination with official, political, and public organizations, and public movements the mass media may accredit their journalists with them.

The journalist participates in sessions, meetings, and other activities of the organization that has accredited him, and is provided with stenographic reports, minutes, and other documents in the procedure determined by this organization.

Journalists of the mass media of other states are accredited with the Lithuanian SSR Foreign Ministry. The Lithuanian SSR Foreign Ministry may terminate the accreditation of these journalists if they violate the constitution and laws of the Lithuanian SSR, systematically prepare and disseminate disinformation about the life of Lithuania, or harm its interests.

V. Responsibility for Violation of the Law on the Press and Other Mass Media

Article 32. Principles of Responsibility

Responsibility for the preparation and dissemination of the product of an unregistered mass medium, breaking the secrecy of a source of information, impeding a journalist in the performance of his professional duties, refusing to make information available to a journalist, disseminating information not conforming to reality, offending an individual's honor and dignity, and publishing official or other secrets protected by law is borne by the persons guilty of this in accordance with legislation of the Lithuanian SSR.

Article 33. Restitution for Moral Damage

Moral damage caused a person as a result of the dissemination by a mass medium of information about a person's private life without his consent or which fails to correspond to reality and offends an individual's honor and dignity is compensated by the mass medium in accordance with a ruling by a court of law.

The amount of the compensation for moral (exemplary) damages is determined by the court, but the sum total must in each individual case not exceed R30,000.

Article 34. Exemption From Responsibility

Publishers, editors, journalists, and authors of the mass media are not responsible for the dissemination of information not conforming to reality if this information:

1) is present in official documents, in communications of organs of state power and administration, in political and public organizations, and in public movements;

2) is a verbatim reproduction of public speeches;

3) has been obtained from other press agencies.

VI. International Cooperation in the Sphere of Mass Information

Article 35. International Treaties and Agreements

The international cooperation of the mass media is regulated by treaties and agreements concluded by the mass media, professional journalist organizations, and other artistic unions of the Lithuanian SSR.

If an international treaty or agreement has determined rules different from those contained in this law, the rules of the international treaty or agreement are applied.

[Signed] A. Brazauskas, chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.
L. Sabutis, secretary of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Vilnius, 9 February 1990.

Kaliningrad First Secretary Views Lithuania

90UN1407A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 4 Apr 90 p 2

[R. Motskus report: "And Tomorrow?..."]

[Text] In general the situation both within the republic and about the republic has become dramatic, the president's appeal states. And if we do not listen to the voice of reason now the consequences for all of us may be serious. We must be united in our desire to prevent this.

Yes, we must listen to the voice of reason. And the hotheads in the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet have disregarded subsequent dialogue. And so, time and again we must return to the idea of a republic referendum, considering that a law on this has already been passed by the previous Supreme Soviet. In this tense and unpredictable situation the inhabitants of the republic and party and public figures are also recalling the fact that some time ago, before the elections to the Supreme Soviet, the question of presidential power in the republic was on the agenda. But at that time the deputies postponed the problem for the future, until after a new Constitution was adopted. One would think that, this having been decided, things would be much calmer today in Lithuania.

"Why have you acted so unreasonably with Brazauskas, forcing him into the political background?" This was the first question I was asked by workers at the "Rossiya" hospital when I was filling out the documents for admission there.

In fact, observing the work of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet does lead to the thought that there is a certain "air embolism" in individual new-fledged politicians. Drunk with power, they are making one mistake after another. And the sanctity of the goal—freedom, independence, sovereignty—does not offer a pretext for this, but on the contrary, demands well-considered actions and a respectful attitude toward political partners and individual groups in the population.

And so not only for those people with whom I spoke in Moscow but also for hundreds of thousands of Lithuanians it seems that if A. Brazauskas, a staid and realistic man, were at the wheel today things would not have become so extreme. One of the reasons for today's situation, apart from anything else, must be the futility (thanks to the efforts of some central departments) of the law on economic independence.

This is how the first secretary of the CPSU Kaliningrad Oblast Committee, Yu. Semenov, assesses the events in Lithuania:

"Of course, it is not only the people of Kaliningrad who are alarmed about everything that is happening in Lithuania. It is a question of the present and future of our motherland, the renewed Federation, and the fate of perestroyka in general. But the events in the Lithuanian SSR are affecting the inhabitants of our oblast in a most direct way. Various relations of many years' standing link us with this republic. Suffice it to say that we obtain from Lithuania 80 percent of our electric power. The oblast's transport facilities and communications with other parts of the country run through Lithuania.

"At the same time I would like to emphasize that no matter what the situation that may have taken shape, we have been and remain neighbors of Lithuania and each of us should do everything possible to maintain normal, and I would say civilized relations. I draw your attention to the fact that the resolution of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies does not cast any doubt on the constitutional right of the Lithuanian people, and, of course, all other peoples, to self-determination, right up to the question of secession from the USSR. This is not the point. The point is how to resolve this issue not in hurry and haste, since the organs of power, in this case the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, do express the aspirations of the people and reflect their will..."

Lithuanian Council on Kaliningrad Formed

90UN1352A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 14 Mar 90 p 4

[Interview with Vytautas Shilas, chairman of the public council on Little Lithuania under the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, by R. Grumadayte, ELTA correspondent, under the rubric "Club of Interesting Meetings": "Help for Little Lithuania"]

[Text] **Little Lithuania [Malaya Litva] is the homeland of the first Lithuanian books and the region which preserved the language in difficult times for Lithuania and which nurtured a host of cultural and scientific public figures.... Two centuries later the time has come for big Lithuania to pay its debt to the little one. In the southern part of Little Lithuania, where Kaliningrad Oblast was formed after the war, it is difficult for the 20,000 Lithuanians to preserve the Lithuanian spirit when, in the absence of its true**

master, the monuments that are so valuable for the culture and the history of our people are disappearing.

Recently a public council on Little Lithuania was created under the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium. The council included representatives of various societies and organizations and people concerned with the fate of this historic region. Vitautas Shilas, its chairman and a construction engineer at the Vilnius radio component factory, shares his thoughts about the responsibilities of the council.

[Shilas] The council includes people of various professions who had a previous interest in Little Lithuania and know the region well, as well as people's deputies and public figures. We have created several commissions to manage matters that we consider to be important. They are the commissions on the restoration of cultural monuments, on perpetuating the memory of public figures of Little Lithuania, on the creation of Lithuanian schools and kindergartens, on an investigation into genocide, etc. In the near future we plan to restore the home of Vidunas and an ethnic Lithuanian country estate—the first ethnic museum in Tilzit (Sovetsk)—as well as the Roman Catholic church in Valtarkemis (Olkhovatka) where the talented poet Merkelis Shvoba, the linguist Pilipas Ruygis, and Iogann Iordann, who preserved the manuscript of K. Donelaytis' "Of the Seasons," all worked. The poet himself gave services there. One more Roman Catholic church awaits the restorers in the settlement of Pabechyay (Romanov) close by the Baltic Sea, where Abel Villi, founder of the Prussian literature, was abbot at one time. We raised the question of establishing a monument to Gerkus Mantas at the place of his death in the settlement of Narkichyay (Mezhdurechye) and to Martinas Mazhvidas in Ragayn (Neman), and of setting up a memorial plaque to Ionas Bretkunas, one of the forefathers of Lithuanian literature, in Labgub (Polessk). In Konigsberg (Kaliningrad) a search will be conducted for the grave of folklorist Lyudvikas Reza and a monument in his honor will be erected.

[Grumadayte] And how do the authorities in the neighboring republic view this?

[Shilas] Before the council was created we established ties with the Kaliningrad Party Oblast Committee and its executive committee. On the whole we agreed to cooperate in the sphere of culture and decided to sign an agreement, although we felt some uncertainty and distrust of those with whom we were talking. We discussed many questions with local Lithuanians, and we are thinking of creating a center of Lithuanian culture which will become a gathering place for our fellow countrymen, and they can acquaint the residents of these places more broadly with the history of this region and all of Lithuania. For the time being there are difficulties with the creation of a Lithuanian school. It is not so simple to come to an agreement with the rayon leadership, and as before they sent us to the center, in Kaliningrad. Nonetheless, people have begun to understand our causes better.

The residents of Kaliningrad have received the news about the creation of a council on Little Lithuania guardedly, even with some apprehension. But they need to be understood, too. The people who have migrated here from the rest of the country say that the history of this region began in 1946.

[Grumadayte] There are doubts as to whether the restored churches and monuments, which are alien to the local population, will last long...

[Shilas] There is by no means enough information in Russian about the past of the oblast, and our good intentions are not always understood here. For instance, the Kaliningrad book concern refused to distribute the publication "Prominent People of Little Lithuania," citing its high price.

By the way, the cultural environment in Kaliningrad Oblast is also gradually changing. There is talk of changing the names of Kaliningrad and Sovetsk. There are teacher-enthusiasts who are showing interest in the past of Little Lithuania. When a garden was planted to memorialize K. Donelaytis, a large group of students from Gumbine (Gusev) traveled here to help. Kaliningrad University also sent us a request to prepare an explanatory dictionary of place- names, and it is a pity that our linguists did not respond to that wish.

[Grumadayte] You do not seem to have any problems with the northern part of Little Lithuania—the Klaipeda region.

[Shilas] After the war the residents of these places were exiled or emigrated to the West themselves. With the change in circumstances they want to return. We are trying to help them regain the property they lost. The neglected churches that are used for other purposes concern us, as do the cemeteries of Lithuanians that are falling into ruin—there is no one to look after them. In June in the Klaipeda region we plan to take action to care for the cemeteries.

We have many causes and concerns. Help Little Lithuania, everyone who can.

Baltic News Agencies Start Joint Bureau

LD0504190690 Moscow TASS in English 1844 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Riga April 5 TASS—The telegraph agencies of the three Soviet Baltic republics—Latvia (LETA), Lithuania (ELTA) and Estonia (ETA) today signed a treaty to establish a joint information bureau BALTIJA.

The bureau will prepare, exchange and spread printed information and photos inside and outside the Baltic region.

The bureau's establishment has been prompted by the desire to ensure a prompt coverage of all the major events in the region and transmit them to all the organisations concerned.

Although BALTIJA plans to specialise in short reports, it is also ready to dispatch to the mass media expanded materials, commentaries and photo information.

BALTIJA says that one of its main principles is to spread materials that are not influenced by any party, organisation or public movement.

A resolution to rename the information agency under the Latvian Council of Ministers (LATINFORM) into the Latvian Telegraph Agency (LETA) was spread in Riga today.

Paper on Rebirth of Baltic Military Structures

LD1204064590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0455 GMT 12 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 12 Apr (TASS)—"The recreation of militarized structures that existed in the bourgeois republics of the Baltic region is far from being rumor. An example of this is the rebirth of the unfortunately well-known organization of Kaytseliiyt [Defense Union] in Estonia," writes the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA newspaper today.

The newspaper recalls this nationalist militarized formation got its name in November 1918, although in fact it was founded a year earlier, when, frightened by the extent of the revolutionary movement in Russia, the Estonian bourgeoise created in Tallinn the voluntary nationalist organization of "Omakaytse" [Self-Defense].

In 1921 the organization was liquidated as it was not wanted. Already three years later, in December 1924, in connection with the popular insurrection that flared up in Tallinn, "Kaytseliiyt" was restored and its members took an active part in putting down the revolutionary movement in Estonia. Surviving until June 1940, it showed itself to be a most well-organized and active formation. The officer corps of "Kaytseliiyt" was made up of officers of the Estonian Army hostile to the Soviet Union, many of whom took part directly in fighting with the Red Army at the dawning of Soviet power.

Many former members of "Kaytseliiyt" joined the military-fascist organization of "Omakaytse" that was created during the German occupation of Estonia and which was of significant service to the Hitlerite Army.

Today "Kaytseliiyt" is being reborn from the ashes and an active process is underway to form its renewed structure. Moreover, at a number of meetings of supporters of the organization, it was stressed that the main task of "Kaytseliiyt" will be "to ensure the security of citizens of Estonia, first and foremost in rural localities, and to train officer cadres for future national forces of self-defense of an independent Estonia. "There too one heard the idea that "Kaytseliiyt" must "train Estonians for active self- defense, including with weapons in their hands."

Understandably, writes the newspaper, the recreation of "Kaytseliiyt" cannot be viewed outside the context of events not straightforward in nature, that are taking place in the Estonian SSR. It organically blends with the plans of separatist-minded forces and is supported and encouraged by them in every way. Evidently some people here are impatient to switch from parliamentary discussion to more resolute actions, concludes the article.

Estonians Appeal to Gorbachev for Independence

AU1204105790 Paris AFP in English 1034 GMT 12 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 12 (AFP)—The Estonian parliament has issued an appeal to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev calling for "justice" to be done and the Baltic republic to regain its independence, local journalists said Thursday.

The appeal, to be published Friday by all Estonian newspapers, reaffirms the local Supreme Soviet (parliament) decision of March 30 which declared the state under foreign occupation and Soviet control illegal. The parliament also proclaimed the restoration in law of the former state—independent from 1920 to 1940—and ruled that the republic now entered into "a period of transition" prior to the formation of new institutions which would take over from Soviet- imposed ones.

The parliament in Tallinn said that a return to democracy and creation of a state of law in the Soviet Union could only come about once injustices done to the Baltic state had been repaired and when Moscow agreed to stand by the 1920 treaty recognizing Lithuania's sovereignty, according to an unofficial translation of part of the message by journalists at the Estonian news agency.

Meanwhile, the parliament has called on local authorities in the republic not to assist with the drafting of Estonian conscripts into the Soviet Armed Forces. The next military call-up for all parts of the Soviet Union is to go ahead on April 15.

In an unrelated protest at Tallinn International Airport, air traffic controllers have called a two-hour warning strike for Sunday to protest work conditions and safety standards, journalists also said. Tallinn airport is served by the Scandinavian SAS and Finnair airlines.

TASS Reports Estonia's Military Service Laws

LD1204132990 Moscow TASS in English 1304 GMT 12 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryam]

[Text] Tallinn April 12 TASS—The Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic has declared service by Estonian citizens in the Soviet Armed Forces "illegal".

The law on service by Estonian citizens in the USSR Armed Forces during the transition period, adopted by the Estonian parliament on Wednesday evening, repeals

articles in the republican criminal code on punishment of draft dodgers and exonerates those convicted for this.

The transition period "to form constitutional bodies for Estonia's state power" was declared on March 30 by a decision on "the state status of Estonia" by the Supreme Soviet, which proclaimed as "illegal" the Soviet Union's state power in the republic.

This decision provoked protests among non-indigenous Estonian citizens. They make up about 40 per cent of the Estonian population and live in its north-eastern part. Local soviets (councils) in some cities of this region have not recognised the decision.

The adoption of the republican law on military service after conscription has begun, prods hundreds of youths to violate the Soviet law on universal military service and the USSR Constitution.

Deputy Chairwoman Mariu Lauristin explained at the session that the law grants the right to Estonian citizens to choose, since the military service will be voluntary.

However, far from all members of parliament share her opinion, since the law's preamble describes the illegality of Estonian citizens' service in the Soviet Army.

Nikolay Zakharov, a representative of the Estonian north-eastern region, called the act "another unrealisable law". He told TASS that most deputies to the Kohtla-Jarve city soviet had decided not to recognise it on the city's territory after reading the bill.

Earlier, the Supreme Soviet adopted the law on "Labour Service in the Estonian Republic". According to the law, young people in Estonia who cannot serve due to valid reasons, are granted the right to work at economic projects for a specified period of time.

The session decided to extend the period of registration for those desiring to serve on an alternative basis until May 15.

Estonian legislators adopted an address to President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Estonia Adopts Law on Army Service

LD1104201190 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1700 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [The idea] of [the Estonian Supreme Soviet] adopting a resolution—a kind of interim solution—was abandoned and the focus came upon the second reading of the law on Estonian SSR inhabitants in the USSR Armed Forces during the transition period. By the end of the working day the law was also adopted. Seventy-one people's deputies were in favor, three were against, and four abstained. Twenty-two [words indistinct] group of deputies did not participate.

The main contents of this law are: Those articles in the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Criminal Code which deal with matters related to the Army are annulled—in essence this means that Army service will be declared to be voluntary; those who have been found guilty on established grounds will be rehabilitated; thirdly, an end is declared to participation of Estonian SSR organizations and establishments in the forced conscription of the population into the Soviet Army, as being an activity not in keeping with the status of Estonia as a state. Fourthly, it will be established that it is prohibited to demand inhabitants' military registration documents as and when they are registered at an address or leaving an address and when implementing other citizens' rights. Fifthly, it is established that the rules for the Estonian SSR [word indistinct] serving in the USSR Armed Forces, in active service, and (?methods) of release will be determined by the Estonian SSR government in coordination with the USSR Council of Ministers [passage indistinct]. Sixthly, the deadline for registration into labor service [alternative military service] will be extended up until 15 [passage indistinct]. And finally, the present law will come into effect upon its adoption. [passage omitted]

Article Describes Rise of Estonian Popular Front

PM0604164090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 14, 3-9 Apr pp 28-30

[Oleg Yanitsky article: "A New Force Is Born"]

[Text] How did the Popular Front win the wide support, and how was it born? In the spectrum of the country's public organizations, among which the Popular Fronts are counted by the dozen, the one in Estonia, as I came to be convinced, is the most salient example of the social changes under way in this country, the changes we have not yet fully realized.

From a public movement to a political party

A void does not give birth to anything. The fabric of the totalitarian regime had—it transpires, some niches for the buds of civil society, which were yet to burst. For some time they went into hybernation, yet spiritual and public life sizzled on in universities, scientific institutions and in artistic guilds. In a country where free thinking was ruthlessly persecuted everywhere, Estonia remained a "hotbed of tension." Which is why in 1987 the hybernation was abruptly cut short and transformed into a powerful wave of public protest following the routine move taken by Moscow to develop phosphorous deposits in the very heart of the republic.

The well-organized intellectuals helped channel unrest into more constructive directions, hammering out the concept of Estonia's self-accounting and self-financing programme that came to be called IME. This was the second stage in forming the Popular Front. Initiated by a handful of professionals, it quickly spread to the grassroots level, engulfing masses of people in its work. Unlike the previous unhappy patterns of social development implying the party's upper hand in decision-making, the Front worked on the first scientifically

thought-out model of a future Estonia. The third and most important stage of the Front's formation followed the events of February 1988 in Tartu, which exposed the utter inability of the local authorities to control the situation (but for the common sense and patience on the part of the organizers of the students' mass rally it might very well have repeated the tragedy of Tbilisi).

The congress of Estonia's Popular Front was held in the autumn of 1988. It endorsed the Charter of the Front and its Action Programme. To follow the programme the Front is a political public movement based on popular initiative, aimed at profoundly changing the socialist society on the principles of democracy and humanism. The movement aims at realizing the will of the people through democratically elected representative bodies and public control over the activities of the state bodies of power."

Shortly after that the Front showed teeth by sending a petition signed by over 900,000 people protesting the law on constitutional amendments.

The republic's Popular Front was driven by the personalities behind it, their unquestionable authority and personal influence, their zeal and courage. It also has a very wide social base in all layers of society, represented by "support groups," regional and city branches and thousands upon thousands of people sympathetic to its activities. Finally what attracts people to it is the problems it is trying to solve—central to the future of Estonia, and its values.

January through August of 1989 was marked by coordinating activities between the public movements of all Baltic republics. In May of that year the Baltic Assembly was held, bringing together representatives of the Estonian Popular Front, Latvia's Popular Front and Lithuania's Sejm of the movement Sajudis. Among the themes which won universal approvement were the right of every nation to live on the territory historically belonging to it, to self-determination and a free choice of political status, the right to preserve and develop national culture and folklore, the freedom of economic management, ensuring the nation's social and cultural entity, as well as the freedom to exercise fully civil rights and maintain cultural self-management in every national and ethnic community.

What now? The republic has several political parties: the Social Democratic Independence Party, the Estonian Democratic Workers' party, Estonia's National Independence Party, Estonia's Christian Alliance, etc. Public movements Interfront, the United Council of Work Collectives, Estonia's Society for the Protection of Historic Monuments exist side by side with these. Committees of Estonia's Citizens are also gaining momentum, their membership soaring to 500,000. These unite citizens of the Estonian Republic that existed in 1918 through 1940, and their descendants. Against this increasingly diverse background support for Estonia's Popular Front shrunk somewhat, yet it swept 45 percent of the vote in recent elections to local bodies of power. In their election campaign, members of the Front centered around the stage- by-stage transition from the sovereign republic to the status of a sovereign state, and eventually to that of a neutral state "in demilitarized neutral Baltoscandia."

The Popular Front is no longer acting independently, it has reached out into most of the state and public organizations. Hardo Aasmae, for instance, was elected Mayor of Tallinn. The Front's members have gained valuable practical experience of independent activities in conditions of shaping up economic and political pluralism. It was the birth of the Popular Front and the organizations like it, including the ones opposing the Front, that have in effect drastically changed the inner structure of society in the republic.

Potential for the movement

The Front now has a tremendous potential - moral, intellecutal, informational, political, organizational, as well as material, financial and human. It also has breathing space.

"The Popular Front seeks to ensure the spiritual cleansing of society and the rebirth of moral virtues, like honesty, good will, conscience, honour, a feeling of shame, of justice, of sacredness and compassion based on the freedom of the individual." There have not been many documents which have stated moral values with this precision. In place of the vague and unclear goals of "all-round development" or "the consolidation of all progressive forces" (who would avow to being a reactionary?), the Front has come out with a whole package of vital objectives to secure: the preservation of nation's integrity on its historical territory, the sovereignty of the republic, the freedom of the people to make decisions independently, without outside interference, the creation of ecologically clean industries - in a word, the goals of the nation's survival and its development. We started out with technical priorities (like speedy development of science and technology), the Estonians - with the shattering of ideological stereotypes and exposing the truth about the nation's history. We have in fact, surrendered to Pamyat the cause of spiritual renewal of the Russian people, their social awareness, while the Popular Front in Estonia has done all it could to awaken Estonians. We tried to introduce democracy "from above," and the leaders of the Front started from the grass-roots level, tackling local problems and teaching common people to act and think independently.

To get the feel of the intellecutal potential of the organization, one has to look at "the founding fathers" of the movement - a group of university graduates specializing in humanities. Yet Russia wasn't running short of great minds either, particularly critical ones. The idea is to have the kind of people who have the necessary knowledge potential, i.e., a clear idea of possible scenarios for the evolution of socio-political situations into political actions.

The powerful intellectual drive behind public movements in Estonia has been nurtured for centuries in its schools of free thinking and creativity. The University of Tartu is perhaps the best example of this kind, the thinktank for the Popular Front, which continues to turn out experts who act as advisers for the Popular Front. Some other educational institutions can be mentioned as well.

Vestnik, the organization's publication, had been started five months prior to official recognition of the organization itself. It immediately became the prime vehicle for the circulation of information at all levels of society, the task which was considerably helped by the decentralized method of its publication. Simultaneously with Vestnik there appeared a public opinion monitoring service Mainor. On top of that, the Popular Front saw to it that it got maximum support and publicity in the local press. Instead of signing up for the grand-scale but ineffective "public discussions" of proposed legislation, members of the Front use sociological studies to get a representative sampling of public opinion, and the disposition of social forces in the republic. Last but not least, there are these endless political debates and discussions between the leaders of the Front and their supporters and adversaries alike. The professionalism in creating an information network was thus further augmented by the tremendous moral weight of the movement itself, since only trust can generate truthful information.

The political potential is usually described as a combination of tactical moves, which helps outplay one's adversary, win over to your side those who hesitate, and neutralize one's opponents. I think it also implies vision, which the leaders of the Popular Front undoubtedly have (planning everything at leat two steps ahead of their opponents) and a decentralized structure of the movement. Vision is based on professionalism and a good knowledge of sociology, while the structure of the Front is firmly rooted in independent local groups. Both are helped a great deal by adequate information.

The material and financial potential of the Front is not the subject of my attention here. Suffice it to mention that the organization was never indiscriminate in accepting donations and other material help from organizations or individuals. Allow me also to remind you that the Front is an independent organization, which is not responsible to either the government or any public institutions.

Human resources is something I am utterly unable to accept as an idea. The Popular Front is first and foremost a movement of individuals that has nothing to do with the all too familiar "campaigns" and "mottos." It is based on contacts between groups of like-minded individuals, and on face-to-face contacts. So this kind of "reserve" is, in fact, the self-governing society for decades destroyed and suppressed in this country. It is no surprise therefore that what seemed like a disorganized splintered mass of people ysterday may well turn out to be a united public movement tomorow.

Yet another resource—unfailing and accessible to all public organizations—is openness. The headquarters of the Popular Front and the local fronts hold their doors open to each and everybody who come for advice, consultation, or literature. The first edition of Vestnik carried home addresses and office and home phone numbers of all the leaders of the Front, as well as its commissions and services.

Shortly before departure from Tallinn I called one of the members of the Board of Directors of the Front, who is in charge of finance. After introduction I asked if it would be possible to get access to some figures and documents. "Look at that," I could hear the readers saying, "calling people by phone and asking for this sort of information." "If you are in a rush," said the voice on the other end of the line, "I can give them to you now. Get a pen ready and write down: Donations from industrial enterprises and individuals totalled.... Proceeds from the sale of post cards in support of 'the Baltic Chain' stand at...." I was caught off guard: as simple as that! And they were talking to someone they did not know at all!

Returning to Moscow, I decided on an experiment: I called the accounting department of a public organization of which I have been a member for 25 years now. I introduced myself and heard the indignant: "What? What do you want? We don't give out information, all the more so by phone."

Prognosis for 1990

What is the present position of the leaders of the Front? Kostel Gerndorf: "The time of flag-waving has long since passed... Practical problems of our life have comme to the fore." Lembit Koik: "The Popular Front has fulfilled its task. The forces of renewal in Estonia are coming together." Mati Hint: "A coalition of all national and democratic forces is building up in Estonia." Ulo Kaevats: "Estonia will have a multiparty system." Henn Latt: "The extreme radicals will lose their social base."

Sociologists provide factual backup for these assessments. Mati Heidmets: "The Popular Front has taken on another dimension. Up to now it has been a middle-of-the-road organization." Remaining by and large a mainstream movement even now, the Front, as well as society, has undergone some radical change. Public opinion polls suggest a gradual coming together of the Estonians and the Russian- speaking part of the population, a movement away from confrontation to acceptance by the Russians of the movement's values and obejctives. We have to focus on the general democratic nature of our organization." Marju Lauristin: "We will be inwardly free next year. We will be very close to a free democratic society.."

What they all seem to agree upon is that the public movement is entering a new stage in its development. A movement born of popular initiative is now a key force in the process of radical social change in Estonia. The

movement is not opposing this change, but is transforming it from within, destroying the command-adminstrative system. The movement is also changing, bringing forward new political parties and associations that form a civil society.

Latvian Information Agency Renamed

LD0504165990 Moscow TASS in English 1639 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Riga April 5 TASS—The Latvian Council of Ministers has adopted a decree, renaming the Information Agency at the Latvian Council of Ministers (LATINFORM). It is now called the Latvian News Agency (LETA).

Interfront Official Discusses Latvian Congress

PM1104150190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 10 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[Article by I. Lopatin, chairman of the International Front of Working People of the Latvian SSR Council: "The 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress Through the Eyes of a Delegate: Choice of Future"]

[Text] The 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress' two days of work, which were filled with passionate, sometimes implacable discussion, excitement, and reflection, are behind us. But it seems to me that the congress is continuing its work—but now in the primary party organizations, the labor collectives, and no doubt simply within the fold of the families of inhabitants of the republic too, for society today is consumed by politics and everyone is concerned by the most pressing and vital question: Whither Latvia?

It was clear at the congress from the very outset that it mirrored the political and social situation occurring in the Baltic republics, including Latvia.

There were 798 communists, representing diverse standpoints on events, elected to the congress. The congress witnessed an acute struggle between the supporters of CPSU unity and perestroyka based on renewing the federation of the Soviet Union, and the champions of an "independent" Latvian Communist Party seeking Latvia's withdrawal from the USSR.

Delegates' speeches provided not just political assessments of the events in Latvia but also voiced sharp criticism of the republic leaders for omissions in their conduct of measures aimed at securing the republic's economic autonomy and of the CPSU Central Committee for its belated response and inadequate attention paid to events in the Baltic, although the CPSU Central Committee Politburo had already received alarming reports a year or more ago. Criticism was also leveled at B.K. Pugo, former head of the republic party organization, present candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and chairman of the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee, who in his own speech endorsed such an assessment of his activity in the republic.

The Interfront of Working People of Latvia was inundated with telephone calls immediately after the congress. Everyone wanted to know how we regarded the criticism or, more accurately, the description given of the International Front in the report. The following was literally said of us: "The International Front of Working People of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and the formations politically affiliated to it, for example, the United Front, the Council of Labor Collectives, and several associations of war and reserve veterans belong, as they do in other parts of the Soviet Union, to conservative organizations of a left-wing orientation in our republic." The work of consolidating society carried out by those organizations is thus dismissed with a single stroke of the pen.

To be honest, the assessment contained in the report was no surprise to us. I will go further: Knowing the Central Committee secretaries' position, we expected nothing else. We have grown accustomed to being vigorously portrayed as "enemies of the nation," conservatives, and all but the adversaries of democracy. I think that a fitting rebuke was given at the congress to J. Vagris, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, by A. Alekseyev, chairman of the Interfront republic council presidium.

The most dramatic moment of the congress came at the end of the first day of work, when A. Cepanis, deputy chairman of the republic Council of Ministers and, incidentally, one of the leaders of the "independents," after requesting a couple of minutes to speak, stated that they may agree to consolidate the party, but only if the majority of congress delegates agree to the idea of withdrawing Latvia from the USSR and the Communist Party from the CPSU. We were faced with the question of whether to continue to try to cling to a sham unity or to actively demarcate ourselves from antisocialist forces. It was time to make a choice and, I think, every communist felt in his every cell the weight of responsibility: It was the choice of the destiny, the future of Latvia.

I will say quite frankly that I spent a difficult, sleepless night. We rang one another, consulted, argued, and reflected. On the one hand, a split would weaken the party, but, on the other hand, we tried to tell ourselves that a "surgical operation" was simply essential at this stage of the disease.

And communists made their choice. The next day, when debate started, an overwhelming majority of speeches voiced the congress delegates' resolve to maintain unity with the CPSU and keep Latvia within the USSR. A section of the delegates, 236 in number, then left the session. And yet this does not betoken, in our estimation, a split in the Latvian Communist Party, because the delegates who left represented positions alien to the

Communist Party. The grouping which has just broken away will hencefc th assume the title communist, although they will be attempting to hold their own constituent congress on 14 April. Some communists have been duped by the demagogic speeches of the leaders of this grouping of "independents." And there is the hope that some of them will return to our ranks, particularly as the congress has left its doors open for this. In particular, places have been reserved in the Central Committee. In our view, the positive thing in this event is the fact that the party is in fact cleansing itself of those who dislike perestroyka in a renewed federation, the socialist option, and CPSU unity.

Those who left the congress included people who did so in practice to escape party accountability for their activity or inactivity aimed at worsening the political and economic situation in the republic. These included I. Kezbers, ideological secretary of the Central Committee; V.-E. Bresis, chairman of the republic Council of Ministers; and A. Cepanis, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, who also headed the group of "independents."

A number of important documents were adopted during the work of the congress. In particular, a resolution on the political report in which the former Central Committee's activity was adjudged unsatisfactory. USSR Deputy A. Rubiks, former chairman of the Riga Gorispolkom [City Soviet Executive Committee], was elected first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee.

The situation in the republic remains tense. Under pressure from Sajudis, which acutely needs to create a united front in the Baltic very soon, aimed at withdrawing Latvia from the USSR, republic separatist forces will take the decision to speed up events and proclaim the restoration of Latvian independance and its withdrawal from the USSR at a so-called congress of Latvian citizens, which they plan to hold in the very near future.

Communists' feelings are mixed. Those who support the CPSU position have taken heart and acquired greater confidence and optimism. Those who support frankly separatist positions, however, have an ill-tempered, even hostile reaction. We sense this time and again through the telephone calls we receive, most of which are anonymous. We are not used to threats. Some of the "independent" communists are confused, that too is felt. According to my observations, a split, a demarcation of forces, is also taking place within the group that left the congress. The most radical people insist upon the new party's complete independence, some would like to be independent but "on the Gorbachev platform," while a third and final group which has said neither yes nor no has gone back to consult with communists at local level. Yes, a time for deep reflection is upon us.

Further on Split of Latvian Communists Reported

PM0904210990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Irina Litvinova report under the rubric "Direct Line": "Latvian Communist Party Split"]

[Text] Riga—On Saturday evening A. Cepanis, deputy chairman of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, announced that supporters of the independent Latvian Communist Party were leaving the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress session.

The day before, on behalf of the independents, A. Cepanis had read out the four points which were to determine whether further dialogue was possible. The points varied in significance. For example, one of them, which asserts the need for different forms of ownership (including private ownership) to ensure society's normal development, has prompted no particular contradictions. But is it really possible to reach a compromise on the point which announced the party's political objective to be "a socially fair, democratically open society in an independent, rule-of-law Latvian state which must be a subject of international law?" After all, some communists conceive of the republic only as an independent state, while others see Latvia's future as lying only within the USSR.

Assembled in another part of the Political Education Center, the independents adopted as their basis the draft program and statute which were rejected by the majority, and agreed to continue preparations for their own congress, scheduled for 14 April.

The work of the congress continued with two-thirds of the delegates. The first secretary of the Central Committee was elected by direct secret ballot. He is Alfreds Rubiks, USSR people's deputy and republic people's deputy. The election of the new Central Committee and adoption of documents took all night. The congress resolution deems the work of the previous Central Committee and Bureau unsatisfactory. None of the previous Central Committee secretaries were elected to the new Central Committee. The congress decided to break off its work, discuss the statute and program documents in primary party organizations, and continue work when the 28th CPSU Congress is over.

The resolution "On the Status of the Renewed Latvian Communist Party" says that it "rejects any monopoly on power, ownership, and ideas and is in favor of democratic, reformist methods for resolving social problems. Together with other sociopolitical organizations and movements and through communists in soviets and other social organs, it will take part in the management of state and social affairs in the republic."

The answer to the main political question in the republic—whether it is to be part of the USSR or outside it—is given in the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress address to republic people's deputies, communists, and all working people. The Latvian Communist Party, it

says, is in favor of restoring the republic's real sovereignty within the USSR on the basis of a new Union Treaty and wants full power in decisions concerning questions of state building.

A plenum of the new Central Committee will be held this week, at which secretaries will be elected.

Latvian Plenum To Resolve Organizational Matters

LD1204061390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0330 GMT 12 Apr 90

[Text] The first plenum of the new Latvian Communist Party Central Committee is set for today. It is proposed to resolve organizational matters. Secretaries of the Central Committee and of its Buro will be elected and chiefs of departments will be appointed. Places are reserved in the new composition of the Central Committee for representatives of those rayons whose delegates left the congress. I will remind you that almost a third of delegates who supported the idea of creating an independent party left the Latvian Communist Party Congress. Comrade Rubiks, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, thinks that for the time being one should not call this a split but only a disagreement that needs resolving or settling.

Independent Latvian CP Congress Agenda Detailed

LD1104205390 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1310 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] In three days time, on 14 April, the congress of the adherents of the Independent Latvian Communist Party will convene in Riga. Yesterday the last sitting of the committee for organizing preparations for this congress took place with the participation of representatives of delegations of rayons and towns. Decisions were made on several questions connected with the congress. The main thing which many republic inhabitants are interested in now is what will take place at this congress.

The departure of the 263 adherents of independence from the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress has not received an unequivocal assessment. The present leaders of the Latvian CPSU branch have taken a stand against the ideas of independence and the party's democratization. Therefore they have denied rooms to the organizers of the congress of adherents of independence at the House of Political Education.

It will take place at the large hall of the Latvian University. The congress will begin at 1000 [0600 GMT]. The registration of delegates will begin at 0800.

A large majority of delegates have been selected at party organizations, but the organizing committee of the congress decided to also recognize the mandates of those delegates to the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress who tried at that congress to take a stand to establish an independent party, but, as we know, they did not succeed. Besides the delegates, there will also be several of the 600 members who in the future, want to become participants in the Independent Latvian Communist Party and have filled in registration cards.

It will be proposed to the congress delegates on the agenda that they examine the present political situation in the Latvian Communist Party, evaluate its historical activity, and to lay down the party's status in order to adopt a corresponding party program and rules and form the central leadership.

It is envisaged to recommend to the delegates to elect the party's chairman, two secretaries, a central committee composed of 73 participants, and the party's board with 11-13 members. Half of the central committee will be elected by party members at their organizations. At many places those representatives have already been chosen.

It is planned to also recommend for discussion several resolutions on the attitude toward the decisions of the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress to form their reconciliation commission.

Likewise, future relations with the CPSU Central Committee will be examined.

RSFSR

Russian Christian Democratic Leader Interviewed

LD0904225490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2005 GMT 9 Apr 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Yesterday, many of you perhaps saw on the "Vremya" program a report on the constituent assembly of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement. Today's report develops that theme.

[Begin recording] [D. Kiselev] The constituent meeting of the new political party in our country, the Russian Christian Democratic Movement, continued its work in Moscow today. Our viewers who watched yesterday's report on the constituent meeting of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement have wondered what sort of relationship you have with the Pamyat society.

[V. Aksyushits] I regard myself as a Russian patriot, but I have a negative attitude toward Pamyat, as toward all forms of nationalist extremism.

[Kiselev] I have in mind not your own personal attitude, but the attitude of your movement, of your political party which is being created now.

[Aksyushits] Without a doubt, what I said relates both to our movement and to our political party. All my friends and supporters share the same point of view. [video continues to show this interview, but the reporter's voice is heard in a voice-over]

[Kiselev] I will remind you that the Russian Christian Democratic Movement is against any kind of official

dialogue in society, in favor of parliamentary democracy and a legal state, in favor of the independence of the mass media, a professional army, jury service, the restoration of the historical names of cities and streets, and also the return of Russian symbols, including the flag, coat of arms, and anthem. [video shows close-up of lapel badge worn by Aksyushits showing Russian imperial colors]

Today, the clergyman Vyacheslav Polosin and our conversation partner Viktor Aksyushtis were today cochairmen of the party. [end recording]

Democratic Russia 'Association' Described

LD0804211290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0945 GMT 8 Apr 90

[Report by Lev Aksenov, TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 8 April TASS—" 'Democratic Russia' is not a political party, nor an organization with a rigid structure, but an association of people's deputies of the Russian Federation. We have set it up for joint, coordinated work at the Congress of People's Deputies and at the Russian parliament." This is how Mikhail Bocharov, deputy, formulated the essence of the new bloc set up by a group of members of the top legislative organ of power of Russia, the largest [krupneyshey] Soviet Union republic.

Actually, the foundation of "Democratic Russia" at this precise time is, to a certain extent, a formality. This association grew up in various regions of Russia in the course of the recent election campaign. Communists and non-Party members, representatives of the working class and the intelligentsia, servicemen and cultural figures, have united under its banner. "We see the point of our activity in the struggle for transformation for the good of man," Nikolay Travkin, deputy, said of the aim of the association.

In the course of two days the members of this bloc have been discussing issues of its organization, tactics, and strategy in Moscow. In the next few days a second meeting will take place at which documents of "Democratic Russia" and a platform for the forthcoming May Russian Federation Congress of People's Deputies will be adopted.

Mikhail Bocharov, one of the originators of the bloc and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, spoke of the significance of the experience which he and his parliamentary colleagues, having also now received republican mandates, can hand on to less experienced colleagues. "We want to avoid the mistakes made in the course of preparation for the first USSR Congress of People's Deputies, he said. "Democratic Russia" has already set up a number of working groups whose members are preparing our proposals for the agenda and standing orders of the congress, on the economic program, and changes to the Russian Constitution."

The impression from the recent two-day meeting is, speaking honestly, ambiguous. Obviously, the "Democratic Russia" members are people politicized to a high degree and have not yet cooled from heated preelection fights. But "street politics" [mitingovaya borba] is one thing, and the development of a clearly defined position which should serve as the foundation of precise, balanced, and painstaking parliamentary work is another. Here, initially, the absence of the necessary political experience among the vast majority of members of the bloc cannot fail to be a factor. But, it is known that experience is something that can be achieved. Several hundred Russian people's deputies, united in "Democratic Russia" are amassing it. And the main thing is that they believe that they are capable of achieving their aim of creating a powerful and flourishing Russia, a sovereign state in the union of equal sovereign states.

Moscow Factions Clash at Press Conference

PM1204101390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 11 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "What Form Will the Moscow Soviet Take? Press Conference by the Organizational Committee for the Preparation of the First Session of the New Convocation"]

[Text] "Democratic Russia," "Moscow," "Independent Deputies," and "Fathe land." These are the names of the four blocs of deputies which make up the capital's substantially renewed supreme body of state power.

How will this distribution of forces affect the future activity of the capital's parliament?

The draft agenda of the forthcoming session already includes almost 20 different items which deputies consider to be extremely important. The issues proposed for discussion include the election of the capital's mayor and his deputies and matters concerned with forming the city soviet's committees, commissions, and executive committee.

"As far as the executive committee apparatus is concerned, it would be rash, given the present difficult situation in the city, to radically renew the collective of the executive committee, in which a considerable number of skilled specialists now work. Nevertheless, some personnel changes and structural amendments will be made," V. Shakhnovskiy, one of the organizational committee's deputy chairmen, explained to journalists.

Journalists were given a graphic answer to the question of how the work of the Moscow Soviet could be affected by the diversity of stances taken by its deputies: In the course of the meeting, representatives of the deputy "factions" constantly engaged in mutual recriminations and made complaints against each other and against some of the mass media. According to I. Krugovykh, another deputy chairman of the organizational committee, and spokesman for the "Independent Deputies"

group, this kind of situation is typical of the organizational committee's working sessions.

Well now, however much various deputies spoke of the proximity of their approaches to solving various of the capital's problems, they were unable to conceal one depressing fact from those present: Judging by its first meeting with representatives of television, radio, and the press, the present Moscow Soviet could, under certain circumstances, change from being a place where the city's various problems must be efficiently resolved and become an arena for political skirmishes and campaigns.

Surely the capital's deputies are not going to repeat the dismal experience of their Leningrad colleagues who, instead of discussing the city's urgent problems at their session, have spent a whole week trying to wrest the television center from the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting?...

Rally for Refugees in Moscow Oblast Held

PM1004115990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 8 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[N. Garifullina report: "Appeal on Behalf of Refugees"]

[Text] "Esteemed Comrades, this is an appeal from those who for many years lived side by side with you and who were forced to leave their native lands. We appeal to your reason: Do not behave in a manner which will make children and grandchildren curse you. Stop before it is too late. While sympathies and friendship toward the Azerbaijani people are alive in our hearts, we will do everything possible to prevent a black shadow from settling on our relations." These lines are taken from an appeal issued by participants in an authorized rally in defense of Russian-speaking refugees which was held at the Luzhniki Central Stadium yesterday. The rally was organized by the "Rossiya" social center's Committee for Russian Refugees and the Public Fund in aid of Russian refugees of the "United Council of Russia" association. The aim of the rally was to draw public attention to the plight of more than 600,000 refugees forced to flee from their homes and give up their jobs as a result of the ethnic strife kindled by extremists. Their problems are not being resolved. Their stay in Moscow Oblast boarding houses, health centers, and pioneer camps is coming to an end. What next? How are they to live? These questions now confront every family, and there is no answer to them. This is what the refugees who addressed the rally spoke about.

The rally participants adopted an appeal to President M.S. Gorbachev of the USSR and a resolution setting out their demands. Here are some of them: It is necessary to establish a Union-republic committee for refugee affairs with immediate effect; until the fundamental problems of the refugees have been resolved, it is necessary to settle the question of their accommodation or to revoke the decision on evicting them from temporary accommodation in boarding houses, health resorts, and so forth. It was decided to send the resolution with signatures collected at the rally to the Third Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Interior Minister Discusses Crime Statistics

LD1204025790 Moscow TASS in English 2127 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 12 TASS—Over the first three months of this year, more than 371,000 crimes were recorded in the Russian Federation, or 16.8 per cent more than in the similar period of last year.

Just as in the country as a whole, the growth of crime included mainly thefts of state and public property, frauds, hold-ups, willful murders and assassination attempts.

In all, 127,682 people who committed criminal offences were identified over the period. These mirthless statistics were given at the first briefing in the Russian Federation's Interior Ministry today.

Republican Interior Minister Vasiliy Trushin emphasised at the briefing that the criminogenic situation in Russia remains complex. Like before, a growth of crime against personal, state and public property as well as against the life and health of citizens is observed.

The number of grave crimes grows faster than that of all crimes- - grave crimes account for 68,766 out of the total number of registered crimes, Trushin said.

Particular concern is aroused by unceasing increase in the number of crimes committed by organised groups, Trushin emphasised.

Currently alone, investigators in the republic deal with cases of about 400 such groups.

Nevertheless these cases in the main are connected with the activities of members of the lower and medium echelons of organised crime, he said.

As far as the higher echelon of organised crime is concerned, there still remain many complexities in efforts to combat it, Trushin said.

As a rule, the personel of law-enforcement agencies have to encounter a situation when the leaders of criminal groups are not directly involved in the commission of crimes but are only a kind of "think tank" to prepare them.

At the same time, paradoxically as it may seem, the country's legislation does not envisage a punishment for the leaders of criminal gangs for masterminding crimes, the minister emphasised.

Trushin also touched upon the problem of refugees that keep arriving in the republic's territory in view of developments in the "hot spots" of the country.

According to the Russian Federation's Interior Ministry, he said, there are already 120,000 refugees in the towns and villages of the republic.

This number includes only those who have officially completed passport registration formalities at the places of their new residence. Naturally, in actual fact, the number of refugees is much larger, Trushin said.

Leningrad Soviet Opens With Procedural Problems

PM1104151590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Vladimir Nevelskiy report under "Direct Line" rubric: "Leningrad City Soviet Session: A Difficult Beginning"]

[Text] Leningrad—A motion to halt direct television broadcasting from the Leningrad City Soviet was one that was put to the vote 9 April: The people's elected representatives were being presented to viewers in too unfavorable a light.

The motion fell. But the problem still remains acute. The new Leningrad Soviet is having a difficult birth as far as organization is concerned. There are endless debates on every point. A typical example was the reference back twice to plenary sessions of the discussion of different versions of provisional standing orders for the session. And the fact that the debate had to be halted twice because the participants were unable to proceed further than the second item.

Nevertheless, we must not draw hasty conclusions about the young Leningrad Soviet's lack of productivity. In fact the deputies' main activity is going on in sections and working groups, which are putting in some solid work on proposals for the City Soviet's structure, the deputies' commissions and committees, and rules for the composition of the leading organs.

The session adopted an appeal to City Soviet Executive Committee personnel and to all Leningraders to show patience and not precipitate events.

Novosibirsk Academics Begin Economic Think Tank

PM0304150790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Andrey Illarionov report under the "Direct Link" rubric: "Independent Economic Analysis Institute"]

[Text] Novosibirsk—A constituent assembly of academics, practicing economists, sociologists, and production workers in Akademgorodok has laid the foundations for a new social organization.

Those present agreed that widespread ideas about economic and social processes in our society and sometimes even the decisions of planning and other organs are based on an incorrect idea of the real state of affairs. This has been caused by the rapid and sometimes unpredictable changes in the situation. Official scientific and economic institutions are overworked with planning tasks and are too conservative to note in good time and correctly assess the rapid changes in society.

The new social institute is designed to remedy the shortage of timely and sufficiently accurate analysis. Its plans include elaborating economic methods to research the black economy, means of assessing the actual amount of incomplete construction work, methods of bringing it into national economic circulation, and other plans.

It would be naive to expect such urgent and complex work to be carried out gratis. That is why the institute is counting on financial help from sponsors. As the initiators see it, this work should not be carried out to any one organization's orders. The results of independent economic analysis should be accessible to all who want to familiarize themselves with them. The new social institute can be contacted through the editorial office at the magazine EKO.

Hasty Decision on Solovyev's Expulsion Revoked

PM0904141190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Vladimir Nevelskiy report under the rubric "Direct Line. IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "...The Mercedes Is To Go Back. Leningrad CPSU Obkom Bureau Has Waived Its Decision on Yu.F. Solovyev"]

[Text] Leningrad—At the beginning of February newspapers, including IZVESTIYA, reported that the Leningrad CPSU Obkom [Oblast Committee] Bureau had expelled Yu.F. Solovyev, former CPSU obkom first secretary, member of the CPSU Central Committee, and personal pensioner of Union status, from the party for "manifest indiscretions and violation of the norms of party ethics." The reason for this decision was the fact that Yu.F. Solovyev had bought a Mercedes car at a commission store—a fact unearthed by television.

Comrade Solovyev's expulsion from the party provoked mixed reactions within the city. In particular, some communists objected to such a strict punishment. Returning to the question now, the CPSU Obkom Bureau has deemed it necessary to waive its former decision and reinstate Yu.F. Solovyev in the party since the Leningrad Prosecutor's Office failed to establish any breach of legal norms when checking out the circumstances of the car purchase. Solovyev has been told to return the Mercedes to the commission store.

This is what A. Kirsanov, chairman of the CPSU Obkom Party Control Commission said:

"There were no breaches of the law. The norms of party ethics were violated because the car was bought without waiting in line. People are on the waiting list for foreign cars for many years. I cleave to the following opinion (I voiced it at the bureau): Yu.F. Solovyev committed a heinous act, but he has been punished too severely.

Everything happened in a rush, at a time when we should have conducted a thorough investigation into everything."

Irkutsk Obkom Plenum on 'Nationalist Forces'

PM0504092590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[Correspondent V. Yermolayev report under the general heading: "Heed the Voice of Reason"]

[Text] An enlarged CPSU oblast committee plenum was held in Irkutsk yesterday. While recognizing the Lithuanian people's right to self-determination and to accelerate economic, social, and cultural progress, its participants emphasized that it is possible to achieve these aims only by strictly observing USSR legislation and taking account of the interests both of Lithuania and of other Union republics. We have a common responsibility for the fate of socialism and peace.

However, Siberians point out with alarm and pain, we are seeing increasingly clearly that separatist, nationalist forces are striving to remove from the Lithuanians' consciousness their sense of belonging to the united family of Soviet peoples. Misinterpreting the slogan of sovereignty, these political intriguers are virtually seeking self-isolation, aloofness, and the rupture of the Balts' economic and spiritual ties with other republics and are shamelessly slandering the policy of the CPSU and the USSR.

The events taking place in Lithuania arouse profound concern and alarm among communists and all working people of the Angara region. Siberians still believe that the people of that republic will display prudence and restraint during difficult days and will firmly tell the political intriguers who deceived them with false and not disinterested promises and who are doomed by history to bankruptcy: "No to political recklessness and separatism!"

Sakhalin Koreans Form Cultural Association

PM0604093590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Yuriy Balakirev: "Association of Sakhalin Koreans Created"]

[Text] Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk—A constituent conference of the Association of Sakhalin Koreans has been held in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. The association's board has been elected and its statute and program discussed.

The first settlers from the Korean peninsula did not come to Sakhalin voluntarily. In the thirties and during World War II they were brought to the island by the Japanese to work on the construction of military establishments, at felling areas, and in mines. For various reasons a considerable proportion of the immigrants settled here after the war, putting out deep roots in the island soil. Today the Sakhalin section of the Korean diaspora numbers over 35,000 people. A newspaper is published and there are radio broadcasts in Korean. A Korean cultural center and the "Chesen" youth center, meaning "Resurrection," are in operation.

"We elected Kim Mi Un, director of the Korean cultural center, as chairman of the association. He is a communist and a Korean Sakhalin inhabitant: He was born and studied here," says Sun Dyun Mo, member of the board and editor of the Korean-language newspaper. "The association will promote the resurrection of national traditions and coordinate all the work of Korean unions on Sakhalin."

Volgograd Party Obkom Apparatus Reorganized

PM1004122590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Valeriy Kornev under the rubric "Direct Line: IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "Obkom Without Departments and Instructors"]

[Text] Volgograd—Henceforth there will be no departments in the Volgograd CPSU Obkom [oblast committee] and the instructor posts which have existed for decades are also being abolished.

The demand to review the old structure geared to the administrative-edict method of work was heard at the recent oblast party conference. A commission was formed which generalized the proposals of the primary organizations and a broad circle of communists.

What did they take as their point of departure in the reorganization, what did they abandon, and what are they seeking? I put this question to A. Anipkin, first secretary of the party obkom.

"First of all," he replied, "we were seeking to assert the supremacy of the elected organ over the apparatus. We abandoned ossified forms preventing the democratization of work and relations in the party. Here we set one more aim—making do with a smaller number and reducing the apparatus. As a result the number of apparatus workers has been reduced by one-third.

"The basis of the new structure consists of three commissions approved at the plenum, which have been joined by party obkom members. They are the commission for questions of organizational-party and cadres work, the ideological commission, and the commission for questions of socioeconomic policy. Their chairmen are obkom secretaries. In each commission there are a further two full-time workers—the deputy chairman and the responsible secretary. The apparatus is assigned the role of an executive organ under the party obkom bureau and commissions.

"In this connection the functions of its workers are changing. For instance, there will be consultants, sociologists, and abstractors. And the task of one sector, for instance, is to analyze and predict political situations.

"The staff of the working apparatus and other commissions is now being formed on the same principle."

Vladivostok, Maritime Kray Soviets Meet

PM1104155190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Yuriy Balakirev under the rubric "Direct Line; IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "Debates Were Stormy"]

[Text] The first sessions of the Vladivostok City and Maritime Kray Soviets of the new convocation have broken off their work.

At city level, after nearly a week of debates, the soviet chairman had still not been elected while at kray level the formation of committees and commissions had not been completed.

There were many differences on procedural issues and sharp criticism. The targets were the "apparatus" in general and the local party apparatus in particular. Nonetheless A. Volyntsev, first secretary of the party kraykom [kray committee], was elected chairman of the kray soviet of people's deputies. Answering a query from those taking part in the session, he stated his intention to resign from his party post. Incidentally, this year Volyntsev also became an RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] deputy, winning in the same Artemovskiy Okrug where he was defeated a year ago at elections of USSR people's deputies. The trust shown by the voters undoubtedly played its part. After all, the chairman of the kray soviet was elected from five candidates.

After stormy debates and refusals to accept nomination, six contenders for the post of krayispolkom [kray soviet executive committee] chairman came to the secret ballot stage. V. Kuznetsov, a 36-year-old candidate of economic sciences and deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Far Eastern Branch institute of economic and international problems of ocean development, was elected.

Immediately after the repeat elections which will be held in a number of RSFSR okrugs 22 April, the sessions of the city and kray soviets in Vladivostok will continue their work.

Udmurt Security Discovers Arms Manufacturers

LD1204030190 Moscow TASS in English 2128 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 12 TASS—The State Security Committee of the Udmurt Autonomous Republic has uncovered and stopped the criminal activities of a group of people who engaged in the manufacture of firing devices and who intended to sell them to taxi drivers and members of cooperatives.

Criminal proceedings have been instituted in connection with this fact.

Investigation is under way.

Baklanov, Ryabev on Ural Ecological Matters

LD1204041190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] Many Ural towns have turned into areas of ecological disaster. It is difficult to breath here, the water is polluted by effluents, harmful outflows. Some wonderful nature study corners, where nothing outwardly betokens a disaster, have become life threatening. Baklanov, CPSU Central Committee secretary, and Ryabev USSR Council of Ministers deputy chairman, and the heads of ministries and departments stayed in this troubled region for four days.

Together with the oblast leaders and public representatives they thoroughly studied the situation. The situation was complicated by the fact that the construction of the Yuzhno-Uralskaya nuclear electric power station, which a considerable part of the population believes will aggravate the situation, began here.

It has been decided to work out a complex program for improving conditions in the region. This program would envision returning polluted lands and reservoirs to economic use and building social, consumer, medical, and other facilities.

At the oblast party aktiv an exchange of opinions on the situation in the party and concerning the country's economy took place. The issues on the CPSU split, the transfer to a planned market economy, and problems of [currency] conversion occupied a special place in the conversation.

Mari ASSR Launches New Newspaper

LD1004094690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 10 Apr 90

[Text] Those who have been participating in the constituent congress of the democratic movement called Mari Ushem, meaning People's Union, are today dispersing from Yoshkar Ola. They were there to represent the 300,000 members of the Mari population living outside their own autonomous area in other parts of the country. During two days of intense work the movement's constituent congress adopted rules for the new union, ratified its platform, and elected leading bodies. It also legitimized publication of its own newspaper entitled NARODNYY KOLOKOL [People's Bell].

Western Republics

Western Border District Official Interviewed

PM0604095190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 3 Apr 90 p 4

[Interview with Yu.V. Babanskiy, member of the Military Council and chief of the USSR KGB Western Border District Political Directorate, by special correspondent V. Yunisov in Kiev; no date of interview given: "Do We Need the Border?"]

[Text] [Yunisov] Yuriy Vasilyevich, rumors about opening the border are circulating in the country. Is this true?

[Babanskiy] First, any question about the state border, no matter which state lies on the other side or what political system it has, is decided not by border guards but by legislative organs, by the country's government. Second, the present liberalization of passage and inspection procedures at our subunits does not in any way mean an opening of the border. Despite all this, our task is to guarantee the state's security and to ensure that the state border is crossed according to established procedures, in accordance with the law and existing rules and regulations which have been arrived at on the basis of mutual agreement between neighboring states.

[Yunisov] Back in the late seventies I served as a soldier on the Soviet-Norwegian border, and I knew even then that the USSR was known as an "iron curtain" country due to the protective barbed wire fence erected virtually all along the state border. The alarm system was activated every night and we had to "Take Up Arms!" or "Man the Posts!" several times each night, especially in spring, without, alas, catching any agents. It was, as a rule, elks and wolverines that were crossing the protective fence. You are, after all, perfectly well aware that agents in the nineties are not likely to take to the forests or fields. They would opt for a much smarter way to penetrate our territory. So, why do we need this protective fence, especially along the borders with socialist countries?

[Babanskiy] Let me answer your question with another question. Tell me, were there no border violations while you served along the border with Norway, a NATO country which, incidentally, does not extradite defectors? And especially across the alarmed fence?

[Yunisov] Of course there were. Mainly people escaping from our country to Norway. I do recall, however, some Norwegian fisherman crossing over from the other side with the intention of taking advantage of our free medical service to have his hernia cured. But with due respect, Yuriy Vasilyevich, why confuse what are two exceptionally different border lines?

[Babanskiy] Fair enough, I agree. The point is that the protective fence on borders with fraternal countries was erected during the "cold war" times, and it can be formally concluded that we fenced ourselves off from fraternal countries during the postwar years. Even at that time, however, the fence was installed not to prevent even a mouse crossing but to ensure that armed border guards did not have to patrol along the state border.

...Barbed wire fences are now being partially demolished along the border with European countries, which runs to about 4,000 km.

[Yunisov] Residents in border regions have evidently welcomed this event with joy?

[Babanskiy] Not quite. People's opinions differ. Some felt morally oppressed by the wall, others actually did not wish to see the protective fence come down. Certainly not for any political reasons. You may not believe this—it was for economic reasons. There are many places where the two-meter "barbed" fence protects subsidiary farm plots against damage by domestic livestock. Matters at times reach the point of absurdity.

[Yunisov] Is this partial demolition of the protective fence the only sign of democratization along the Western border?

[Babanskiy] No. Simplified border crossing procedures for residents of border regions to visit relatives are already firmly established in four Transcarpathian rayons—Hungary was the first country with which such agreement was reached. There has been a sharp reduction of the time it takes to obtain visas. Look at what used to happen: A relative "on the other side" would die and people would be notified by telegram but could not make it in time for the funeral. The same happened with weddings and celebrations. Simplified crossing points have been introduced virtually everywhere that it was possible. Whereas citizens were previously allowed to cross at railroad, airport, and highway checkpoints, now they can also cross at border guard unit posts [lineynaya zastava].

[Yunisov] But who performs this function there?

[Babanskiy] A new officer position—controller—has been introduced at border guard units especially for this purpose.

[Yunisov] Evidently events in East Europe and the expansion of cultural and economic contacts have made more work for border guards.

[Babanskiy] That is an understatement. In 1989, compared with 1988, there was a 170-fold increase in the number of citizens using simplified border crossing checkpoints. Specifically? From 20,000 to 3.5 million people. This is a lot, bearing in mind that our technical facilities are the same as before. I would like to single out this problem yet again, especially for the benefit of journalists who have recently been accusing border guards of rudeness and red tape. Yes, there are bottlenecks along our border, at railroad and highway crossings alike, bearing in mind the great workload of border checkpoint controllers. Nor should you discount the fact

that checkpoints were not prepared for the greater volume of passenger and transport crossings. Last year, our border district's checkpoints alone were used by more than 11 million people. In 1989, for example, Ukrainian branches of the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity performed foreign currency transactions for 890,000 persons, more than eight times the 1987 figure. It is strange and sad at the same time: It was border guards and customs officers who promoted the introduction of simplified crossing procedures for citizens, and yet the state did not increase our manpower. And so, long lines form at barriers and border post signs. People—exhausted by the long wait and exasperated by the minimum standards of comfort—as a rule make border guards the target of their dissatisfaction, as if it were all their fault. If there are no blank application forms—we are to blame; if there are no toilet or snack bar facilities at the checkpoints—we are again to blame. At times I fail to comprehend the fact that the customs service is at times confused with the service manned by guys in green caps [border guards]. Moreover, each and every one of us is perceived as the malevolent executor of orders by local "border guard bosses." Never mind that each and every border guard strives not to deviate in the least from the USSR Law "On the State Border" adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet. The law precisely defines the rights of border guards and of citizens crossing the border. Let me emphasize: We are unfairly reproached for having adopted some sort of "ferroconcrete" reticence and coldness in behavior.

Incidentally, if someone has any complaints about the content of the Law on the Border, he has the constitutional right to appeal to the Committee for Defense and State Security Questions, to give instructions to his people's deputy, and to submit specific proposals in this regard.

[Yunisov] Yuriy Vasilyevich, you spoke about the problems facing border guards as a result of democratization; you are—to use a lofty style—honorably performing your duty. But what are the results of the border guards' hard work?

[Babanskiy] Our state is now proposing new peace initiatives which, in their turn, have demanded the elaboration of a new defensive doctrine. In our sphere, this means a sharp simplification in the processing of documents giving the right to cross the border, and democratization of the border regime. But I do not know whether this will make our life easier, seeing that 3,400 violators were detained along the entire length of the state border last year alone. There were 9,000 cases of foreign fishing vessels attempting to fish in our territorial waters in breach of the law. The struggle against the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and valuables was sharply stepped up recently. As regards the Western Border District, I must say bluntly that things here are not as calm as we would like. Think of the misfortune that could have been caused by a thug from an international terrorist organization had he not been detained by our border guards at Kiev Airport. Or another case: Only recently Ensign A. Novikov from "Brest" Sector Checkpoint thwarted an attempt to smuggle a consignment of contraband into our country—almost 39 kg of pearls worth about R2 million in total.

[Yunisov] Is it possible to institute some sort of economic accountability in the customs and border guard services?

[Babanskiy] It actually used to exist at the dawn of Soviet power, when border guards came under the People's Commissariat for Finance.

[Yunisov] Nonetheless, Yuriy Vasilyevich—even though this is outside your province—what do you think of the possibility of opening the border with neighboring states?

[Babanskiy] I think that the consequences could be most unpredictable. Our country will become a hot spot on the geographical map for the marketing of drugs and weapons and for the export of any valuables still remaining here. I am sure that those who do not get on with the law—in other words those wishing to evade punishment for murder, violence, robbery, or foreign currency intrigues—will vanish abroad.

[Yunisov] What sort of people violate the border? Are such statistics kept in the border district?

[Babanskiy] We do not keep such statistics. We simply have no manpower for this. Our job is to detain, to identify, and to hand over to the administration of justice. As for categories... There is the category of people on the run from the law. There are sick people who yearn to begin their travels and their experience of the world by violating the border—and do so deliberately. All border guards know an individual down in the Crimea who has already made several attempts to escape abroad.

[Yunisov] Yuriy Vasilyevich, how badly did the border regions of neighboring states "suffer" in the economic sense when our citizens rushed over there?

[Babanskiy] You are asking the wrong person. On the basis of my personal knowledge, however, I can say that when crossing procedures for relatives divided by the state borders were simplified, our citizens "swept clean" the stores there. Consequently, the Hungarian State Bank, for example, reduced the amount of rubles that could be exchanged for forints from R30 to R10. Regular visitors from our country used to and still travel to Hungary for children's footwear, clothing, radio equipment, and chewing gum which they later resell at our markets.

[Yunisov] It is well known that Poles and Hungarians do not leave our country empty-handed, either. What I have in mind are their "excursions" to USSR border regions.

[Babanskiy] Be that as it may, it is we and the customs officers who bear the full load of this exchange of goods and mutually pleasurable visits. This is another case

when residents of border cities, villages, and settlements accuse us border guards when foodstuffs or industrial products vanish. We are in no position to ensure that goods are sold in these regions, as in Leningrad, only on presentation of passports. A serious problem. In any event, it is incumbent upon border guards to ensure the smooth passage of freight, transport, and people through checkpoints. To ensure that there is no breach of established treaties and contacts, that people cross the border in a good mood. After all, the meeting with a Soviet border guard is their first and last encounter on our soil. The way it is conducted will determine the mood in which people will return home.

I cannot comprehend certain provocative voices which speak against us. Let me answer them: For the time being we are unable to take a peaceable attitude toward what is happening along the border. Its protection means the protection of our society, of our economy, of our science. The state border must be reliably closed, and this is not at odds with what has been said at party forums and at the Congress of People's Deputies.

'Rukh' Excluding Communists From Enterprises

PM0604083390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[Correspondent V. Drozd "Rejoinder": "Truth Perforce"]

[Text] Lvov—When "Rukh's" [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka] primary links began to be created in labor collectives, its leaders gave all kinds of assurances that this was being done exclusively to determine the extent of the informal association's popularity. It was hard to credit such modest tasks, but for the time being "Rukh's" leaders were firmly keeping their intentions hidden behind "distracting speeches."

Their intentions first began to show themselves slightly when the "Rukhites" took to supplanting the primary party organizations at individual enterprises in the city of Drogobych in Lvov Oblast, as well as in Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast. In some places the "Rukhites" and Ukrainian Helsinki Union activists succeeded in extending these demands through collective contracts. It is naive to assume that the initiators of the removal of communists from the work environment did not know that they were acting against the law. They were pursuing a clear-cut aim: to subordinate working people of industrial enterprises and organizations totally to their will. And confirmation of this was not long in coming. At a recent rally in Lvov its organizers issued a directive to "Rukh's" grass-roots links: to assume special control over the fulfillment of orders for Lithuania...

Of course, there is nothing reprehensible about such a commission: It is a matter of honor for every labor collective and its social organizations to fulfill contract deliveries. But in this case the "Rukhites" exposed themselves: However hard they endeavored to claim to have no personal "interest" in labor collectives, they still failed to keep it under wraps. Political aims proved stronger than verbal camouflage. The penetration of the work environment, as well as the removal of communists from it, pursues one task—to occupy the place of the primary party organizations there. With all the resultant consequences. Is this not why the "Rukhites" are trying so persistently to remove communists from the Army, the militia, and the KGB? Well, "Rukh's" leaders have once again demonstrated that even a long lie will, perforce, tell the truth. However long and carefully it may have been disguised...

Kharkov Electoral Commission Resigns

PM1004105590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by Anatoliy Kleba under the rubric "Direct Line; IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "Electoral Commission Resigns"]

[Text] Kharkov—The okrug electoral commission of Radyanskiy Okrug No. 375 for the election of Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputies has announced that it is impossible to continue its work any further and has resigned.

Analyzing the figures for the election of a people's deputy of the republic, the commission uncovered gross violations of Article 50 of the Ukrainian SSR Law on Elections and noted incidents of exaggerated figures in counting votes for one of the candidates. The central electoral commission agreed with the Kharkov people's decision and has scheduled repeat elections in this okrug for late April.

"Pressure" on the principled commission has begun in Kharkov. Following leaflets from the supporters of V. Shcherbina, to whom an extra 1,187 votes were ascribed in just 22 precincts, the former contender for a deputy's seat himself joined the campaign. Then the oblast newspaper KRASNOYE ZNAMYA attacked representatives of the public of Dzerzhinskiy and Kiyevskiy Rayons who had observed the elections and put the question like this: "Do the voters have the right to entrust the repeat elections to the same commission?

The oblast soviet executive committee, which formed this commission, has adopted the stance of a neutral observer and kept quiet. Without receiving any support, the commission has noted that in this situation it cannot continue to fulfill its civic duty.

Report on Ecclesiastical Life in Western Ukraine

LD1104223790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2018 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] [Presenter Aleksey Gurnov] The situation lately in the Western Ukraine has been steadily deteriorating. Extremist-minded Catholics of the Eastern rite, pursuing mainly political aims, are trying to deadlock the work of the so-called quadrilateral commission for the regulation

of relations between members of the Orthodox Church and Greek Catholics in the western oblasts of the Ukraine.

Here is just one phrase from a topical interview with Metropolitan Filaret to Soviet television which demonstrates how serious the situation is:

[Begin Filaret video recording] We request the personal intervention of USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and of the supreme authorities of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to introduce rule of law and put a stop to the violence; to rescind the unlawful decision by the Lvov city soviet regarding the Cathedral of the Holy George and of the residence of the higher orders of clergy in Lvov; to return the churches seized by force; to ensure normal ecclesiastical life and to surmount the difficult problems which we have inherited from previous years. [end video recording]

Moldavian Peasants Form Civic Union

PM1004092190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by Eduard Kondratov under the rubric "Direct Line; IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "Peasants Union"]

[Text] Kishinev—A new mass public organization—the Moldavian Peasants Union—has been registered in the republic.

The charter of the new union says that it has arisen at the initiative of the peasants and other rural inhabitants to defend their rights and interests and to create normal living and working conditions. The Peasants' Union is vitally interested and intends to take part in the elaboration and adoption of republican laws on land use, land ownership, and the implementation of the peasant's right to possess land for his lifetime and to bequeath it.

The new public organization intends to involve itself resolutely in land use affairs which the state has so far managed. The union regards the return to rural inhabitants of the lands confiscated from them to be an important task. It will struggle to put to rights the use of the land allocated to horticultural fellowships.

Inasmuch as the problem of the rural population's employment is becoming increasingly urgent with every passing year, the Peasants Union will be concerned to create new jobs for rural inhabitants. It will start to create cooperatives and enterprises which will grow and process agricultural output directly on the spot and also produce construction materials from natural raw material and build apartment blocks for peasants.

Moldavian Youth Polled on Army Service

LD1204025490 Moscow TASS in English 2135 GMT 11 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Tkhorov]

[Text] Kishinev April 12 TASS—The Enlistment Office of Soviet Moldavia has undertaken a sociological survey of young people's attitudes to the forthcoming service in the Soviet Army.

The purpose of the survey was to identify drawbacks and lapses in preparing them for service in the country's Armed Forces. The poll involved 3,000 senior-form pupils of general educational and technical schools of the republic's capital and their parents.

Every fourth pre-conscription registrant voiced conviction that service in the Army accorded with his own aspirations. The majority of respondents said that they are impelled to serve in the Armed Forces by the awareness that this is the constitutional duty of the entire male population of the country.

However, more than 20 per cent of young people answered that they are far from rejoicing at the prospect of living in the barracks.

The sociological survey revealed young people's certain apprehensions about the forthcoming service in the Army. Less than a half of them consider themselves prepared for it physically. Only 17 per cent of young people hope that they will establish comradely relations with their future commanders.

Parents' attitude to the draft of their children into the Army varies, too. A third of respondents are convinced that active military duty may help their sons get physically conditioned and gain useful life experience. But about a half of parents adhere to the opposite point of view.

Commenting on the results of the sociological survey, Major General Viktor Nazarov, Moldavia's chief enlistment officer, pointed out that the survey helped determine first priority tasks in reorganising work with the pre-conscription registrants.

Emphasis will be laid on goals that are attractive to young people: their physical conditioning, the development of military applied sports, training in military professions that are useful in every-day life as well, Nazarov said.

He noted the negative impact being made on a certain proportion of young people by the ideas that are being spread of late about creating national military units in the republic or declaring the republic "demilitarized".

Nazarov confirmed that during the spring-time draft campaign there had already been several cases of refusal to serve in the country's armed forces for political reasons. In previous years cases of refusal to serve were isolated and were motivated by religious convictions.

Boycotts Block Moldavian Soviets' Activity

PM1104141790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Arkadiy Pasechnik dispatch: "Politics: Life or Game?"]

[Text] Kishinev—...Last fall I overheard a conversation on a suburban bus between the driver and his friend:

"I went to see my mother out in the country. When I got there, I saw that the house was locked. Where was my mother? A neighbor told me she was harvesting beets. I drove to the field. What do I see? The beets are dug up and the women are standing in a circle discussing something. I walk up to them and chide them jokingly: What's going on? There you are gossiping and the beets will perish—frosts may strike any day. 'Who cares about beets, son,' my mother said dismissively, 'we are discussing politics.'"

The times are irretrievably gone when politics, as far as we were concerned, for instance, was confined mainly to impeccably stage-managed protests against the latest intrigues of world capital, and when the words "political activity" invariably made people turn their eyes toward heaven. The tectonic explosion of public activeness has destroyed this long-standing attitude down to the foundations—irreversibly, it is to be hoped. The headlong democratization of society, all the rallies, demonstrations, and strikes have swept across the country like a hurricane, sweeping us from the trenches of stagnation. There is no sitting it out.

In Kishinev, which has of late become one of the flashpoints on the Union political map, these peals of thunder rang out forcefully a few days ago in the halls of local soviet organizational sessions—the first since the elections. In a number of the republic capital's rayons the sessions did not take place, and the city session was held only at the fifth, moreover very painful attempt. Even before they had begun to take on the very heavy burden of the present times, the people's representatives split into two irreconcilable camps. One of them demanded the immediate establishment of "cabinets" of local power, referring to the law which stipulates that the first session of a soviet should be held no later than two weeks after its election. The second camp strove with equal persistence to have the organizational sessions postponed to the period after 22 April, when the repeat elections will be held.

"These events are merely a reflection of a very acute and very topical problem of society," I was told by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences V. Chichilimov, a well-known republic sociologist with whom I analyzed the prevailing situation. "More and more new sections of society are being drawn into the vortex of political life. Life means action. And some people are acting—organizing rallies, calling strikes, setting ultimatums, toppling... And all the while they are firmly convinced that they are actively engaging in politics. But is this really so? Political life is a most complex sphere of human activity which, unfortunately, was not in demand in our society until recently. A total lack of appropriate experience and the masses' extremely low political culture cannot be replaced, after all, with even the most radical slogans and appeals. Consequently, it is necessary for us to learn. To learn those very politics which, as is known, are above all the art of analysis, balance, and compromise. Otherwise political life is inevitably supplanted by political games.

It seems that this is precisely what frequently happens in the republic. Especially with regard to the sociopolitical movements in Moldavia which have grown into a major force over the past year. Despite their wide-ranging aims, tasks, and methods, there is something that they have in common in their activities. It is blatant intolerance and an inability to listen to or hear the other side. Is this not why, having repeated the word "consolidation" many times in their election platforms, they have arrived at exactly the opposite result—sharp confrontation between themselves. In informing citizens and the republic about the sessions which have failed to take place, the local press and even official sources refer delicately to some groups of deputies allegedly opposing one another. However, when you see that the Kishinev evening newspaper's list of deputies who have boycotted the rayon sessions contain nothing but Moldavian surnames and, by contrast, the names of those who boycotted the city session are, how shall I put it, non-Moldavian, everything becomes clear. And it is very alarming.

"How are we ever going to get down to work?!"—my old acquaintance, City Soviet Deputy Ya. Mogoryan despaired after yet another thwarted session. "After all, the city with its enormous complex of problems is our responsibility... Meanwhile people are locking horns to see who will triumph!"

Locking horns is what we are good at. However, it is much more difficult to grasp that even an "overwhelming majority" merely overwhelms and so fails to produce real political gain, that civilized political life begins when people begin to understand the main point, namely that in such a complex world as ours conflicts can be resolved only by consensus.

The appreciable deterioration of the sociopolitical situation in Moldavia in recent days and the activation of destructive forces combine to cause special concern on the eve of the first session of the republic Supreme Soviet, due to open shortly.

Incidentally, about the session. A few days ago the new parliament's communist deputies met at the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee. They met to consult on how best to prepare for their first session, ensure that it is held in a constructive spirit, and prevent a split along national lines. And when the esteemed people's representatives emerged from their meeting, a frenzied mob attacked the chairman of the presidium of the republic council of the "Yedinstvo" international movement right there on the steps of the Central Committee building, violating the deputy's immunity in the literal sense of the word and beating the aged professor about his legs, ribs, and head... This is what it has come to...

Caucasus

Armenians Fire on Azerbaijani Settlements

LD1104192790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1716 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] Stepanakert, 11 Apr (TASS)—TASS correspondent Vadim Byrkin reports: Tension has intensified in Nagorno-Karabakh, the autonomous oblast which forms part of Azerbaijan and is mainly populated by Armenians. In the past 24 hours a number of Azerbaijani settlements were fired on. There are casualties among the Azerbaijanis. At the same time the other side has taken 5 Armenians hostage.

The outburst of violence in the oblast was preceded by an exacerbation of the situation along the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, where Armenian militants launched a number of attacks on Azerbaijanis.

Baku—TASS correspondent Natan Barskiy reports:

In connection with the exacerbation of the situation in Kubatlinskiy Rayon in Azerbaijan, which borders on Armenia, Ayaz Mutalibov, first secretary of the Azerbaijani Communist Party Central Committee, and Colonel General Yuriy Shatalin, commander of the internal troops of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry, arrived there today.

They visited the village of Chayzemi, where on 9 April, as a result of an attack by Armenian militants, one person was killed and others were injured. Yuriy Shatalin stated that additional subunits of internal troops will be transferred to this rayon.

The situation has tended to stabilize in the capital of Azerbaijan, Major General Anatoliy Kapliyev, the commandant of the city, stated in an interview to republican television. All enterprises, institutions, and public transport are operating, classes are being given in schools and higher institutions of learning, and cinemas and theaters are open until 1800. Soccer games have been played at the city's central stadium.

At the same time, the commandant reported that in the past month over 1,500 people were detained for violating the curfew and 144 people were subjected to administrative arrest in connection with unlawful activities or with disregarding the requirements of the city commandant's office. Threats are being made against non-natives.

Danger of Armenian 'Extremists' Noted

LD1104214690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] The situation in the areas of Azerbaijan adjoining Armenia, where a state of emergency was introduced, is still very complex.

Our special correspondent Leonid Lazarevich interviewed Colonel General Yuriy Vasilyevich Shatlin, commander of the internal troops in Lachin Rayon.

[Lazarevich] Yuriy Vasilyevich, we drove through villages and heard many words of gratitude to the internal troops who have been defending the people's lives. At the same time one cannot pass over the fact that exchanges of fire are continuing and people are continuing to die.

[Shatalin] To our great distress it is a fact that over the past two days on the border between Kafan and Kubatly Rayons one person died and two were wounded. And today again we also witnessed here on the border between Goris and Lachin Rayons that the father of seven children died. These acts of vandalism are continuing despite the measures being taken. Well, the greatest danger at present to normalizing relations is of course presented by the armed and, let me say bluntly, the well-organized and the tactically fairly well-controlled armed formations of Armenian extremists. In recent days the firing has as a rule been from their side, and moreover on both occasions the firing was from automatic weapons.

Evidently we must stop seeking shortcomings on both sides, fearing to offend someone somehow. We need to call a spade a spade and give a correct assessment to those processes and those forces that are still destablizing the situation today.

[Lazarevich] We have been speaking to servicemen who were in Goris Rayon. They are united in the view that the state of emergency does not function in Goris Rayon to the extent demanded by the decree that was adopted and that there are unfortunately insufficient troops there. People are simply walking along the streets there carrying weapons.

[Shatalin] The personnel of a special motorized militia regiment are located there. There is a company from Yerevan and also a company from the Soviet Army. If the people have become so brazen that even in the presence of troops they walk along carrying weapons, then we are obviously not performing our duty there. This is a disconcerting fact and we need immediately to check up on it, and I will organize this today.

[Lazarevich] A further question. During a troop operation 25 people were detained and the appropriate documents drawn up. To our great regret we found out that these people were set free, and, you know, the things that are now arising include the taking of hostages and the setting free of criminals. It seems to me that there can be talk of a normalization in only one situation, which is when everyone who has committed a crime knows that punishment is unavoidable.

[Shatalin] If we forgive everything in this way, we still of course never establish order. The criminal is an interethnic one and he must definitely bear responsibility because impunity is leading to a state of affairs where in

our country at the present time the law is in practice not functioning vis-a-vis interethnic relations.

Armenians Build Border 'Fortifications'

NC0904093490 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 7 Apr 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The armed members of the Armenian Bandit National Army have moved to build fortifications on the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia in an effort to escalate their extremist activities against residents of border towns in Kazakhskiy Rayon. Meanwhile, they have also intensified their combat operations. The militia groups and the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry internal units have repulsed an attack by Armenian bandits near the town of Bala Kengerli. Fire was also exchanged with Armenian bandit groups near the town of Kemerli. There were no casualties.

AZERINFORM has reported that provisions, clothes, and other necessary goods are being sent to the border region with the help of the local party and soviet organs. Experts (?are working in the border regions) with the [words indistinct] of the internal units and militia workers to repair damages to the electricity supply and communications systems.

Continuing Rail Blockade Reported

NC1204100390 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The republic's Council of Ministers and the USSR Ministry of Railways are trying to remove the blockade of the Azerbaijan railways and restore normal transportation, but these efforts have not yielded any positive results yet. [passage omitted].

None of us could imagine his life without daily newspapers, but the population faces the danger of at least a temporary interruption in publication. This is because not a single ounce of paper has entered the republic recently due to the current, and fourth, blockade organized by the Azerbaijani extremists with the permission of the central authorities. Only 200 [word indistinct] paper—a three-day supply—is left, said Vrezh Martirosyan, head of the Procurement Department of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee. We have more than 300 tonnes of paper stranded on the roads. If they do not reach their destination on time, there could be no papers in Armenia on Sunday. Our only hope is to obtain—how many times now?—some paper from the state reserves, and this requires special permission from the central government. However, that does not solve the problem. The radical solution would be the lifting of the blockade, through the efforts of the central government.

The heads of the publications have warned the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers in Moscow many times about the lack of paper because of the blockade. However, these appeals remain unheard.

Movsisyan Takes Over as First Secretary

PM0904141590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[Correspondent A. Sarkisyan report: "Plenum Held"]

[Text] Yerevan, 6 Apr—An Armenian Communist Party Central Committee plenum has been held and has examined an organizational question. The plenum granted S.G. Arutyunyan's request to be released from his duties as first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee and member of the Central Committee Bureau in connection with his transfer to other work. The Central Committee Plenum thanked Comrade Arutyunyan for his work in the republic's party organization.

V.M. Movsisyan, formerly first deputy chairman of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers, has been elected first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee.

The plenum was addressed by G.P. Razumovskiy, candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Col Gen Shatalin Interviewed on Border Situation

NC0904095390 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 7 Apr 90

[Text] The incidents in the border rayons between the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] and the Armenian SSR have made all the Soviet people feel uneasy. What measures are being taken to normalize the situation in these rayons and obstruct outbursts of violence and failure to comply with the laws?

Colonel General Shatalin, first deputy minister of internal affairs and head of the USSR Interior Ministry troops, who has recently returned from the border rayons, answered an Azerinform correspondent's questions about this. He said that urgent measures are being put into effect to provide security for the people in the border rayons. Six hail-guns were recently impounded in the Armenian SSR. Furthermore, the bandits' attempts to disrupt the state vehicle transportation system in the Armenian SSR has created a state of unease.

Comrade Shatalin noted that they and the command headquarters of the military district of the Transcaucasus have taken concrete measures to strengthen the protection of the bridges, tunnels, and other installations along the section of the Azerbaijan railways network which crosses through Megrinskiy Rayon in the Armenian SSR. The movement on the tracks has not yet been resumed. The decision now rests with the Armenian side. The Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has to adopt a decision on the implementation of a state of

emergency. The movement on the tracks will be resumed only after that decision is adopted.

Reports on Border in Central Press Criticized

NC0904080890 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 7 Apr 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] IZVESTIYA, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, and SOVETSKAYA KULTURA have given incorrect information to their readers on the incidents which have taken place in Azerbaijan's border rayons. The newspapers today published an article by Azadov entitled "(?Mistakes)."

The article refutes the very serious and (?open distortion of facts) by the said newspapers. We recommend that our listeners read the article.

Baku Explosion Causes Extensive Damage

NC0904094790 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 7 Apr 90

[Text]There was an explosion in the second housing complex of apartment block No. 121 in the [word indistinct] (?Dokuzuncu Misra) quarter of Baku at 2330 on 6 April. The investigation revealed that the explosion took place in the second [word indistinct] of the block. No one was killed or wounded. Baku's Kirov district procuracy is investigating the explosion and trying to determine the reason for the explosion and the extensive damage it caused.

'Tense' Situation in Tauzskiy Rayon Continues

NC0904095990 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 7 Apr 90

[Text] Our correspondent established a telephone link with Isay Bagirov, chief of the Tauzskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department, today and urged him to explain the operative situation in the rayon. Bagirov said:

The situation continues to be tense. According to our information, fully armed Armenian bandits intend to attack our towns and take hostages. That is what the bandits are trying to do. However, the workers of the law enforcement organs are effectively obstructing their disgusting activities, which do not comply with any ethical norm. The armed Armenians are behaving this way because they are not being punished as they deserve to be.

For example, the militia workers arrested 19 bandits who attacked Alibeyli town on 27 March. Regrettably, eight of them were released by the representatives of the authoritative central organs as if they were peaceful individuals who committed no crime.

Bandit (?Majnunian), director of the [name indistinct] factory in Shamshadinskiy Rayon, was among those who were released. A criminal investigation was launched against the remaining 11 bandits. Let us put this aside. We have received reports saying that a meeting was held in Armenia's Shamshadinskiy Rayon today. The meeting participants demanded the release of the bandits. The Armenian instigators are spreading a lie that the militia workers in Tauzskiy Rayon have attacked and captured the armed Armenians in Armenian territory. Meanwhile, two of the captured bandits have admitted in their accounts to [word indistinct] that not even a single effort has been made to launch an attack on Armenian territory from Azerbaijan. All this indicates the degree of shamelessness.

One of the serious problems which has made the rayon internal affairs department uncomfortable is the republic's internal affairs ministry's preparedness to make only the necessary help available regardless of the gradually intensifying ferocious behavior of the Armenian bandits.

Airplane Fires on Azerbaijani Town

NC1204082890 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 10 Apr 90

[Weekly notice by the Azerbaijan SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs on criminal activities from 2 to 8 April—read by correspondent Firuz Akhmedly]

[Excerpts] According to the statistical reports, the number of criminal activities recently increased in our republic. Ninety-nine crimes were recorded from 2 to 8 April. [passage ommitted]

Kokhne Kyshlak, Barkhudarly, and Bala Kengerli towns in Kazakhskiy Rayon were fired on from Armenia's Idzhevanskiy and Shamshudinskiy Rayons yesterday. The residents of the Azerbaijani town of Kirkidzhan, which is close to Stepanakert, have informed the pertinent organizations that an airplane, which was marked as AN-2, opened fire on the town on 8 April. No one was killed. However, an Azerbaijani youth was shot and killed by Armenian extremists yesterday. [passage omitted]

Armenians in Georgian Region Launch Movement

NC0804110090 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1530 GMT 7 Apr 90

[Text] The constituent conference of the officially sanctioned regional organization known as the Dzhavakh Popular Movement has taken place in Akhalkalak [in Georgia]. Representatives of Akhalkalak's Armenian Pan-National Movement and representatives from Akhaltsikhskiy, Marneul'skiy, Bogdanovskiy, (Avsintsayskiy), and Borzhomiskiy Rayons participated in the conference.

The conference established the by-laws and program of Dzhavakh Popular Movement organization of Akhalkalak and elected the leading bodies.

Gorbachev Sends Message on Tbilisi Jubilee

PM0904101590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

[USSR President M.S. Gorbachev Appeal "To the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet and All the Republic's Working People"]

[Text] Dear comrades!

On the anniversary of the tragic events in Tbilisi 9 April 1989 I express my sincere sympathy to the Georgian people and the families of those who died.

At this hour I would like to once again express my respect for Georgia and its hardworking people, who are notable for their glorious traditions, unique culture, and friendliness. I am convinced that all the difficulties and problems of perestroyka in the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] will be overcome and the working people of Georgia, in alliance with the country's fraternal peoples, will display their talent and energy even more graphically in creating a truly democratic, humane socialist society.
USSR President M. Gorbachev.

'Namecalling' at Tbilisi Rally Deplored

PM1104115590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Telephone dispatch by correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Kaushanskiy: "Georgia: Rally Outside Transcaucasus Military District Headquarters"]

[Text] Tbilisi, 10 Apr—Soon after midday yesterday demonstrators filled the square outside the Trancaucasus Military District headquarters. In the center of the square there were two vehicles fitted with high-powered radio equipment. The previously invited Western mass media correspondents were also ready.

What appeals had been heard in surrounding districts? A pretty banal collection based on the repertoire already familiar from other such rallies: The Russian Soviet empire is the enslaver of all peoples and the Soviet Army is an instrument of occupation. Whence stems the demand that the withdrawal of the occupation troops from Georgia be pursued by every means and that the next draft of Georgians for service in the Soviet Army be wrecked. Incidentally, a rally held the same day outside the republic military commissariat added yet another demand to this one: To suspend the activity of the republic's military commissariats as of 17 April, following Lithuania's example.

For an hour speakers produced a stream of oratory. And columns of demonstrators moved toward the national stadium, where, at a rally attended by around 50,000 people, opposition leaders again expressed their attitude to "military questions." Meanwhile district headquarters officers again got a chance to return to normal working conditions.

I asked Major General A. Skoryy, member of the Military Council and chief of the district Political Directorate, to comment on what had happened outside the headquarters building:

We share the Georgian people's pain and mourning and believe that 9 April must never be repeated. But we will leave on the rally organizers' conscience both the accusations and the namecalling, which, let me say outright, outraged all headquarters and political directorate officers, and also the adventurist demands to disrupt the spring draft in the republic. Another thought also came to me. My father Vladimir Skoryy died at the front. His last letters home from the war included many words of warmth and manly kindness about his Georgian front-line comrades. The "occupationist" tag is both an insult to their radiant memory and also an encroachment on the ages-old friendship in arms that has united our peoples.

Central Asia

Kazakhstan Considers Draft on New President

LD1204110190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0813 GMT 12 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Raisa Ioffe]

[Text] Alma-Ata, 12 Apr (TASS)—A draft law of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] on the establishment of the post of president and on the insertion of amendments and additions to the Constitution of this Soviet Asian Republic was submitted for popular discussion in Kazakhstan today.

The document stresses that the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet intends to establish the post of president to further develop the deep political and economic transformations being effected in the republic, and to strengthen the constitutional system and citizens' rights, liberties, and security. Any citizen of the republic no younger than 35 and no older than 65 who has been permently resident on the territory of the Kazakh SSR for at least 10 years and who has a command of Kazakh and Russian may be elected president of the Kazakh SSR. This person cannot be president for more than two consecutive terms.

The president of the Kazakh SSR will be elected by the republic's citizens for a five-year term by secret ballot on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage. The number of candidates for the post of president is unlimited. The candidate for whom more than half the electors in the ballot voted will be deemed to have been elected.

The draft law specifies the president's powers as being to take measures to protect the republic's sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, and to ensure observance of the union treaty. The president will represent the republic inside the country and in international relations, and will submit to Kazakhstan's Supreme Soviet candidates for the posts of head of the republic's government and chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, and for the other supreme state offices. He will have the power to halt the operation of decisions and instructions of the USSR Government that run counter to the interests of the republic, and to introduce a state of emergency on its territory to ensure the safety of the republic's

citizens, with the immediate submission of the decision for endorsement by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet.

The draft law makes provision for the election of the first president of the Kazakh SSR by the republic's Supreme Soviet for a term of six years. The president may be dismissed by the SSR Supreme Soviet if he violates the republic's Constitution.

Results of Kazakh Election Runoffs Outlined

PM1104115890 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Apr 90 Second Edition p 4

[PRAVDA correspondent T. Yesilbayev report: "Runoffs"]

[Text] Alma-Ata, 9 Apr—The second round of elections of Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic deputies ended yesterday; according to preliminary figures 75 percent of voters took part.

As PRAVDA reported earlier, the first round of the elections, held on 25 March, determined the holders of 131 deputies' seats in 270 territorial okrugs. After the runoffs the names of 126 more deptuies have become known. More than 90 percent of the people's elected representatives are communists. The republic's new Supreme Soviet now has more lawyers and leaders of industrial enterprises and farms among its numbers.

The formation of Kazakhstan's parliament is not yet complete. Repeat elections have to be held in 13 okrugs in the next few weeks. Furthermore nine deputies have to be elected from the republic's social organizations.

Kirghizia Supreme Soviet Opens 10 Apr

LD1004143390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1355 GMT 10 Apr 90

[Text] Frunze, 10 April (TASS)—The session of the Supreme Soviet of Kirghizia began its work here today. On its agenda is a series of very important questions connected with the life of this Soviet Central Asian republic and its development.

After long debates, Absamat Masaliyev, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the republic, was elected in an uncontested election to the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Kirghizia by secret ballot

Deputies again elected Apas Dzhumagulov as chairman of the Council of Ministers of Kirghizia.

The session will continue work tomorrow.

Masaliev Elected Kirghiz Supreme Soviet Chairman

LD1104122690 Moscow TASS in English 1220 GMT 11 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Boris Mainaev]

[Text] Frunze April 11 TASS—Kirghiz Communist Party Chief Absamat Masaliev, 50, has been elected chairman of the republican Supreme Soviet, local newspapers reported today.

Participants in a plenary meeting of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee, held the day before, had an argument over combining the two posts. Some communists regarded it as an attempt to impose the dictatorship of the party of the republic.

However, the majority of the delegates representing some 150,000 Kirghiz communists did not agree with them. They believe that the combining of the posts of secretaries of party committees and heads of the soviets will make it possible to pool the efforts of the soviets and party committees to promote the improvement of living standards of the 4 million-strong population of the republic.

Communists account for 89 per cent of members of the recently elected Kirghiz Supreme Soviet. Fifty two out of 57 chairmen of Kirghiz local soviets, elected recently, are secretaries of party committees of various levels.

Kirghiz Party Congress Set for 14 June

LD1004154990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0400 GMT 10 Apr 90

[Text] The next congress of the Communist Party of Kirghizia is to be held 14 June. This decision was made by the plenum of the Central Committee of the republic's Communist Party.

Tajikistan Central Comittee Plenum Opens 11 Apr

LD1104080390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Summary] The 19th plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan started work in Dushanbe today. The agenda includes discussion of candidacies for chairmen of the Supreme Soviet and the government of Tajikistan.

Draft Law Adopted

LD1104173490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1256 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] Dushanbe, 11 Apr (TASS)—Today the plenum of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee took place here. A decision has been adopted to submit by way of a legislative initiative a draft law of the Tajik SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] on changes and additions to the Constitution of the Tajik SSR with regard to issues of the political system (Articles 6,7, and 49) for consideration by the session of the Supreme Soviet of the republic, which opens tomorrow.

The plenum has also considered the issues connected with the holding of the session of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR.

At this point the plenum concluded its work.